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method of reasoning, because it lacks sufficient economic wealth and, once independent of England, would have to become economically dependent upon some other state, which would be inadmissible and impracticable. The principle of equality of all states, large and small, emphasized so strongly during the war, is shown to be applicable only to the modern civilized states possessing real autonomy, not, for instance, to the Asiatic or African states. In Professor Lavergne's opinion the nations made a grave error when they pronounced the principle of free accession in the two Hague conferences, especially in the second. To him it is one of the reasons for the "semisterility" of these conferences.
In his second chapter the author takes up the question of colonization. Although the prime motive of colonization, he frankly states, is the enrichment of the colonizing nation, colonization is not incompatible with the principle of nationalities for two reasons. In the first place, as far as the colonies are concerned, it is not unjust, as it overturns nothing and violates no national sentiment among the natives, who do not possess such a sentiment. In the second place, colonization is beneficent to the colony economically and otherwise, provided always that the work of colonization is carried on in a spirit of justice and humanity by the colonizing power. This leads the author to a discussion of the French system of colonization. He finds it sound on the whole, although he deplores the French practice of allowing the colonists to elect deputies to the French Chamber and thus to deal with questions not concerning them.
The final chapter reviews once more the principal defects of the present League of Nations, as the author envisages them, namely its lack of basic principles and its non-conformity to any clear-cut type. He says that there are four distinct types of groups that the peoples of the world may form with a view to international order, to wit: 1. The old-fashioned, thoroughly discredited political alliance; 2. The judicial alliance, which failed to function in 1914; 3. The federal league, approached imperfectly by the present League of Nations; 4. A superstate or permanent federal union, that is, an international, universal group possessing an autonomous legislative council and an executive power, each with the right of absolute command in its particular sphere, the union having permanent binding force upon each member state and conditioning a frank renunciation of some sovereign rights on the part of each. This last alternative is the author's ideal. Differences arising between nations, he claims, are questions of power and are not reducible to simple questions of law. As life means motion, so there will always be struggles between peoples. At present they are manifested in war. However, war must be replaced, not by a court of justice, but by an international legislative assembly with well-defined powers, wherein each state is represented by delegates. In this assembly the author would have the future battles of the nations waged in a parliamentary manner, just as now the political party issues are decided in the national parliaments. A court of justice, he says, is insufficient and inadequate, for it is not a question of judging but of legislating. We have experimented enough with wars, diplomacy and courts of justice in vainly attempting to bring about peace on earth, he argues. It only remains to try the international, worldembracing parliament.
The foregoing résumé of Professor Lavergne's argument will be sufficient to give the reader an idea of his line of reasoning. Such a book is easy to criticise. For one thing, its three chapters are not sufficiently connected in plan or thought, and a better, more exact title could be found for the work. Again, many Americans will be inclined to smile at the solicitude with which the author argues for his ideal international parliament, which he himself admits still lies far in the future. This is only another indication that Europeans are by force of circumstances taking problems of future international organization much more seriously than Americans. It might also be said in criticism that while the book begins as a theoretical study of the principle of nationalities it ends as a Tendenzschrift and that it is unfair to the principle of the judicial settlement of international disputes. But in spite of its shortcomings, whatever they may be, the book is a stimulating piece of work and reveals careful, logical thinking.
EDWIN H. ZEYDEL.
The Conduct of American Foreign Relations. By John Mabry Mathews,
Ph.D. New York: The Century Company, 1922. pp. vii, 353. $3.00.
This book is a study of law and practice in the management of our foreign relations. The author shows the basis and modes of control, describes the central organization, the diplomatic and consular service, shows how treaties are made and enforced, and how we enter into a state of neutrality, war and peace.
There are many books on our foreign relations, but this is the only one devoted to an exposition of how they are conducted. The author has smooth sailing when he describes the basis and machinery of control, but the waters become rougher when he describes the powers in treaty-making of each house of Congress and of both together and what are the untrammelled powers of the executive. Here we find much of conflict beginning when the government began and not yet settled. The principal sources of the book are: Moore's Digest, Butler's Treaty Making Power, Crandall's Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, John W. Foster's Practice of Diplomacy, Corwin's The President's Control of Foreign Relations, W. W. Willoughby's Constitutional Law of the United States, the volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States and the Supreme Court Reports, the richest mines of information being the Supreme Court Reports, Foreign Relations and Moore's Digest. The man who knows these three works thoroughly knows American international law.
Dipping into the middle of the book, the most important section is that which treats of treaty-making, and here Mr. Mathews draws a distinction between the “practical influence" of the Senate and the "legal control" of the President. The Senate may give its advice during the progress of treatymaking, but this is not necessary; or it may grant or withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty which is necessary. The Executive is wise if he seeks the advice with a view to obtaining the consent. That the Executive and the Senate should each so jealously guard over its authority Mr. Mathews thinks coincides with the purpose of the framers of the Constitution, because they aimed to curb power. The House, too, has interjected itself into treaty-making, being a part of the machinery necessary to pass laws and appropriate money, which often are necessary to put treaties in force. In 1796 the House called on the President for the papers in the Jay treaty and he refused to send them. Similar instances of conflict have occurred since then without determination of the question of legal obligation. The House takes the action which the treaty requires after some of the members have made speeches insisting that it is not obliged to do so. Mr. Mathews thinks that the inclusion of the Senate in the treaty-making power has proved to be a wise provision in the government, but that a minority of the Senate should not be allowed to block action on a treaty and that a majority should be sufficient to approve the ratification, at any rate if the majority represents states having more than a majority of the population of the coun
a try. In advocating approval of treaties by a majority of the Senate, Mr. Mathews has companionship, but that a majority of the population should be potential through Senators is a novel idea. The reviewer thinks that such an important law as a treaty, limiting, as all important treaties do, the sovereignty of the nation, should have general acceptance. A bare majority of one body of the legislature should not have unchecked power over national rights. Ours is not a government of the unchecked will of the majority. As for counting a majority of the population through representation in the Senate, the effect of doing so would be to destroy the foundations of the Senate. What would happen if the Senators from the same populous state took opposite sides on the question of approving a treaty? The subject is too large to be pursued here, however, and it is only fair to say that Mr. Mathews shows little interest in his own suggestion, as he says nothing in support of it. It plays no part in the development of his book.
The power of the President looms large on every page. In some fifty instances he has landed armed forces on foreign soil to protect American interests, acting under his own authority as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and under general international right without specific congressional authority. This part of the book would have been stronger without the quotation from Mr. Taft.
Mr. Taft says: “In practice the use of the naval marines for such a purpose has become so common that their landing is treated as a mere local
police measure, whereas if troops of the regular army are used for such a purpose it seems to take on the color of an act of war". Troops were landed in China in the Boxer troubles and in Mexico to coerce Huerta, and more recently in Russia (to mention only a few instances), and we insisted that the acts were not acts of war. Marines and blue jackets are armed forces as well as soldiers, and Mr. Mathews himself makes no such distinction as Mr. Taft implies.
The chapter on the agreement-making power recites numerous international agreements which have been made by the Executive alone. When they are the result of specific authority of law they are unobjectionable; but when they are initiated on the President's authority they raise suspicion, for they may be secret and they tend to diminish the Senate's rightful authority. However, we must remember that international agreements made by one Executive may be set aside by his successor; consequently, they lack certainty and stability and foreign governments would not be apt to accept them in important matters in lieu of binding treaties.
The book closes with an account of the modes of declaring war and making peace. Congress thus far has never declared war except upon the recommendation of the President. By inference, the power to declare peace resides in the same place with the power to declare war. The President negotiates the treaty of peace, but before the treaty is completed Congress may declare that a state of peace exists. Mr. Mathews narrates the proceedings of Congress in April, 1917, when war was declared on Germany. Mr. Wilson's message of April 2 recounted our grievances against Germany and added certain other objects for which we should fight-notably "To make the world safe for democracy”. Congress, however, placed the justification for war simply upon Germany's repeated acts of war against the Government and people of the United States.
This is a good book, well conceived, well executed, and serving a useful purpose. It will soon pass into general use among students of our foreign affairs.
Manual of Collections of Treaties and of Collections relating to Treaties. By
Denys Peter Myers, A.B. Printed at the expense of the Richard Manning Hodges Fund. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922. pp. xlvii, 685. $7.50.
This book is the second in a series of bibliographies printed by the Harvard University Press, the first having been on the languages, history, etc., of Slavic Europe by Robert Joseph Kirmer, Ph.D. The preface, contents and a few other lesser portions are printed in French as well as English, but the titles are in all languages and few of the books and periodicals have been translated. Mr. Myers' arrangement is: General Collections, Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern, collections by states, collections by subject matter, collections by international administration and as an appendix The Publication of Treaties. Upwards of 3408 separate titles are cited.
The purpose of the book is to place a list of books and articles relating to his subject before the student of international agreements. The basis of Mr. Myers' work is the lists of Martens, Garden, Martitz and Clunet which he has brought together and added to. The book is not a list of treaties but of books about treaties and which contain treaties.
The painstaking industry and exhaustive research of the compiler reflect great credit upon him and it is apparent that the book will be very useful. It takes its place among the essential works.
The Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom of the British Oversea Dominions. By
Edward Porritt. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1922. pp. xvi, 492. (Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History.) $4.00.
Co-ordination. Inasmuch as it deals with diplomatic freedom only in connection with fiscal affairs (p.10), this book falls short of the promise of its title. Within the more limited scope, its principal value is (1) that it is a creditable attempt to compare, contrast, and, as it were, co-ordinate political development in various of the Dominions, instead of, as is usual, tracing the unrelated history of only one of them; and (2) that the author's familiarity with British political history has enabled him to point to the influences which, from time to time in London, aided or retarded the expansion of colonial freedom. Works confined to Canada, by omitting references to the Australian Act of 1850, its modification in 1873, and its repeal in 1895, leave us uninformed as to British policy with regard to differential rates of customs duties in colonial tariffs, while, on the other hand, the Australian books tell us little of the struggle for responsible government and the acquisition of freedom with regard to protective duties. The Colonial Office attitude with reference to bounties and bonuses, too, is one that must be studied not in a single colony but in various of them. And the changing influences of the ever-changing Colonial Secretaries must be noted as the stories develop. In these respects Mr. Porritt's book, if not altogether unique, has special value.
On the other hand, the author has paid little attention to analysis or orderly arrangement. Freedom to enact tariffs is a part of general legislative freedom. Its bistory cannot be altogether separated from the whole of which it is a part, nor indeed from the story of the acquisition by the colonies of responsible government. This the author recognized, but he has had little success in coping with the difficulties which it raises.
Responsible Government. If the struggle for responsible government (an executive responsible to the House of Commons instead of to the Gover