ance on all causes decided, and we have no power to bring them back. After that, we can do no more than correct any clerical errors that may be found in the record of what we have done. In Brown v. Aspden, 14 How. 26, where the practice in respect to orders for rearguments was first formally announced, the rule in this particular was not extended, for Chief Justice Taney was careful to say that the order for reargument might be made after judgment, provided it was entered at the same term; and in United States v. Knight, 1 Black. 490, the same limitation is maintained. Down to that time such an order could be made only on the application of some member of the court who concurred in the judgment, and this continued until Public Schools v. Walker, supra, when leave was given counsel to submit a petition to the same effect. In all other respects the rule is now substantially the same as it was before this relaxation. Appeal from United States Circuit Court, Iowa. Brooks et al., appellants, v. Burlington & Southwestern Railway Co. Opinion by Waite, C. J.

tional provision, without reference to the statutes of the State passed in fulfillment of the constitutional mandate. Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo. 256; Railroad v. Buchanan, 39 id. 485; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518; Gray v. Coffin, 9 Cush. 192; Erickson v. Nesmith, 15 Gray, 221; Windham Prov. Inst. v. Sprague, 43 Vt. 502; Priest v. Manuf. Co., 115 Mass. 380; Shaft Co. v. Evans, 72 Penn. St. 331; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119; Dauchy v. Brown, 24 Vt. 197; Thompson on Liab. Stockh., § 56; Knowlton v. Ackley, 8 Cush. 93; Cambridge Waterworks v. Dyeing & Bleaching Co., 4 Allen, 239; Briggs v. Penniman, 1 Hopkins, 300; S. C., 8 Cow. 387; Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns. 456; Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Ibbottson, 24 Wend. 473. U. S. Circ., Massachusetts, Sept. 1880. Morley v. Thayer. Opinion by Clifford, C. J. JURISDICTION -OF FEDERAL COURT -NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.-(1) The Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under section 1, chapter 137, of the act of March 3, 1875, over a suit brought by the assignee of a municipal bond, where such bond is in form a simple acknowledgment of indebtedness, and an un

COMMON CARRIER-HAS NO RIGHT TO EXAMINE CONTENTS OF PARCELS INTRUSTED TO HIM.-The refusal of a railroad company to carry an express company's safes and chests, unless it was allowed to open the same and inspect their contents, or was furnished with an inventory of such contents, with the further understanding that the railroad company might, whenever it saw fit, open and inspect the safes and chests of the express company, and also collect the freight on each separate article or parcel contained therein, as if each had been shipped by itself, violates both the express company's rights as a shipper, and the terms of an interlocutory judgment temporarily restraining an interference with the express company's business. In the Nitro Glycerine case, 15 Wall. 524, it was held that express carriers were not chargeable with notice of the contents of the packages they carry. The court then remarks: "If express carriers are thus chargeable with notice of the contents of packages carried by them, they must have the right to refuse to receive packages offered for carriage without a knowledge of their contents. It would in that case be unreasonable to require them to accept as conclusive, in every instance, the information given by the owner. They must be at liberty, whenever in doubt, to require for their satisfaction an inspection even of the contents, as a condition of carrying the packages. This doctrino would be attended, in practice, with great inconvenience, and would seldom lead to any good. Fortunately, the law is not so unreasonable. It does not exact any such knowledge on the part of the carrier, nor permit him, in cases free from suspicion, to require information as to the contents of the packages offered." In Leaf v. Tuton, 10 Mees. & W. 397, a number of small parcels belonging to different owners were united in one large package, and directed to one person as consignee, and it was held that the carrier was bound to take the package, charging for it as if each parcel belonged to one person, and that there was no right to charge upon each separate parcel as if it had been shipped by itself. U. S. Circ., Indiana, June, 1880. Dinsmore v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railroad Co. Opinion by Gresham, D. J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EFFECT OF STATUTE LAW UPON PROVISION OF CONSTITUTION.-Section 2, art. 12, of the Constitution of Massachusetts, provides that dues from corporations shall be secured by individual liability of the stockholders to an additional amount equal to the stock owned by each stockholder, and such other means as shall be provided by law. Held, that suit could not be maintained by virtue of this constitu

a time certain. (2) The words "bearer" or order " are not essential to the negotiability of a promissory note. See City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282, 293; Brainerd v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 496; Blake v. Sup'rs S. Co., 61 Barb. 149; 3 Kent's Com. 77; Story on Notes (7th ed.), $$ 43 and 44; Daniels on Neg. Instr., § 1046; Klauber v. Biggerstaff, 47 Wis. 551. U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D. Wisconsin, July, 1880. City of Jonesville. Opinion by Bunn, D. J.

Porter v.

IOWA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. OCTOBER, 1880.

CORPORATION-SUBSCRIPTION

ΤΟ STOCK WHAT CONSTITUTES VALID SUBSCRIPTION.-Defendant subscribed a statement and the articles of incorporation of a banking corporation. The statement read thus: "We, the undersigned, having associated ourselves together for the purpose of organizing a banking association, and transacting the business of banking, under chapter 52 of the revision of 1860, do declare and state as follows: First, the name and title of the association shall be the Farmers & Merchants' Bank of Bloomfield, Iowa; second, the authorized capital of said Farmers and Merchants' Bank of Bloomfield, Iowa, shall be $150,000, which shall be divided into shares of $100 each; third, the name and residence of the shareholders of this association, with the number of shares held by each, are as follows: " To this was appended defendants' subscription thus, "J. W. Clayton, 10 shares." The articles of incorporation contained this: "Eighth. Fifty per cent of all the stock subscribed for this association before it commences business shall be paid in at the time of commencing business, and the balance so subscribed shall be paid in at such times and in such installments as the board of directors may prescribe." The directors called for full payment for the stock subscribed. Held, in an action by the assignee of the bank to recover fifty per cent unpaid on the stock, that the subscription was a valid one and defendant liable for the amount unpaid. In Spears v. Crawford, 14 Wend. 20, the writing subscribed was in these words: "We, the subscribers, do hereby severally agree to take the shares by us subscribed in the Harlem Caual Company." A certain number of shares was set opposite the name of each subscriber. The question presented was whether the mere agreement to take shares rendered the defendant liable to pay for them. The court held that it did. In Hartford & N. H. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Conn. 500, the word "subscriber" was used in what was claimed to

be the subscription to stock. It was held that the subscriber was liable to pay for the stock without a promise to do so in so many words. The court said: "It is true a promise to pay in precise terms does not appear to have been made. The defendant has not affixed his signature to an instrument which contains the words 'I promise to pay,' but he has done an equivalent act. He has contracted with the plaintiff to become a member of the corporation and to be interested in its stock." In Rensselaer & W. P. Co. v. Barton, 16 N. Y. 460, the court said: "Whatever may be the form or language of a subscription to the stock of an incorporated company, any person who in any manner becomes a subscriber for, or engages to take any portion of the stock of such company, thereby assumes to pay according to the conditions of the charter." See, also, Small v. Herkimer Manuf., etc., Co., 2 Comst. 335; Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 437; Hartford & N. H. R. Co. v. Crowell, 5 Hill, 384; W. & M. R. Co. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa, 121. Nultor. v. Clayton. Opinion by Adams, C. J.

NEGLIGENCE-ENGINE ON RAILWAY NEAR HIGHWAY MAKING NOISE WITHOUT NOTICE-QUESTION OF FACT.-While plaintiff was approaching defendants' railway crossing on the highway with his horses, an engine which stood still, without notice made a noise caused by blowing off steam and ringing a bell, preparatory to backing, whereby the horses were frightened and overturned plaintiff's wagon, injuring him. In an action for such injury, held, that whether defendant was under obligation to notify plaintiff of the intended noise and movement was a question of fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances. If the noise and movement were likely to be attended with danger to plaintiff, then it was the duty of defendant to exercise reasonable and ordinary care to prevent injury; and if the exercise of such reasonable and ordinary care, under the circumstances, would require notice in some manner to plaintiff, then it was the duty of defendant, as a matter of law, to give such notice. The true doctrine upon this subject is stated in Penn. R. Co. v. Barnet, 59 Penn. St. 259. There the plaintiff was driving over a bridge which crossed the defendant's railroad 19 feet above the track. Whilst he was upon the bridge defendant's train passed under it, whistling as it passed, at which plaintiff's horses took fright and ran away, injuring him. The court say: "It is as clearly the duty of a railroad company as it is of a natural person to exercise its rights with a considerate and prudent regard for the rights and safety of others; and for injuries occasioned by negligence, both are equally responsible. Nor is it any excuse or justification that the act occasioning the injury was in itself lawful, or that it was done in the exercise of a lawful right, if the injury arose from the negligent manner in which it was done. If there was no danger to the persons and property of those who might be travelling along the public road, in running its trains without giving any notice of their approach to the bridge, then the company is not chargeable with negligence in not giving it; but, if danger might be reasonably apprehended, it was the duty of the company to give some notice or warning in order that it might be avoided. If it would have been negligence in the plaintiff to drive upon the bridge just as the train was about to pass under it, had he been aware of its approach, then he was entitled to notice, and it was the duty of the company to give it. Whether, therefore, the company exercised proper care and diligence in running the train, in order to prevent injury to the persons and property of those who were lawfully on the public road and in the vicinity of the crossing, was a question for the jury." See, also, Hill v. P. & R. R. Co., 55 Me. 438; Norton v. Eastern R., 113 Mass. 366; Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Harmon, 47 Ill. 298; Mau

chester, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fullarton, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 53. Hart v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. Opinion by Day, J.

REAL ESTATE- BUILDING ERECTED BY LICENSE ON RAILROAD, RIGHT OF WAY NOT.-S. owned a mill near a railroad company's right of way. By permission of the company he erected an elevator on the

right of way. The machinery in this he operated by shafting carried from this mill across lands of another to the elevator. Held, that the elevator was a mere chattel not subject to a judgment lien and was liable to be seized upon execution. "A house erected by one man upon the land of another, by his assent, and upon an agreement or understanding that the builder may remove it when he pleases, does not become a part of the real estate, but remains a personal chattel, and removable." 3 Wait's Act. and Def. 381. Even if S. had held a lease of the land upon which the building was erected, and had built it for the purpose of carrying on his business therein, he would have had the right of removal; and in such case it has been held that the building would have been personal property during his term of lease, and liable to be levied upon and sold as personal property for his debts. Heffner v. Lewis, 73 Penn. St. 302; Lemor v. Miles, 4 Watts, 330; Amos & Ferr. on Fix., 250; 3 Wait's Act. and Def. 391. Walton v. Wray. Opinion by Rothrock, J.

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR-DUTY OF CREDITOR AS TO COLLATERAL SECURITY. —(1) One who receives collateral security is bound to the use of reasonable diligence in connection therewith. If the collateral be promissory notes or like evidences of debt, he is bound to use ordinary diligence to collect them. But where stock, worth about par, was deposited as collateral security, the creditor was not compelled, on failure of the debtor to pay the debt, to sell the collateral; although he had the option to do so, in the manner provided by the Code, section 2140. His not selling, although he knew that the debtors had failed in business, and the subsequent depreciation of the stock constituted no defense to an action on the indebtedness, it not appearing that the debtors took any steps to secure a sale. (2) It did not alter the case that the stock was transferred on the books and new stock issued to the creditor. No sale was claimed, and he held only sub modo. A plea to an action on the debt which sought to recoup because of the failure of the creditor to sell the collateral, not caused by him, was demurrable. Colquitt v. Stultz.

EVIDENCE-OF AGE AND NATIVITY REPORT OF OFFICIAL COMMITTEE.- In 1790 M., who had been consul in London for the Genoese government for about ten years, applied to be appointed "agent" for that government, and a committee was instructed to report as to his qualifications. M. was appointed agent, and died in London in 1803. B., his daughter, and sole next of kin, died intestate in London in 1871. In an action brought by various persons claiming to be next of kin to B., it was proposed to put in evidence the re

port of the committee made to the Genoese government in 1790, to prove the age and birthplace of M. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the evidence was not admissible either as part of the res gestæ, or as being an entry by a deceased person in discharge of his duty, or as a public document mado by a public officer. Doe v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 890, followed. Cases referred to: Higham v. Redgway, 2 Sm. L. C. 318; Price v. Lord Torrington, 1 id. 328; Irish Society v. Bishop of Derry, 12 Cl. & F. 641; Price v. Littlewood, 3 Camp. 288; Arnold v. Bishop, v. Bath, 5 Bing. 316. House of Lords, June 18, 1880. Cturia v. Freccia. Opinions by Lord Chancellor Selborne and Lords Blackburn and Watson. 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 209.

HUSBAND

AND WIFE AUTHORITY TO PLEDGE
COHABITATION-NECESSARIES-RE-

CREDIT DURING
VOCATION OF IMPLIED AUTHORITY.-A husband who
is able and willing to supply his wife with necessaries,
and who has forbidden her to pledge his credit, cannot
be held liable for necessaries bought by her; and a
tradesman, without notice of the husband's prohibi-
tion and without having had previous dealings with
the wife with his assent, cannot maintain an action
against him for the price of articles of female attire
suitable to her station in life, and supplied to her upon
his credit but without his knowledge or assent. Jolly
v. Reese, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 177,
approved of. Ct. App., March 24, 1880. Debenham v.
Mellor. Opinions by Bramwell, Baggalay and Thesiger,
L. JJ. L. R., 5 Q. B. D. 394.

PUBLIC POLICY COMPOUNDING CRIME AGREEMENT NOT TO PROSECUTE MISDEMEANOR RIGHT TO RETURN OF SECURITIES DEPOSITED. An agreement not to go on with a prosecution of an offense of a public nature for private benefit is contrary to public policy and bad. For tho purpose of this rule some misdemeanors are considered to be of a private nature only, but all felonies and many misdemeanors (among which is the crime of larceny by a bailee) are considered to be of a public nature. It is immaterial whether the proposal for the compromise proceeded in the first instance from the prosecutor or from the accused person or his friends. It is immaterial whether the judge presiding at the criminal trial did or did not give his assent to the withdrawal of the prosecution on the terms of the compromise. It is immaterial whether the wrongful act charged against the accused person was or was not sufficient to give rise to a right to proceed civilly as well as criminally. Where title deeds have been deposited at a bank in order to insure the carrying into effect of an agreement for a compromise of a prosecution, on the agreement being declared invalid, the person who deposited the deeds is entitled to have them returned to him. Clubb v. Hutson, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 414; Keer v. Leeman, 3 L. T. Rep. 299, and Osbaldiston v. Simpson, 7 id. 347; 1 id. 535; Williams v. Bayley, 14 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 802. Ch. Div., July 1, 1880. Whitmore v. Farley. Opinion by Fry, J. 43 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 192.

NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

A meeting of the Executive Committee was held, pursuant to a call issued by the chairman, at the office of the secretary, Albany, N. Y., November 15, 1880, at 4 P. M. Mr. Mathews in the chair.

There were present President Hand, Albert Mathews, Clifford A. Hand, Elliott F. Shepard, First District; William M. Ivins, Second District; S. W. Rosendale, Third District; Horace E. Smith, John R. Putnam, Fourth District; and Bradley B. Burt, Fifth District-a quorum.

An excuse on behalf of Mr. A. J. Abbott was received and filed. The minutes of the meeting held February 18, 1880, were read and approved. The amendment proposed by Albert Mathews to By-law X. as follows: In the paragraph of said By-law X, commencing with the words, "In case any standing committee shall fail to organize," strike out the words, "whose duty it shall be to submit by mail," etc., down to and including the words, "as prescribed in the Bylaws;" also the whole of the succeeding paragraph ending with the words "by a plurality vote be elected chairman of the committee," and substitute in lieu of all the matters so stricken out the words following, viz., "to be the chairman thereof, and another member to be the secretary thereof, until otherwise provided by such committee," was taken up for consideration. The secretary reported that he had on tho 15th day of April, 1880, pursuant to By-law XI, notified in writing all members of the Executive Committee, of the proposed amendment to By-law X, and had invited the views of the chairmen of the various standing committees in regard to the same, and also

read a letter received from John F. Seymour, Esq., Chairman of the Committee on Grievances, relative thereto.

The question being taken on the adoption of the

amendment, the same was unanimously adopted. resolution adopted at the meeting of this committee, The secretary also reported that pursuant to tho held February 18, 1880, requesting that "the chairman and secretary of the committee prepare for publication the report of the annual meeting of 1879, pursuant to article XII of the Constitution, and that a sum not exceeding $600 be appropriated for that purpose"that they had discharged the duties thereby imposed, that the contract for the printing thereof was awarded to the Argus Company, for the sum of $419, they being the lowest bidders; that the usual number of copies were printed and distributed, and that the bill for tho samo had been audited to the abovo amount, and tho same had been paid.

Mr. Hand moved that the report be accepted and the action ratified. Adopted.

The secretary reported that no determination had been reached relative to bills for printing "Subject and Regulations for Prize Essay of 1879." time was granted.

The secretary presented bills as follows:
Disbursements.

Postage on Annual Reports, etc..
Weed, Parsons & Co.....
The Argus Company

Further

$53 48

7 25

52 25

On motion the secretary was authorized to audit bill for clerical services for the remainder of the year for an amount not exceeding $150, the balance of the appropriation.

Mr. Ivins, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Miller, from the Committee of Arrangements, reported that the arrangements for the annual meeting had been completed; that Hon. George W. Biddle, of Philadelphia, had been invited and had accepted the invitation to deliver the annual address; that Essays had been promised by members from each of four districts, as follows: Edward E. Sprague, of Flushing; Hon. Mathew Hale, of Albany; James D. Teller, of Auburn; Joshua Gaskill of Lockport; and that all members of the Association had been notified of the annual meeting, by the secretary of this committee inclosing, with the notice, a copy of the order of exercises; that the arrangements had been made at the Kenmore Hotel for the annual dinner, same as last year, and that the Judges of the Court of Appeals, and of the General Term of the Supreme Court, Third Department (to be in session), had been invited.

Mr. Ivins moved that the sum of $150, or so much

resented, and does not include the value of articles stolen from it. National Commercial Bank of Mobile v. Mayor, p. 284.- An assessment upon the shares of a National bank in gross, or upon the capital stock, against the corporation, is invalid, but the remedy is at law and not by injunction. Buckalew v. State, p. 334.- Where money is put upon a round board, having different numbers around its rim, in equal amounts by several persons, each in turn whirling a hand fastened in the center, the one at whose whirl the hand registers the highest number taking all the money, the owner of the board sometimes putting up money and sometimes charging the winner a small sum for the use of the board, this is not a lottery. Wright v. Paine, p. 340.-An instrument acknowledging the receipt of money "for safe-keeping," to be "returned whenever called for," is prima facie a special and not a general deposit; and an instrument acknowledging the receipt of money "on deposit, to be paid on demand," is prima facie a loan, against the recovery of which the statute of limitations will run from the date of the writing, and not from demand. Sumter County v. National Bank of Gainesville, p. 464.-Repeating the doctrine of Nat. Bk. v. Mayor, supra, and adding that where a provision in a statute, that a tax shall be paid by the bank for the shareholders, depends upon other and unconstitutional provisions, and is incapable of independent operation, it is invalid, and the county has no right of action against the bank for the tax. John v. City National Bank of Selma, p. 529.It is a sufficient excuse for omitting personal notice of dishonor to an indorser, residing in the same place with the holder, that an attempt was made during business hours to do so, but his office was locked and no one was present to receive the notice, and in such case notice by mail is valid. The volume is marked by the usual excellencies of the series.

CORRESPONDENCE.

FORENSIC ELOQUENCE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Your note in yesterday's ALBANY LAW JOURNAL on the decline of eloquence at the bar brought to my mind a passage which I regard as one of the gems of our judicial literature. It is from William Eden's* "Principles of Penal Law," published anonymously in 1771. Of course its allusions will be readily understood by placing one's self in imagination at that period. You will find it on the 159th and 160th pages of the second edition - one paragraph commencing with the words: "It is a consequence of that wisdom," etc. Lest you may not be able to lay your hands on the volume, I copy the paragraph:

"It is a consequence of that wisdom which characterizes the English, as a people, in the whole system and administration of their laws, that all the artifices of speech are banished from the bar. The passions ought not to be addressed in appeals to the reason. The unsubstantial harmony of declamation may be well adapted to the ears of an arbitrary tribunal; but the decisions of English judges are founded on the argumentative inferences of strict statutes and recorded precedents. Our courts have furnished proofs indeed, that the strains of ancient eloquence are neither inimitable nor unattainable; but a nobler and more proper theater hath been found for the exertion of that talent. Plain sense, delivered in accurate expression, with a warm and graceful articulation, is the true cloquence of law."

It seems to me that this passage is worthy to be set beside the concluding paragraph of Coke's Commentary upon Littleton, and his application of the apologue

*Afterward Lord Auckland.

of the eagle's nest, in the Preface to the 8th Reports. How delicate and beautiful is the allusion to Mansfield and Camden, then holding divided rule in the House of Lords! Lord Bacon, however, had said before: "When the famous case of the copper-mines was argued in this court [the Exchequer], and judged for the king, it was not upon the fine reasons of wit; as that the king's prerogative drew to it the chief 'in quaque specie;' the lion is the chief of beasts, the eagle the chief of birds, the whale the chief of fishes, and so copper the chief of minerals; for these are but dalliances of law, and ornaments; but it was the grave records and precedents that grounded the judgment of that cause; and therefore I would have you both guide and arm yourself with them against these vapours and fumes of the law, which are extracted out of men's inventions and conceits."

Dr. Blair evidently had Eden's book before him when he composed his Lecture on the Eloquence of the Bar-the 28th of his "Rhetoric."

Having thus displayed before us in the old books the true model of forensic eloquence, it is not to be wondered at that the highest legal talent should aim at a calm and temperate method of speech. As, in the progress of the nation, all the arts become more refined and subdued to the rigid laws of taste, it is but natural that our profession should feel the influence of this progress. The fervid flights of Patrick Henry and the vehement declamation of Pinckney would hardly be deemed fitting, at the present day, in the discussion of grave questions before a competent court. The finest exhibitions of legal eloquence to which it has been my fortune to listen have been made by the late George Wood, of New York, and Judge B. R. Curtis. Their arguments always filled the mind, the ear and the sense of fitness and good taste. Aud of the two, I always thought the style of George Wood the more admirable. It was chaste, yet rich in choice legal diction, pervaded with the odor of jurisprudence, as parchments with the sandal-wood in which they are kept, and conveying the impression that it was the law itself, and not an argument upon the law, which the advocate was unfolding.

But I am digressing. I took my pen merely to refer you to the beautiful passage of Eden.

Respectfully, your obed't servant,

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14, 1880.

JOSEPH P. BRADLEY.

LEGISLATIVE HUMORISTS.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Your correspondent, J. H. Hopkins, in his article on Legislative Humorists, might have instanced several other blunders perpetrated by the last Legislature of the State of New York.

Chapter 480 of the Laws of 1880, cited by him, not only amends a section that had been twice repealed, but is in conflict with the Constitution of the State (Art. 6, § 15).

Chapter 416 of the Laws of 1880 purports to amend sections 197 and 198 of title 3, chapter 3, part 4 of the Revised Statutes. These numbers are evidently taken from Banks & Brothers' sixth edition of the Revised Statutes (so called), a book which, as every lawyer knows, is an unauthorized compilation of all the statutes of the State, revised or general, which seemed to the editor to be of general interest, and in which the editor has taken the unwarrantable liberty of prefixing numbers to the various sections to suit himself. The sections intended to be amended by chapter 416 of the Laws of 1880, are 150 and 151 of the above title, chapter and part of the Revised Statutes.

Chapter 437 of the Laws of 1880, amends section 16, article 3, chapter 6, part 1 of the Revised Statutes. There are eight titles in chapter 6, and several sections