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upon the popular principle and given to numbers and wealth, or to the great states, which, in this view of the subject, are synonymous. It was thought by the convention, that a consolidation of the states into one simple republic, would be improper: and the local feelings and jealousies of all, but more especially of the small states, rendered a consolidation impracticable. The senate, who have the power of a legislative check upon the House of Representatives, and many other extensive and important powers, is preserved as an entire federative feature of government, as it was enjoyed, by the small states, under the first confederacy.

In the article, which obliges the electors of President to vote for one person not an inhabitant of the same state with themselves, is discovered state jealousy. In the majorities, required for many purposes by the constitution, although there were other motives for the regulations, yet the jealousy of the small states is clearly discernible. Indeed, sir, if we peruse the constitution with attention, we shall find the small states are perpetually guarding the federative principle, that is, state equality: and this, in every part of it, except in the choice of the House of Representatives, and in their ordinary legislative proceedings. They go so far as to prohibit any amendment which may affect the equality of states in the senate. This is guarding against almost an impossibility; because the senators of small states must be criminally remiss in their attendance, and the legislatures extremely off their guard, if they permit such alterations, which aim at their own existence. But lest some accident, some unaccountable blindness or perfidy should put in jeopardy the federative principle in the senate, they totally and forever prohibit all attempts at such a measure.

In the choice of President, the mutual caution and concession of the great and small states, is, if possible, more conspicuous than in any other part of the constitution. He is to be chosen by electors appointed as the state legislatures shall direct, not according to

numbers entirely, but adding two electors in each state as representatives of state sovereignty. Thus Delaware obtains three votes for President, whereas she could have but one in right of numbers. Yet, mixed as this mode of choice is with both popular and federative principles, we see the small states watching its motions and circumscribing it to one attempt only; and on failure of an electoral choice, they instantly seize upon the right of a federal election, and select from the candidates a President, by states, and not by numbers. In confirmation of my assertion, that this part of the constitution was peculiarly the effect of compromise between the great and small states, permit me to quote an authority, which will certainly have great weight, not only in the senate, but through the union, I mean that of the present secretary of state, (Mr. Madison,) who was a leading member of the federal convention who formed, and of the Virginia convention who adopted the constitution. In the debates of the Virginia convention, volume 3, page 77, he says, (speaking of the mode of electing the President,)" As to the eventual voting by states it has my approbation. The lesser states and some larger states will be generally pleased by that mode. The deputies from the small states argued, and there is some force in their reasoning, that when the people voted, the large states evidently had the advantage over the rest, and without varying the mode, the interests of the little states might be neglected or sacrificed. Here is a compromise. For, in the eventual election, the small states will have the advantage."

After this view of the constitution, let us inquire, what is the direct object of the proposed alteration in the choice of President? To render more practicable and certain the choice by electors: and for this reason; that the people at large, or, in other words, that the great states, ought to have more weight and influence in the choice; that it should be brought nearer to the popular, and carried further from the federa

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tive principle. This claim, we find was made at the formation of the constitution. The great states naturally wished for a popular choice of first magistrate: this mode was sanctioned by the example of many of the states, in the choice of governor. The small states claimed a choice on the federative principle, by the legislatures, and to vote by states: analogies and examples were not wanting to sanction this mode of election. A consideration of the weight and influence of a President of this union, must have multiplied the difficulties of agreeing upon the mode of choice. But, as I have before said, by mutual concession, they agreed upon the present mode, combining both principles and dividing between the two parties, thus mutually jealous, as they could, this important privilege of electing a chief magistrate. This mode then became established, and the right of the small states to elect upon the federative principle, or by states, in case of contingency of electoral failure of choice, cannot with reason and fairness be taken from them, without their consent, and on a full understanding of its operation; since it was meant to be secured to them by the constitution, and was one of the terms, upon which they became members of the present confederacy; and for which privilege they gave an equivalent to the great states, in sacrificing so much of the federative principle, or state equality.

The constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popular principles; the senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance, under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented, should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the constitutional power of amending is, that you may, upon experiment, so modify the constitution, in its practice and operation, as to give it, upon its own principles, a more complete effect. But this is an attack upon a fundamental principle established after a long deliberation,

and by mutual concession-a principle of essential importance to the instrument itself, and an attempt to arrest from the small states, a vested right, and, by it, to increase the power and influence of the large states. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this constitutional compact, cannot alter its original, essential principles; and that such alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the state legislatures, to the people at large, that the intention is to change an important federative feature in the constitution, which change, in itself and all its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this union into a simple republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small states have too much agency in the important article of electing a chief magistrate, and that the great states claim the choice, and we shall then have a fair decision. If the senators of the small states, and if their state legislatures will then quietly part with the right they have, no person can reasonably complain.

Nothing can be more obvious, than the intention of the plan, adopted by our constitution, for choosing a President. The electors are to nominate two persons, of whom they cannot know which will be President; this circumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men, but gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small states, even in the electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates, set up by the electors of large states, by throwing their votes upon their favorite, and of course giving him a majority; or, if the electors of the large states should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes for one candidate, then the electors of the small states would have it in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the small states will have a considerable agency in the election. But if the discriminating or designating principle is carried,

as contained in this resolution, the whole, or nearly the whole right and agency of the small states in the electoral choice of chief magistrate, is destroyed, and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by states, if not destroyed, is very much diminished. For this identical purpose is the principle of electoral discrimination and designation, introduced into the resolution before you; for the same purpose is the number of candidates reduced from five to three, from whom the House of Representatives may elect, in case of electoral failure of choice; that is, to destroy, or diminish the agency of the small states, in the choice of President. For what purpose else, are we perpetually told, and from all parts of the senate, that the public will is opposed by the present mode, and the public will cannot be gratified without the introduction of the discriminating principle. By the public will thus mentioned, the gentlemen mean the will of a popular majority, or the will of the great states, which, in this case, I repeat it, are the same. How is it possible for the gentleman to increase the chances of gratifying this description of the public will without decreasing the agency of the small states?

The whole power of election is now vested in the two parties-numbers and states, or great and small states; and it is demonstration itself, that if you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose, that the public will, when constitutionally expressed, by a majority of states, in pursuance of the federative principle of our government, is of less validity, or less binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by a popular majority? The framers of your constitution, the people who adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President, should be expressed by electors, if they could agree, and if not, that the public will should be expressed by a majority of the states, acting in their federative capacity, and that, in both cases, the ex

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