convictions which had been taking shape in his mind. As President Wilson saw it, the United States had long been preparing for this opportunity. American purposes and principles pointed in no other direction. It was the right of the world to know definitely the conditions upon which the United States could join a league of nations. The President then proceeded to state those conditions. The conclusive proof that the plan foreshadowed by his note of December 18, 1916, was not a peace project is found in this elaboration of program.

The President suggested "peace without victory," for his interest was in the possible basis for an international concert of power which might be found in the terms on which the war was to be ended. "No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing." "Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe." Just as with reference to Mexico he had been concerned for the people rather than the government, so in Europe he wanted no victory over a people. Small nations were to find in the world after the war a protection that rested in the general acceptance of the principle that in rights all nations, large and small, are equal. Furthermore, governments in the stable world, of which the President was speaking, must

derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." "Any peace that does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset."

But the war had raised more than the question of Belgium or Poland and their right to exist in Europe; the war had forced upon the whole world the primary question involved in the "freedom of the seas." From the outset in spite of the natural limitations of diplomatic notes the President had a freedom of the seas in mind that differed from the contention of either Germany or England.1 Here now he stated it. "And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free, . . . the free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development." An arrangement such as the President was outlining would remove for ever a misuse of the seas, and it would close also, and here the emphasis should be placed, the opportunity sought by Germany to force a way to freedom by denying the use of the sea to all peaceful peoples. The highway of the sea belonged to the whole world. The consent of the governed should here be the guide.

Mr. Wilson must have known that apart from the change that had to be accomplished in the minds of European statesmen before his program could in any measure be accepted, there was for him the need of bringing the American people to the support of such a program. Without change in the popular conception of American foreign policy all effort to establish the United States in an advantageous position prior to the conclusion of a peace would be vain. To conclude, then, he found in this 1 Infra, p. 89.

proposal no break in the traditions or policy of the American people.1 For he was asking merely, that no nation aggress upon another, that there be no entangling alliances, and that the "consent of the governed" be the guide in the rule of the sea.

The way in which the President proposed to use the power of the United States was to throw all its weight toward the formation of a concert of power. He so stated the case in this address of January 22, 1917, that, if his proposal of "peace without victory" failed of acceptance, that nation, or group of nations, which came nearest to his position upon the matter of a durable peace, could be supported by him openly and for greater than national reasons in the next crisis. Mr. Wilson's own comment upon this address is significant of his conception of leadership: "I have said what everybody has been longing for, but has thought impossible. Now it appears to be possible." 2

The next crisis Germany brought on and in a way to indicate that those in control in Germany had not the slightest appreciation of the strength of purpose of the American administration. Indeed the manner in which Germany forced the issue made it clear to those hitherto sceptical that the President's proposal of January 22,

1 See J. H. Latané, "The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace," in Annals of American Academy, LXXII, 100.

46

2 Ex-President Taft stated in an interview that this address marked an epoch in the history of our foreign policy." Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Bryan commented adversely, although each gave different reasons for so doing.

1917, was the last possible move of the United States,

/short of war itself, for participation in a conference of

nations. As Germany saw fit to challenge the basic position of the United States, i.e., its insistence upon adherence to law, the United States had but one course open, to wage war for an international ideal.

On January 31, 1917, the Imperial German government announced that on and after February 1st it would adopt a policy of sinking all ships met in the "barred sea zone." The justification for this move the German government found in the Entente rejection of the German proposal of December 12, 1916. All weapons on land, sea and air were to be used to force a decision. The President pointed out in his address to Congress on February 3, 1917 (Statement No. 81), that this was a repudiation of the promise made on May 4, 1916.

It was this repudiation that made a break with Germany inevitable at this point.1 But the speech of the President on May 27, 1916, his note of December 18, 1916, and his address of January 22, 1917, all raised the matter high above the question of a break with the government of Germany. The time had come when a break meant that the United States was to throw its power against the disturbers of world peace. It was indeed a time to talk of rights of humanity and the welfare of mankind. To Woodrow Wilson do the people of the United States owe the fact that when diplomatic relations were broken on the 3rd

1 Because of the American ultimatum of April 18, 1916. See editorial comment, American Journal of International Law, XI, 380. Also, infra, p. 102.

of February, they were broken for the purpose of advancing an international cause. The President did not ask Congress to declare war, but stated that he should take no further steps toward war until overt acts of the German government forced him to do so. It was not that he really doubted the determined purpose of the German government but that he had another step to take in the particular course that he was following.

On the next day, February 4, 1917, the Department of State asked neutrals to join with the United States in taking a position in conformity with the President's address of January 22, 1917. The German order that led to the rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States was not directed particularly or only at the United States. Consequently President Wilson urged a wider basis for the action of the United States. The statement included a definite reference to the address of January 22, 1917, as a guide and stated that a unity of action upon the part of all neutrals would make for progress toward peace for the world.1

The President was proceeding on a way habitual with him. He had moved forward one more step in his program of January 22, 1917. He now proposed to wait until the American people had not only endorsed it with enthusiasm, as they did, but until they comprehended its implication and enabled him to make the next move safely and as a ruler in a democracy should.2

1 For a summary of action of neutrals, see the World Court, III, 154-163; 234-237.

2 The American government in answer to a memorandum pre