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police measure, whereas if troops of the regular army are used for such a purpose it seems to take on the color of an act of war". Troops were landed in China in the Boxer troubles and in Mexico to coerce Huerta, and more recently in Russia (to mention only a few instances), and we insisted that the acts were not acts of war. Marines and blue jackets are armed forces as well as soldiers, and Mr. Mathews himself makes no such distinction as Mr. Taft implies.

The chapter on the agreement-making power recites numerous international agreements which have been made by the Executive alone. When they are the result of specific authority of law they are unobjectionable; but when they are initiated on the President's authority they raise suspicion, for they may be secret and they tend to diminish the Senate's rightful authority. However, we must remember that international agreements made by one Executive may be set aside by his successor; consequently, they lack certainty and stability and foreign governments would not be apt to accept them in important matters in lieu of binding treaties.

The book closes with an account of the modes of declaring war and making peace. Congress thus far has never declared war except upon the recommendation of the President. By inference, the power to declare peace resides in the same place with the power to declare war. The President negotiates the treaty of peace, but before the treaty is completed Congress may declare that a state of peace exists. Mr. Mathews narrates the proceedings of Congress in April, 1917, when war was declared on Germany. Mr. Wilson's message of April 2 recounted our grievances against Germany and added certain other objects for which we should fight-notably “To make the world safe for democracy”. Congress, however, placed the justification for war simply upon Germany's repeated acts of war against the Government and people of the United States.

This is a good book, well conceived, well executed, and serving a useful purpose. It will soon pass into general use among students of our foreign affairs.

GAILLARD HUNT.

Manual of Collections of Treaties and of Collections relating to Treaties. By

Denys Peter Myers, A.B. Printed at the expense of the Richard Manning Hodges Fund. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922. pp. xlvii, 685. $7.50.

This book is the second in a series of bibliographies printed by the Harvard University Press, the first having been on the languages, history, etc., of Slavic Europe by Robert Joseph Kirmer, Ph.D. The preface, contents and a few other lesser portions are printed in French as well as English, but the titles are in all languages and few of the books and periodicals have been translated. Mr. Myers' arrangement is: General Collections, Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern, collections by states, collections by subject matter, collections by international administration and as an appendix The Publication of Treaties. Upwards of 3408 separate titles are cited.

The purpose of the book is to place a list of books and articles relating to his subject before the student of international agreements. The basis of Mr. Myers' work is the lists of Martens, Garden, Martitz and Clunet which he has brought together and added to. The book is not a list of treaties but of books about treaties and which contain treaties.

The painstaking industry and exhaustive research of the compiler reflect great credit upon him and it is apparent that the book will be very useful. It takes its place among the essential works.

GAILLARD HUNT.

The Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom of the British Oversea Dominions. By

Edward Porritt. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1922. pp. xvi, 492. (Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History.) $4.00.

Co-ordination. Inasmuch as it deals with diplomatic freedom only in connection with fiscal affairs (p.10), this book falls short of the promise of its title. Within the more limited scope, its principal value is (1) that it is a creditable attempt to compare, contrast, and, as it were, co-ordinate political development in various of the Dominions, instead of, as is usual, tracing the unrelated history of only one of them; and (2) that the author's familiarity with British political history has enabled him to point to the influences which, from time to time in London, aided or retarded the expansion of colonial freedom. Works confined to Canada, by omitting references to the Australian Act of 1850, its modification in 1873, and its repeal in 1895, leave us uninformed as to British policy with regard to differential rates of customs duties in colonial tariffs, while, on the other hand, the Australian books tell us little of the struggle for responsible government and the acquisition of freedom with regard to protective duties. The Colonial Office attitude with reference to bounties and bonuses, too, is one that must be studied not in a single colony but in various of them. And the changing influences of the ever-changing Colonial Secretaries must be noted as the stories develop. In these respects Mr. Porritt's book, if not altogether unique, has special value.

On the other hand, the author has paid little attention to analysis or orderly arrangement. Freedom to enact tariffs is a part of general legislative freedom. Its history cannot be altogether separated from the whole of which it is a part, nor indeed from the story of the acquisition by the colonies of responsible government. This the author recognized, but he has had little success in coping with the difficulties which it raises.

Responsible Government. If the struggle for responsible government (an executive responsible to the House of Commons instead of to the Gover

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nors) had been successfully terminated before the efforts to obtain tariff and treaty freedom commenced, the author might well have introduced his special subject by so saying, and by giving us the dates of the end of the one and the beginning of the other. But the date-relations are confused, and the year of the conclusion of the earlier contest is very variously stated.

On p. 61 (see also p. 234) it is said (when referring to the British North American provinces) that “Complete success attended the movement for responsible government in 1849. The question was settled when Parliament at Westminster in this year voted down resolutions" &c. This statement is contradicted at p. 93, where it is said that these decades (1846-1873)

were the decades in which the North American provinces were struggling for responsible government." It is contradicted also by the assertion on p. 111 that 1841-1859 was in Upper and Lower Canada “the period during which the contests for responsible government and for fiscal freedom were going on.” Again, on p. 223 it is said that "the real contest for responsible government began

in 1841. The struggle was over and complete success achieved . in 1854.” At still another place (p. 222) it is said that the movement for responsible government "began in Lower and Upper Canada in 1828," whereas in Lower Canada the movement was not for responsible government but for an elective Legislative Council. On p. 250 it is said that responsible government was conceded to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1848, to Prince Edward Island in 1853, and to Newfoundland in 1855; while at p. 268 it is said that “responsible government was established in New South Wales in 1850 and in Victoria and South Australia in 1854.”

There can be little objection to fixing 1849 as the end of the struggle for responsible government, although, if a specific year must be mentioned, 1847—the year of Elgin's arrival in Canada as Governor-might be preferable. But the action of the British Parliament in 1849 to which the author refers had no relation to responsible government. The question there was not whether a Governor should follow the advice of his ministry, but whether a statute of the Canadian Parliament should be disallowed by interposition of the Crown. Had the author adhered to the 1849 date, and had he recognized that the struggle for fiscal freedom commenced (substantially) after that year, he would have been saved much of the confusion of Part IV of his book (pp. 213-281), entitled “Responsible Government and Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom.” Of responsible government he need have said little.

Fiscal Freedom. Free trade, as preached by Cobden and Bright, being as much an evangel as an economic principle, British governments, while releasing the colonies from the restrictions of the commercial system and the navigation laws, were unwilling to agree that any of the impediments of the old system should be introduced there--either protection or preferences, either bounties or bonuses.

The story with reference to protection (separated from the rest of the story of colonial political development) is a short one. The Canadian Parliament enacted the Cayley tariff in 1858 and the more important Galt tariff in 1859: in these, duties protective as against British goods were imposed; but the statutes, nevertheless, were permitted to go into operation. And, in consequence, no later colonial protective tariffs, in either the British American or Australasian colonies, were interfered with (p. 224). From bis relation of these facts the author omits the extremely noteworthy communication of protest from the Canadian Government. It is one of the most important documents which ever left Canada, and is rarely overlooked.

Canada led the way also with reference to differential or preferential tariffs by providing in 1850 for reciprocal advantages with the other British American colonies (p. 154). Taking warning by this, the British Parliament, in arranging the constitutions of Australian colonies, inserted a clause prohibitive of such departures from the principles of free trade. Efforts for release from the restriction were partially successful in 1873, but completely only in 1895. Mr. Porritt tells the story, but disjointedly (pp. 93, 94, 111, 116, 118–21, 123, 134, 136, 278–9). The subjects of bounties and bonuses are adequately dealt with, but again disjointedly (pp. 85, 87, 99, 111, 114, 128-32, 137, 218).

Dealing with the veto on colonial legislation, the author finds it necessary to speak of statutes other than those of fiscal character. Interference with tariff legislation alone could have been very shortly dealt with. To the larger subject, the author devotes four chapters (pp. 252-281), and from them is omitted much that ought to appear in a general survey,--for example, the conflict over the Canadian bill with reference to copyright. In other words, in this connection, as with reference to responsible government, the author has been able neither to separate his subject from the general story of political development, nor, on the other hand, succinctly to indicate the affiliations.

Era of Indifference. In various other respects, the author has fallen into mistake. For example, at p. 283 he says,-“The era of indifference to oversea possessions

extended from the loss of the North American colonies to the first Jubilee of the reign of Queen Victoria in 1887," and he divides the era into three periods: 1783–1859; 1859–1873; and 1873–1887 (pp. 283–4). Dating British indifference back to 1783 is to make incomprehensible the whole story of the persistent resistance of British statesmen to colonial efforts for responsible government. One effect of the American Revolution was to make clear that such colonies as Canada would some day assert their independence, but the other effect was to induce study of methods by which the arrival of such misfortune might be postponed. On 20 October 1789, the Colonial Secretary sent to Lord Dorchester (Governor in Chief of the British North American Colonies) a memorandum in which was elaborately discussed—"by what means the connection & dependence of Canada, on this country, may be so preserved, & cultivated, as to be render'd most beneficial to Great Britain, during its continuance, & most permanent in its duration.” Eventual independence was unavoidable, “But the real question now to be decided is, what system is best calculated to remove this event to a distant period & to render the connection, in the interval, advantageous to the Mother Country without oppression or injury to the Colony” (Canadian Constitutional Documents, 1789–1791, Part II,

p. 982).

Indifference to retention of Canada arose and increased only as her value diminished. While her trade was regulated by the statutes of the British commercial system and by the navigation laws, anxiety, rather than indifference, was the attitude of the Colonial Office. Every exhibition of tendency toward self-government was countered. The Colonial Office was “the office at war with the colonies” (p. 312), and finally drove the Canadas into rebellion against it. The colonies were valuable, and the colonies must be retained. Adoption of the principles of free trade in commodities, and unrestricted access of foreign shipping, was the explanation of the commencement of the era of indifference. The colonies had ceased to be of value, and the colonies might go. That was natural. Termination of the indifference came, not in any particular year, but gradually with the growth of conviction that Canada had once more become valuable,—this time for her fighting capability.

Not recognizing this last mentioned fact, the author explains the end of the era of indifference by British loans for railway and other purposes; by emigrations which "created another link of empire and also stimulated a more widely extended popular interest in Great Britain in the dominions" (p. 403); by the work of the Royal Colonial Institute; by the propaganda of the Imperial Federation League; by the meetings of the Chambers of Commerce of the Empire; by the Colonial Conferences; by "the appearance on the scene of Germany as a new European competitor for oversea possessions" (p. 405). Most of these movements had but the slightest relation to the British change of attitude, and it was the desire to combine the colonies in a war-union ( a kriegsverein, to use Lord Salisbury's word) that actuated the Imperial Federation League, and that engaged the attention of the first of the Colonial Conferences. The later meetings have all dealt with the same subject. Very clearly, then, until the adoption of free trade, while Canada was of enormous value to the United Kingdom, there was no British indifference. And after Canada became of military value, there was none. Between these periods, Canada was of no value, and was somewhat unanimously told that she might as well "cut the cords and go.” That is as one would have expected.

Treaties. The author's treatment of the treaty-making power of the colonies is complete, if the phraseology employed is somewhat faulty. Commencing with the demand of New Brunswick in 1850 for "full power to treat

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