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self-governing colonies were at last freed from the fiscally hampering articles of the Prussian treaty of 1865, and of a score of other commercial treaties made by Great Britain before 1878 to which the self-governing colonies had not been consenting parties” (pp. 199–200). The Prussian and Belgian treaties were denounced in 1898. The others were not. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, a resolution was passed recommending that action in that respect should be taken. Mr. Chamberlain's tenure of office is specially remembered in Canada because of his imperializing efforts, which Sir Wilfrid Laurier successfully withstood. Mr. Chamberlain wanted contributions to the British navy; the enrollment of colonial troops for service in foreign countries; the establishment of an Imperial Council which would develop into an imperial parliament with powers of taxation, &c. Canada's "satisfaction" is that she escaped these things.
Conclusion. While it is impossible to disregard the defects of Mr. Porritt's book (some of which may have been due to failing health and inability to revise the proofs), acknowledgment must be made of its many merits, the most conspicuous of which are (1) the co-ordination above referred to; (2) the useful and scholarly collection of relevant and (upon the whole) accurately stated facts, made accessible by a good index; and (3) the appendices of sixty-one closely printed pages, in which may be found many of the documents referred to in the text.
JOHN S. EWART.
The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879–1914. By Alfred Franzis
Pribram. 2 vols. English edition by Archibald Cary Coolidge. Translated by J. G. D'Arcy Paul and Denys P. Myers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920, 1921. pp. xvii, 308; ix, 271. $2.00, $3.00.
Volume I contains a series of treaties, conventions and declarations that are related to the policies of the Central Powers and of Italy together with an introduction by Professor Pribram.
The main treaties that interest us are those of the Austro-HungarianGerman Alliance of 1879, which, from that time to the end of the world war, was the basis of the mutual relations of the Central Powers, and the kindred but independent and more famous Triple Alliance of AustriaHungary, Germany and Italy. This alliance beginning in 1882, was renewed with changes in 1887, 1891, 1902 and 1912. It was embodied in five distinct treaties. But we are also interested incidentally in documents, now also collected here, of the League of the Three Emperors, the Reinsurance Treaty, and various other alliances, in some of which we find Rumania having common understandings with Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy; of Austria-Hungary with Serbia, and of Austria-Hungary with Russia on Balkan affairs; a political agreement for the preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean which was inspired by fear of French extension between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy dating back to 1887; and a naval agreement for united action between Austria-Hungary, the German Empire and Italy which went into force as recently as 1913.
Volume II contains an account of the various negotiations relating to the five treaties of the Triple Alliance and to Austro-Russian agreements, the Dual Alliance, and Franco-Italian agreements, with some of the documents mentioned in an appendix. The understandings of Italy and France were inconsistent not only with the supposed antagonism of those countries towards each other, but with Italy's loyalty to the Triple Alliance; and with a special treaty between Italy and Germany which in case of war followed by the taking of guaranties involved French interests in northern Africa and even looked to accessions on the Italian border of French home territory itself. These inconsistent understandings of Italy and France, however, apart from changes in political interests that developed later, gave some excuse for the participation of Italy on the side of France in the world war.
The texts of the agreements, which were written in French or German, are printed on the left hand page and the English translation on the right; so that, the reader's eye may conveniently run from one to the other at will. Mr. Myers, whose familiarity with treaties is well known, is the principal translator of the French and Mr. Paul of the German originals; both of which are rendered into smooth English.
The author's introduction, which appears in the first volume, is helpful to a clear understanding of the succession of treaties of the Triple Alliance and may suffice for the general reader if he cares to go no farther; while the story of the negotiations, which with its short documentary appendix fills the second volume, presents sufficient detail to be a valuable help to the specialist. Both volumes taken together make an exceptional source book and commentary.
Professor Pribram's information is taken chiefly from Austro-Hungarian archives which became accessible after the fall of the Dual Monarchy and is necessarily partial because it needs supplementing from the records of the German and Italian foreign offices, but though it reflects a critical spirit on the part of a patriotic scholar it is set forth in a temperate manner.
The complete texts of the treaties of the Triple Alliance were first brought to light by Professor Pribram and their publication together with the history of the negotiations is the chief reason for making his book. The exact wording of the treaties of the Triple Alliance, except for four articles, is new to the public. We now know that there were as many as fifteen articles in their later stages, the contents of some of which had not been surmised before. The treaties of the Triple Alliance were supposed to be defensive, and so they were to a large degree, but they might also have become aggressive in certain contingencies. This was particularly the case in respect to the Balkans and to questions relating to the Ottoman coasts of the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas, which when settled on the breaking up of the Turkish Empire were to be adjusted between Austria and Italy on the basis of mutual compensations; and in respect to North African acquisitions, the settlement of which, though the Egyptian question was left undisturbed, was to redound to the benefit of Italy, even though that meant war by Germany and Italy with France, who was Italy's principal rival.
We must express our thanks to Professor Coolidge, the American editor, for his rearrangement of the material of Professor Pribram's book in order to make it less bulky than, with translations added, it might have been as originally published, as well as for certain notes and headings that he has added for American readers, and we must remark the persistency of Professor Pribram himself in carrying out his plan not only to reveal the actual contents of the treaties but to give an exhaustive account of their negotiation. Although the narrative is loaded with details, is lacking in interesting character portrayal of the individual statesmen who were connected with the transactions, and is without dramatic touches, it makes steady progress, ends with a climax, and presents a picture of the mind of a nation. That nation is Italy, to whose ambitious and clever diplomats the author pays tribute even though he doubts whether, in view of their new Slavic neighbors on the Adriatic and continued French domination in the Mediterranean, they have put their country in a better position than she held before the war. Italy, if the author's argument is to be accepted, secured by appeals, lamentations, flatteries and threats, many advantages from Austria-Hungary and Germany in the time of their necessities. She, flirting with France, England and other countries, at the same time, was suspected by the Central Powers of being an undependable partner and, in the author's mind, gained in financial strength, increased as a great Power, and carried out imperial policies which would have been impossible without the alliance; but Germany and Austria reaped some advantage from it. If Germany had become engaged in defensive war with France, Italy would have been expected to aid and in any case not menace Germany, or if either Germany or Austria-Hungary were drawn into a defensive war with a non-signatory great Power, e. g., with Russia, which was always a possibility, neither had to consider the likelihood of attack from Italy at the same time, as under these circumstances Italy was pledged to benevolent neutrality. In fact Italy kept neutral when the Central Powers began war with France and Russia. Without Italian neutrality at the outset the Central Powers could not have made their initial successes, either on the Western or Eastern front. Had their warfare been strictly defensive, Italy, under the terms of the alliance, could have been expected to stand by them.
Among the things that impress one who reads the treaties and the story of their negotiation are the secrecy about them, which was successfully maintained; the unfortunate situation in which this world has been placed by a system of independent states in which each may add the territories of weaker states to its possessions, if with its own strong arm or with the potential help of an alliance like the Triple Alliance, it can keep its rivals from interference and from extension, a system that seems to have reached its culmination and to have begun its decline in our own time; the logical necessity, however, of alliances and of a balance of power so long as independent imperialistic nations exist; the wisdom of having kept the United States practically out of alliances up to this time; the desirability of still keeping our country clear of them, in the future; and the need of an international organization based upon the mutual interests of all nations rather than on the special interests of some of them; of juridical methods rather than methods of force; an organization in which alliances and secret treaties have no place.
That the whole arrangement of the Triple Alliance, therefore, has gone by the board is one of the greatest blessings of the worlds' upheaval; and it should be the hope of every lover of mankind that a better order of European relations may take its place.
JAMES L. TRYON.
Intervention in International Law. By Ellery C. Stowell. Washington, ,
D. C.: John Byrne & Co. 1921. pp. viii, 558.
In this volume Mr. Stowell has industriously and successfully gathered together data relative to many interventions which have taken place between nations, for purposes of redress, expiation, indemnity, security, or punishment, devoting much attention particularly to humanitarian intervention. In our point of view, and in the present chaotic state of what passes under the name of international law, the book has the value resultant upon industrious labor and judicious collection of instances. We can not believe, however, that it is written upon the theory of international law which, with growing civilization among men, must be accepted if sound reason and the highest ideals of justice are to prevail. The author accepts too readily, we conceive, the principle that might makes right, coupling this with the idea that that which has been done by nations, if repeated sufficiently often, makes law. Of course as to things indifferent in themselves the practices of nations may make sound customs, but the practice of the stronger to lay down rules of action for the weaker, which is almost universal in cases of intervention, is quite another matter. This distinction Mr. Stowell ignores, but may only be criticized for this to the same degree that other writers, who feel that they are laying down international law, may be subjected to the same criticism. Our position in this respect may be elucidated by examining some extracts from Mr. Stowell's work. He says, for instance:
It sometimes happens that a weak or harassed government is unable or unwilling to compel its nationals to observe International Law. In such a situation, the State whose nationals or whose interests are endangered may act directly to compel the observance of International Law.
If Mr. Stowell had simply said that in such cases States often use violence, he would have been more nearly correct, and if he had observed that nations only so act when they feel themselves to be very much stronger than the nation supposed to be in default, he would have made an observation justified by the instances he cites.
Mr. Stowell points out the difficulties which arise within a community when individuals seek revenge on their own account, and he finds that thereby the "avengers were constantly embroiling the community in order to gratify their more selfish lust for revenge.
That an infinitely greater and more intolerable evil exists when a nation becomes its own avenger, and that such action is in itself a violation of true international law, Mr. Stowell, we regret to say, does not appreciate. Particularly he regards a supposed loss of prestige as a justification for bloody intervention. Exactly why this should be true when similar actions are not justified on the part of an individual in like case, or why the wholesale slaughter of men to restore prestige should be more virtuous than individual killing does not appear.
An illustration of the repetition of the old idea that superior force is its own law is furnished by Mr. Stowell when he says that in settlement of the Alabama Claims the American demand for indirect losses was not allowed, “but if war, instead of arbitration, had settled the controversy, there would have been no legal objection to the collection of the indirect losses, provided that the result of the recourse to arms had been sufficiently favorable to the United States." It was by virtue of a general principle of law, thoroughly recognized in England and in the United States as between private individuals, that indirect losses were not allowed. In other words they were not treated as either legal or right. A successful war, however, in Mr. Stowell's opinion, would have changed the legal situation and converted that which was originally illegal into legality.
It can not be admitted that anything which may properly be called law can be changed in its nature by a show of superior force, and so long as what passes as international law recognizes the contrary, it will fail to be a science or worthy of respect.
Mr. Stowell finds that“when a State exacts redress for the injury to its prestige or interests, it protects society by making it certain to all who harbor evil designs that the transgressor will be brought to book.” Inasmuch as such exaction of redress never takes place except the attacking nation be stronger than the supposed offending nation, Mr. Stowell's statement can only be true when the offender is the weaker. He leaves, therefore, the nation superior in power with full liberty to harbor evil designs without fear of being brought to book. But after all, who is to determine that the weaker nation has wrongfully affected the "prestige or interests" of the stronger? So long as the stronger nation alone settles this matter, there can be neither law nor justice controlling the situation. The whole statement, therefore, amounts simply to an assertion that if the weaker nation does something