The time has gone by when such a highway could be controlled by any single Power. It is just 200 years— exactly 200, for it was in 1695—since William Paterson urged on Great Britain the acquisition of the isthmus. He proposed in memorable words that we should take possession of what he called "the keys of the world, enabling their possessors to give laws to both oceans and to become the arbiters of commerce." This, however, is no longer possible for any Power. Whoever cuts the canal, the keys will be, so to speak, in international commission, and the arbiters of commerce will be the Powers who control the largest amount of shipping.

The two great English-speaking nations, those most interested in the canal, could without doubt bring about its neutralization, with a better understanding of their respective aims, and a determination to co-operate in securing a result which would be of such importance to the whole world.

X

CHAPTER XIV.

EFFECTS OF CANAL.

HAT the Canal should meet with bitter opposition

ΤΗ

at the hands of the trans-continental railways of the United States was of course to be anticipated. It is now more than three-quarters of a century since the States entered upon inter-oceanic communication across the American continent, resulting eventually in the creation of the Northern Pacific, the Union and Central Pacific, the Southern Pacific, and the Panama railroads. These lines have been the main instrument in the marvellous development of the Pacific Slope; they have also been, however, the chief antagonists of the Panama and Nicaragua canal schemes. The trans-continental railroads, which have extracted such unreasonable rewards from the producers of the Pacific Slope, indirectly rack-renting that territory as few estates in Ireland have been, have throughout shown the keenest jealousy of their two great railway competitors, the Canadian Pacific and Panama lines. Unable to control these, they have done their utmost to prevent the accomplishment of water transit across the isthmus, and for that purpose have employed, and are still employing, all the powerful machinery

utilized by great corporations desirous of preserving monopolies.

Their fears are in reality futile, for the canal would not only bring about cheap freight rates, of immense service to the community at large, but would also surely conduce to increased business and larger incomes for the railway lines. It would, there can be no doubt, help greatly to create on the whole Pacific Slope, as far east as the Rockies, a field of business, a new market, yielding profits transcending all now derived from trans-continental carriage.

The pressing question for the Pacific Slope, in its present stage of development, is how best to reach and utilize the markets of the Atlantic States and Europe, and, in order to accomplish this purpose, a more efficient means of communication,-one less costly, quicker, surer, -is required, and this is only to be had by opening a passage across the isthmus from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Of immense value to the people generally of the whole United States, the Nicaragua Canal is a matter of special importance to the Pacific coast. As in the case of similar projects elsewhere, the far-reaching changes which would be effected seem to have been incompletely realized. At any rate it has received a surprisingly inadequate measure of support in the very quarter which would be most benefited. The present acute depression in California has, however, stimulated interest in the question, and the community seem at last to be alive to the importance of the canal. "The development of our commerce, our industries, our international influence, and