Both means and results heretofore conspicuous in the settlement of international disputes are thus of a penetrating and distracting character. Are the forces represented thereby among those which give significance to the term "American solidarity"?

American history furnishes many instances illustrative of the attitude of the American States toward a threatened impairment of the sovereignty of one of them by a non-American State as an incident of the solution of an international difference. I should like, however, to refer to the attitude of the American States as disclosed at the Second Hague Conference. The formal diplomatic character of this conference was such that any disclosures of policy there made would have peculiar significance.

One of the most important subjects considered at the Second Hague Conference was the employment of force in the collection of contractual debts. This subject had obtained considerable prominence through the action of certain European powers in blockading the ports of an American State in an effort to secure the collection of debts owing their nationals. The action of the European nations in this instance constituted a typical example of the employment of force as a means of bringing about the solution of an international difference. Yet this action met with strong disapproval on the part of all the American peoples. When, then, there was presented to the Second Hague Conference a proposition designed to limit the employment of force in the collection of contractual debts, it received the united and enthusiastic support of the American States. Their only reservations on adhering to the final convention embodying this proposition arose from the fact that the convention did not, in their opinion, go far enough in excluding the utilization of force as a means of bringing to a solution international differences of this character.

Another proposition considered at the Second Hague Conference was that relative to the creation of a permanent court of arbitration. This proposition in the various forms in which it was presented involved, as one feature, a small court to be composed largely of European judges. If adopted in any one of these various forms it would thus have contemplated the submission by American States of differences with non-American States to a tribunal substantially non-American in character. This feature of the proposed arbital court evoked the vigorous and united opposition of almost all of the American States, and it was this opposition directed against this particular feature of the proposed court which prevented its adoption in any effective form.

While many motives doubtless underlay this opposition, it can be attributed in considerable part to a certain vague apprehension lest a court constituted as proposed might prove a non-American influence powerful enough and which might tend to impair the political integrity of an American State.

Not only was the sentiment of the American States at the Second Hague Conference disclosed by their attitude toward the two propositions I have referred to, but one American State, by means of a reservation to a convention, expressly created an occasion for it to reaffirm its "traditional attitude toward purely American questions." This reservation has commonly been understood to mean that the State making the same opposed any permanent control by a non-American State of either the territory or political destiny of an American State, and that such opposition existed irrespective of whether such control might seem to come as a normal incident to the solution of an international difference, or otherwise.

The Second Hague Conference can, I think, fairly be said to have disclosed an attitude of opposition on the part of the American States as a whole to

influences which, though sanctioned by international law and practice, would permit of the impairment by a non-American State of the sovereignty of an American State. No generalization should, of course, be drawn from any one event. The attitude of the American States as disclosed at the Second Hague Conference is, however, wholly consistent with the well-known and repeated expressions of American solidarity which have been voiced at the various American congresses and upon other occasions of international interest. To such an extent is this true that we are, I believe, warranted in concluding that among the penetrating influences which American solidarity opposes are included all those forces which, while facilitating the solution of international differences, involve some territorial or political impingement of a non-American nation upon an American State.

If this conclusion is correct we have a special problem of international law— namely, a problem created uniquely by the determination on the part of a group of States to oppose forces which have heretofore operated toward the solution of international differences. This problem is American in the most fundamental sense, since the group of States whose attitude creates the problem comprises all of the American States, and them alone.

This problem is furthermore one of first magnitude. I have already referred to the extent to which solutions of international differences have in the past involved to some degree an impairment of the sovereignty of one of the States concerned. In the case of a difference between an American and a nonAmerican State, American solidarity would oppose any such solution to the detriment of an American State. Reference has been made to the prominent rôle which physical force has played as a means to the solution of international differences. There may be conditions under which force might be employed without technically constituting an influence which American solidarity would oppose. It must be recognized, however, that any such employment of force is so charged with the possibilities of permanent domination that it would undoubtedly become a subject of grave anxiety to the American States as a whole. Without question, the tendency of American solidarity is to eliminate wholly force as a means whereby American States shall be induced by nonAmerican States to accept a solution of their differences. Yet, is it recognized that what the American States would thus eliminate is in fact the one great driving force which has in the past been leading nations to compose their differences?

The importance of the problem thus created is still further enhanced by the geographical field of operation of the sentiment which creates it. Within a circle of a radius of less than 750 miles are found all or parts of 12 independent American States, exclusive of colonies. No one of these States has a population equal to that of Belgium. The territory included in this imaginary circle lies at the junction of the great American Continents and of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is, thus, territory which is bound to become of the most tremendous strategic value. If anything can be taken as proved by history it is this, that small States, occupying positions of world-wide strategic value are, irrespective of their own desires and conduct, forced to become the centers of very frequent and most virulent international disputes. At no time and at no place has there ever before been presented, in any comparable degree, a situation so pregnant with the possibilities of international discord as that presented by these 12 American States situated about the Isthmus of Panama. Thus America presents a geographical situation which must be expected to breed international disputes more numerous than normally to be expected between nations. At the same time the American States have adopted a policy which

involves resistance to forces which we have seen have heretofore been most conspicuous in the solution of international differences.

Here, then, is our problem, Whither will the opposing forces that create it tend? Will American solidarity, operating as a negative resistant force, render impossible of any solution many of the differences which are bound to arise between American and non-American States? Such a result would be wholly unjust to the non-American States involved and would not be tolerated by them. Will this aspect of American solidarity have to be abandoned, or will it be broken down by force, so as to permit of such means of solution as it forbids? It would seem that this result must follow, unless as an alternative there be adopted by the American States a constructive program which shall result in quickening international law and arbitral procedure into such an active, resourceful, and respected force that it will be able to bring to a solution, not inconsistent with American solidarity, the many and difficult problems with which it will have to deal.

The cardinal features of such a program are fixed by the requirements of the situation which calls it into being. The scope of the problem of how to solve international problems should be restricted by curtailing the origination of such problems. Since all American States are contributors toward and beneficiaries of the sentiment of American solidarity, it would seem proper that any situation tending to create international differences with non-American States should receive the thoughtful consideration of all of the American States. But despite every effort to avoid international differences, some are bound to arise. Given such a difference, American solidarity tends to eliminate force as an influence leading toward its solution. There must then be created a substitute influence, or else the need of any compelling force whatever must be obviated through a spontaneous desire on the part of the American States to adjust their differences and a willingness to adopt any reasonable method of arriving at the terms of adjustment.

American solidarity opposes the adoption of any solution of an international difference which involves the acquisition by a non-American State of control of the territory or government of an American State. Means must be developed whereby the necessity of any such solution will be obviated. It might, for instance, be suggested that if ever some temporary derogation of the sovereignty of an American State were demanded to accomplish a result which a non-American State was entitled to secure, such derogation might be accomplished through the intermediary of other American States acting for this purpose in a quasi-trustee capacity.

The foregoing is but the barest indication of what a solution of the international problem created by American solidarity may involve. It will be seen that it opens up for consideration not only such matters as the creation of new methods to bring about the solution of international differences, but also the question of whether the united opposition of the American States to forces heretofore recognized by international law and practice should not create a special relationship among them, whereby, through mutual advice and assistance, the acuteness of differences with non-American States may be tempered. Certainly it is appropriate that subjects such as these should receive the thoughtful consideration of this congress, especially where it appears that the adoption and consummation of some such program is essential as the constructive complement of the negative principles embodied in the sentiment of American solidarity.

The CHAIRMAN: The following papers will now be presented as read by title:

¿Ha problemas especialmente americanos de direito internacional? by Manuel Tavares Cavalcanti.

¿Ha problemas especialmente americanos de direito internacional? by Chrysanto Freire de Brito.

Problemas internacionales americanos, by Luis Alfredo Otero. ¿Hay problemas de derecho internacional especialmente americanos? by Manuel Castro Ramírez.

HA PROBLEMAS ESPECIALMENTE AMERICANOS DE DIREITO

INTERNACIONAL?

Por MANUEL TAVARES CAVALCANTI,

Professor da Escola Normal de Parahiba, Brasil.

A resposta á pergunta supra deve repousar sobre a solução de uma questão preliminar sem a qual não parece rasoavel fazer-se o estudo de qualquer ponto de Direito internacional. Esta questão é a seguinte: haverá mesmo um Direito internacional? Por outros termos: Serão juridicos os preceitos dessa disciplina a que falta a segurança de uma coacção legitima, resultante de uma organização judiciaria internacional e de um poder mais alto que os Estados, o qual dê cumprimento e execução ás sentenças?

Não precisamos descer á minudente explanação mais erudita e theorica do que pratica, dos argumentos invocados pro e contra a existencia do Direito internacional. Para que possamos analysar o objecto da these que nos propomos discutir, basta-nos dizer que nos collocamos ao lado dos que affirmão o caracter juridico dos principios e normas que regem a vida internacional. Sempre a vida juridica teve necessidade de crear os orgãos essenciaes ás funcções que a constituem. Se não chegou ainda o momento de fundar-se o apparelhamento coactivo do Direito internacional, não é menos certo que existe um conjuncto de regras que o consenso das nações adopta como a expressão da justiça e como as mais proprias a garantirem a coexistencia harmonica nessa sociedade amplissima que já a philosophia pagã chamara a magna civitas. Assim pensando, não nos distanciamos dos ensinamentos do Professor egregio Rudolf von Ihering que, melhor do que nenhum outro, assignalou a coactividade como o traço caracteristico das normas juridicas. Nem por isto elle negou que os preceitos do Direito internacional sejam regras juridicas. Antes formalmente declarou falsa, segundo o seu pensar, a opinião dos que n'elles vêm sómente mandamentos e deveres moraes. (Zwec im Recht, traducção francesa de Meulenare, n.o 146.) Foi assim coherente com a opinião sustentada no seu monumental L'esprit du Droit Romain. § 11, quando reconheceu um direito já constituido nos tempos da justiça privada, em que cada um procurava fazer valer o seu direito pelas proprias mãos. A ordem juridica, a realização do direito, derivava então, com menor efficacia, é certo, da satisfação das necessidades da vida.

Assim como o direito privado foi, após luctas e resistencias seculares, or ganizando a coactividade e tornando-a funcção superior do Estado, do mesmo modo o direito das gentes chegará um dia a constituir os seus orgãos coactivos, superiores aos caprichos e resistencias dos Estados, com o poder de impor-lhes as soluções judiciarias acima do emergir sangrento das catstrophes bellicosas. Nem nos desconforte o espectaculo pungente da maior guerra dos seculos, ora a ensanguentar a Europa. Os que sabem que o rithmo é a lei do movimento, não perdem a convicção de que, após o conflicto tremendo, o Direito 68436-17-VOL VII- -45

internacional terá de entrar num periodo luminoso e fecundo que, cada vez mais, nos aproximará da sonhada phase em que os pleitos dos Estados terão os seus arbitros legitimos.

Exposto o nosso modo de ver quanto ao problema preliminar, encaremos agora a these escolhida.

Não se faz necessario encarecer a importancia dos factores geographicos nas instituições humanas e particularmente na vida juridica. Tão preponderante ella é que o citado Ihering poude dizer que a geographia é a historia de ante-mão traçada no espaço, do mesmo modo que a historia não é mais que a geographia realizada no tempo, formula verdadeira e precisa que exprime uma grandiosa verdade sociologica.

Uma extensa continuidade territorial, abrangendo todo um hemispherio, conquistada para a civilização a que offereceu campo fertil e fecundo, não podia deixar de suscitar novos problemas e offerecer casos novos á meditação e estudo dos publicistas e jurisconsultos.

Não é de hoje que se assignala o ascendente notavel do elemento ethnico nas creações juridicas. Elle foi já posto em relevo nos assumptos internacionaes.

Já Lorimer dizia: "de todas as sciencias modernas nenhuma parece destinada a exercer sobre a politica internacional e o direito internacional tanta importancia como a sciencia das raças." (Principios de Direito Internacional, Livro 2.° Cap. 1.°)

Na America a differenciação de cultura, ao contacto de novos factores territoriaes e ethnicos, devia gerar sentimentos novos, idéas novas, interesses novos, instituições novas, que exigissem o amparo tutelar de novos preceitos juridicos. Expostas estas premissas, a conclusão é evidente. A resposta affirmativa impõe-se a these ora discutida. E o conhecimento embora perfunctorio do genio americano e dos acontecimentos americanos deixa ver claramente a verdade da solução enunciada.

A divergencia da indole dos povos d'America se fez desde logo notar e reflectiu-se na escolha das instituições politicas. Affeitos á agitação, á independencia, á egualdade, esses povos não se conformaram com os moldes de governo que lhes davam a copiar as suas metropoles monarchicas e aristocraticas. Desde logo a democracia encontrou neste continente o seu mais amplo dominio. Assim se constituiu a trama dos interesses politicos em guarda contra as velhas instituições européas, não só para defesa da independencia, como também das normas constitucionaes e dos principios republicanos triumphantes.

A vida autonoma gerou em seguida os novos interesses economicos. Estes vieram precisamente no momento em que começaram a formar a base do mundo moderno. Trouxeram como consequencia a necessidade de instituições protectoras.

Eis, portanto, os factores embryologicos dos problemas propriamente americanos no direito internacional: 1.° a continuidade territorial que, mesmo quando scindida, tornou ainda mais faceis as communicações e a permuta de idéas e sentimentos entre os povos que nella se erigiram; 2.o a adopção de formulas genuinamente democraticas no regimen desses povos em antagonismo com as vigentes no outro continente; 3.° as relações economicas, cada vez mais intensas, creando posição de dependencia para com os povos do outro continente.

A' medida que se foram fazendo sentir as circumstancias decorrentes da tal estado de cousas, o americanismo foi emergindo á tona das instituições juridicas. O novo continente sentiu necessidade de affirmar-se como complexo de cultura, de systhemas politicos, de interesses humanos, autonomamente desabrochado e evolvido, necessitando de formulas tutelares.

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