United States v. Louisville, etc., Canal Company.

the Thames; and it was held that no action would thereafter lie against the corporation thereon, on the principle that where the performance of an obligation has been rendered impossible by act of the law, the obligation is discharged. (See, also, St. Louis v. Shields, 52 Mo. 351; Dillon on Munic. Corp. sec. 41 et seq. [2d ed.] note.)

As to the right of the United States to bring an injunction bill in the proper circuit court, to protect improvements which she is making under the authority of congress, in navigable waters, from injury which will be caused by acts done by state authority: see United States v. Duluth (city of), 1 Dillon, 469; sequel to same case, 2 ib. 496.

INDEX.

ABATEMENT.

same.

1. PENDENCY OF SUIT IN STATE COURT.-A plea in abatement of a
cause in the federal court that another suit is pending in a state
court, is not good where the parties to the two suits are not the
Brooks v. Mills County,
524.
2. Same. Whether a party, in the United States circuit court for any
district, may plead in abatement of a suit therein the pendency of
a prior suit within the same district, between the same parties, and
upon the same subject matter, discussed by Love, J.,
IV.

3. Same.-Cases on the subject collected and commented on,

ABETTING AND AIDING. See Bankrupt Law.

ACTIONS. See various heads.

Ib. note, 529.

1. The United States may enforce by suit the payment of taxes as-
sessed by it,

66.

2. Against administrator, where the supposed intestate was alive.
United States v. Payne,

387.

3. Recovery, by assignee in bankruptcy, of illegal interest paid by
bankrupt to national bank,

386.

209, 215, 216, 224, 233.

4. Action against county on warrants and levee bonds,

1. Liability where the supposed intestate is alive. United States v.
Payne,

387.
2. Administrator's sale of land in Nebraska. See Guardian's Sale.

ADMIRALTY.

1. LIEN OF MATERIAL-MAN.-DOMESTIC VESSEL.-A material-man has
no lien for repairs or supplies to a domestic vessel. The Albany,
439.

2. WHAT IS A DOMESTIC VESSEL.-HOME PORT.-EnrollmenT.-Whether
a vessel is foreign or domestic, depends upon the residence of her
owners, and not upon her enrollment, where the two are different.

Ib.

ADMIRALTY--Continued.

3. Same. The "Albany" was owned at the town of Boscobel, in Wis-
consin, and was enrolled at Galena, in Illinois, the nearest collect-
or's office to the residence of the owner; necessary supplies were
furnished by the libellant to the vessel at LaCrosse, in Wisconsin:
Held, that the libellant was not entitled to a maritime lien on the
vessel,
Ib.

ADULTERY.

Of wife does not bar dower in Iowa. Smith v. Woodworth,

584.

AFFIDAVIT. See Removal of Causes.

AGENT. See Bankrupt Law; Banks; Insurance.
AIDING AND ABETTING. See Bankrupt Law.

ALIEN. See Constitutional Law; Naturalization.
Removal of causes by. See Removal of Causes.

APPEAL.

1. EXECUTION of final decree in equity pending an appeal where there
is no supersedeas. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Central
Railroad,
531, 546.
2. ORDER Confirming sale appealable, and the appellants may super-
sede it, although they failed to supersede the main decree. Farm-
ers' Loan and Trust Company, v. Central Railroad, 546, 548, note.
3. EFFECT OF APPEAL.-EXECUTION OF DECREE.-The pendency of an
appeal from a final decree in equity, in which no supersedeas ex-
ists, does not deprive the court which rendered the decree from
making proper orders to enable the party in whose favor the decree
was rendered to have the same executed.

ARKANSAS.

1. CASES REPORTED-From eastern district of Arkansas,
2. From the western district,

Ib.

209-238.

239-250.

3. COUNTY WARRANTS.-Defences, rights of holder, 209, 215, 216, 233.
4. LEVEE BONDS.-Mode of payment,

216.

5. MANDAMUS.-To levy taxes to pay judgment on railroad aid bonds,
224.

6. CONSTITUTION OF ARKANSAS, of 1874, in respect to municipal and
county indebtedness, construed,

ARREST OF JUDGMENT. See Criminal Law.

ATTACHMENT.

215, 224, 233.

Effect of bankruptcy on attachment of property on mesne process (see

Bankrupt Law),

173, 519, 549, 588.

BANKRUPT LAW.

1. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURT.-AMOUNT.-Suits may be brought in
the circuit courts of the United States by assignees in bankruptcy,
without reference to the amount or value in controversy. Payson
v. Coffin,
386.
2. RIGHT OF ACTION.-ILLEGAL INTEREST.-Right of action to recover
back illegal interest paid by the bankrupt to a national bank passes
to assignee in bankruptcy. Extent of recovery. Crocker v. Na-
tional Bank of Chetopa,
358.
3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.-A suit by an assignee in bankruptcy to
collect debts or claims due to the estate, must be brought within
two years from the time when the cause of action accrued to the
assignee. Walker v. Towner, 165; Payson v. Coffin,
386.
4. Same.-WHAT IS A COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT.-Where an assignee
filed his petition or declaration in a suit to recover such a debt
within two years from the time when his right of action accrued,
but gave directions to the clerk not to issue the summons, and such
summons was accordingly not issued or served until more than two
years from the time the cause of action accrued: Held, that the
action was barred. Walker v. Towner,
165.
5. STATE AS PREFERRED CREDITOR.— Under the bankrupt act (Rev.
Stats. sec. 5101), the state is entitled to be preferred to private cred-
itors of the bankrupt. Re Dodge,
532.

6. ACT OF BANKRUPTCY.-COMMERCIAL PAPER.-CONTINUING DEFAULT.
-LIMITATION.-A petition for adjudication in bankruptcy cannot
be sustained, in which the only act of bankruptcy alleged is the
failure to pay a specified piece of commercial paper, where the
original default in payment occurred and had continued more than
six months and forty days before the proceedings in bankruptcy were
commenced. Re Brewer & Bemis Brewing Company,
345.

7. CORPORATIONS. NUMBER AND VALUE OF CREDITORS.-Since the
amendatory bankrupt act of June 22d, 1874 (18 Stats. at Large,
18), the same proportion of creditors must join in the proceeding
to force a corporation into bankruptcy that is required in the case
of natural persons. Re Leavenworth Savings Bank,
363.
8. DEPOSIT FOR CLEARING-HOUSE PURPOSES.-TRUST FUND.-Where a
bank agreed to act as the agent of another bank for clearing-house
purposes, and, as such agent, agreed to pay all the checks of the
latter which came through the clearing-house, and received for
that purpose, from time to time, the funds of the latter bank, which
it passed to the credit of the latter bank, without keeping such
funds separate from its own: Held, that the relation of debtor
and creditor-the ordinary one of the bank to its depositors-was
created, and that the deposits could not be considered as trust
funds, which, on failure of the former bank, would not pass to its
assignee. Phelan v. Iron Mountain Bank,

88.

BANKRUPT LAW-Continued.

9. Same.-PREFERENCE.-Under such circumstances, the funds, when
deposited, became the property of the bank receiving the same,
freed of any trust character; and where the bank that received
and credited such deposits paid, on the day of its failure, the
amount thereof to the bank which made the deposit, the latter
bank having knowledge of the insolvent condition of the former
bank, such payment is an illegal preference, which may be recov-
ered by the assignee in bankruptcy.
Ib.
10. PREFERENCE. EXCHANGE OF SECURITIES.-The substitution and
registry of a chattel mortgage, correcting a mistake in a prior unre-
corded mortgage, is not an illegal preference, but simply an ex-
change of securities, and falls within Sawyer v. Turpin, 9 U. S. (1
Otto), 114. Player v. Lippincott & Co.,
124.

11. PREFERENCE.-FRAUDULENT AGREEMENT NOT TO RECORD SECURITY.—
LIMITATION. A deed of trust intended to give a creditor a prefer-
ence, fraudulent under the bankrupt act, was executed more than
four months before the commencement of proceedings in bank-
ruptcy against the grantor therein; in order to prevent the knowledge
thereof from coming to other creditors, and to have it validated by
lapse of time, the grantor and beneficiary agreed that it should be
kept off the record; after the lapse of four months from the date
of the deed of trust, but within four months of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy, the instrument was deposited for record:
Held, on a bill in equity, filed by the assignee in bankruptcy against
the beneficiary, to set aside the deed of trust, that the suit was not
barred because the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced
more than four months after the execution of the deed of trust.
Harris v. Exchange National Bank,
133.
12. Surrender of PREFERENCE.-Section 23 of the original bankrupt
act (sec. 5088 of the Revised Statutes), in relation to the surrender
of fraudulent preferences, is not repealed by the 12th section of the
amended bankrupt act of June 22, 1874, amending section 39 of the
original bankrupt act, nor section 5021 of the Revised Statutes. Re
Israel,

501.
13. EFFECT OF SUCH SURRENDER.-PROOF OF DEBT.-A creditor who,
before presenting his claim for allowance in bankruptcy, and
against whom no action has been brought by the assignee to defeat
the preference, surrenders his preference under section 23, may
prove his whole debt, and not simply a moiety of it.
Ib.

14. ATTACHING CREDITOR.-RIGHT TO FILE CREDITOR'S PETITION.-A
creditor fully secured by attachment cannot, while holding on to
his attachment, sustain, on the same debt, a petition to force his
debtor into bankruptcy. Re Hazens,
549.

15. NUMBER And Value of CREDITORS.-ATTACHING CREDITORS.-Cred-
itors who have obtained liens by attachment within four months