beyond doubt existed in the parent speech, a dependent clause of this kind would inevitably come into existence at whatever point hypotaxis arose. To an "it may be done" or "can be done," there would certainly in time be a corresponding "there are means by which it may be done" or "can be done." The construction is in extremely common use in Greek, as in the following: οὐδέ οἱ ἄλλοι εἴσ', οἵ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλκοιεν κακότητα, “and others he has none, who, throughout the people, might ward off evil from him," Od. 4, 166. οὐ γάρ οἱ πάρα νῆες ἐπήρετμοι καὶ ἑταῖροι, οἵ κέν μιν πέμποιεν ἐπ ̓ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης, “ for he has no ships with oars, and no companions that might send him on his way over the broad back of the sea," Od. 17, 145. A similar interpretation gives a perfect account of Latin examples like those cited above.

Thus in

(b) Latin examples of the type in question find frequent parallels in periphrases with posset, possent, etc. the example from Caesar above, vix qua ducerentur (Potential) corresponds in the sum total of its meaning to quibus exire possent, in which the idea of Potentiality (belonging, not to the mood, but to the inherent meaning of the verb possum) is forced upon us by the examples without a form of possum. In ducerentur, accordingly, the Potential idea lies in the mood itself. Compare also, with est unde haec fiant from Terence, the example unde agger omnino comportari posset, nihil erat reliquum, from Caes., B. C. 2, 15, I.

One consideration, however, remains to be weighed. Alongside of the idiom illustrated above, Greek has also a use of the Subjunctive after a few general phrases of done.' Further consideration has led me to change my opinion regarding the nature of this clause. The unde fiat does not mean by means of which it may possibly be done,' but either by means of which it may certainly be done' (in which case the subjunctive is not potential at all, but volitive, in origin), or possibly, by means of which it would certainly be done.' At any rate, the expression leaves no room for a possible failure and may possibly' expresses an idea very remote from that in fiat."

I find myself unable to follow the thought in the second half of this statement. A "may certainly" Volitive is something both difficult and depressing. It looks as if Mr. Elmer were willing to adopt any explanation except a simple and natural

one.

existence or non-existence, mainly the latter. In the article on "Extended' and 'Remote' Deliberatives in Greek" already referred to, I have given the known examples. A single one will suffice here: ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι βλέπω πλὴν σoû, "for now I've none to whom to look, save you," Soph. Ai. 514. It is morally certain that such constructions are derived from an original deliberative type, as in the combination "to whom save you shall I look? I have no one."

It is perfectly possible, and perhaps probable, that Latin had a corresponding idiom. But the fact that Latin had but a single mood for the Subjunctive and the Optative would make this construction, if it existed, indistinguishable from the true Potential construction. In other words, there would be a fusion of two constructions, of different origin but similar feeling. This fused construction would nevertheless seem (if it existed) to have been, to the Roman consciousness, Potential in feeling, since, as said above, the examples so often find parallels in periphrases containing posset, possent, etc.

XI.-On Plato's Euthyphro.

BY PROF. W. A. HEIDEL,

IOWA COLLEGE.

IN common with many other works attributed to Plato, the Euthyphro has had its genuineness called in question by certain modern scholars. Others, while regarding it as authentic, have disparaged it from the point of view of artistic composition and philosophical content. Schleiermacher was perhaps the first among the latter; of the former there are some who have entertained decided opinions, which, as I shall endeavor to show, are not firmly founded on fact. The pedagogical value also of this dialogue has been the subject of frequent controversy among scholars in Germany, where its use in the schools has always been considerable. In view of these circumstances it may be worth our while to subject this brief work to renewed criticism and examination. It is possible that in so doing we shall advance in some measure our understanding of the Euthyphro and contribute somewhat to the solution of these vexed questions.

I.

In the dialogue there appear only two characters, Socrates and Euthyphro. This fact of itself suffices to account for one alleged defect, the lack of dramatic byplay. When we contrast this situation with that, say, of the Gorgias, the Protagoras, or the Symposium, it becomes at once apparent that the occasions and opportunities for a diversion from the closely reasoned argument are almost wholly wanting. Nor is there an effort made, as in the Phaedrus, to find a sympathetic background in nature. It is, of course, possible to maintain that such dramatic poverty argues against Platonic authorship or against the literary worth of the dialogue; but

it is at least equally possible to maintain that there may be compensations of so essential a character as to offset the lack of these more external adjuncts. I shall return to this point later on.

Of Socrates there is no need to speak at length. He appears in his customary rôle of the seeker after truth who is eager to learn from others what he himself does not profess to know. He is about to be tried for impiety; and even as he appears at the court of the King Archon to take the preliminary steps of the trial he falls in with a man who is ultraorthodox and notorious for his fanatical devotion to matters of religion. But Socrates himself is not an abstraction, simply to be defined as devotion to truth. He is a living character, with many idiosyncrasies quite beyond the comprehension of his fellow-townsmen. He has, among other such traits, the droll humor of the sage, who, without arrogating to himself the attainment of wisdom, appreciates the ignorant conceit of the multitude that makes ostentatious pretensions to knowledge. Hence, while seeking truth in all sincerity and singleness of heart, he takes an unmistakable delight in putting to confusion those who are overconfident of having attained it.

Those who were thus rebuked and those who witnessed their discomfiture naturally regarded Socrates as a man who trifled with the most sacred truth and ruthlessly laid the ax to the root of society, since they one and all assumed without question the validity of the traditional unphilosophical views. It was idle to speak to them of the benefits that would accrue to the state and to men individually from an effort to lay a rational foundation for their beliefs. Hence it was a foregone conclusion that the attempt, which Socrates made in the Apology, to show that he bore a commission from God and that his mission and his manner of fulfilling it were of the very essence of piety, should not only fail to effect his acquittal but should even fail of an intelligent hearing. Man can judge only by his own ideals, and the Athenians of that day had attained no standard but that of tradition. History makes and unmakes its own ideals, and it is better to appre

hend the progressive development of moral standards than to inveigh against temporary judgments of men. Plato, in the Euthyphro, makes it clear that he had attained to this insight; for nothing is more evident than the purpose to set over against each other two ideals, one based upon tradition, the other upon reason. Euthyphro, the type of the former, is benevolent but utterly incapable of understanding Socrates. If the Euthyphro possessed no other value but that of enforcing this truth, its claims to perpetual interest would have sufficient foundation.

Of Euthyphro, who met Socrates at the porch of the King Archon and discoursed with him on the true nature of piety, we know ultimately only what may be learned from Plato. Apart from the dialogue of which we are now speaking, he is mentioned also in the Cratylus. Euthyphro is characterized there as a reckless etymologist, whose distinctions are often far-fetched and ridiculous. In our dialogue he is a μávτis, seer, devoted to matters of religion and orthodox to a fault. Indeed, it is in consequence of his extreme orthodoxy and his disposition to apply to human affairs analogies drawn from the mythical conduct of the gods, that he is led to bring against his father the strange and questionable action for manslaughter which affords occasion for our dialogue. Dramatically he is, of course, intended primarily to serve as a foil to set off the character and conduct of Socrates. We have here piety, old style and new, placed in immediate juxtaposition for the sake of contrast. The piety of Euthyphro, well-intentioned but unenlightened, may lead to conduct the reverse of pious, as judged by the standards of the new; and Socrates, just because he discards traditional ideals and sanctions, is certain to be adjudged a paragon of impiety. Socrates is, however, so punctilious in his observance of the forms of the religion of state, and Euthyphro has a heart so much wider than his creed that he is prepared, in spite of their differences, to see in Socrates the saving influence of the city. To me there seems to be an exquisite fitness in the

13 Α: ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφ ̓ Εστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ.