along with the limitations of time, has resulted in the adoption of rules of procedure by which it is intended that business shall be done quickly without any detriment to the public interests. As a result of the short session a great part of the time is taken in the presentation of bills and in the consideration of measures in committee, leaving a very small amount of time for the passage of measures. Thus, it is not unusual for fifty or a hundred bills to be passed on the last few days in a rush which gives little or no time to the careful consideration of separate measures. Furthermore, constitutions contain rules of procedure which tend to hamper the legislature rather than to expedite the legislative process, such, for example, as the requirements for the reading of bills, which must either be ignored or perfunctorily performed by reading titles. The practice of bringing in special rules to govern procedure with respect to matters in which the legislative leaders are concerned, and of setting aside rules of procedure by unanimous consent, often fosters contempt for constitutional limitations.

Another matter frequently commented upon relative to American legislatures is the enormous number of bills presented at each legislative session and the great number and variety of bills enacted into laws. Different causes contribute to the grist of the legislative mill. In the first place, individual members can introduce bills freely instead of securing the consent of the House or a committee in advance as was formerly the practice in Congress and in the state legislatures. Again, a large number of bills approximating as high as 60 per cent in certain legislatures are introduced at the request of individuals or societies.1 Many duplicate bills or bills dealing with substantially the same matters are introduced. It is not unusual for ten or more bills to be presented to accomplish the same purpose. Finally, it is regarded as enhancing the prestige of a mem

"Legislative Procedure in the Forty-eight States," Bulletin No. 3, Nebraska Legislative Reference Bureau, p. 9.

ber if his name is attached as the proponent of many bills. Although attempts have been made to restrict the freedom of members to introduce measures, none has proved acceptable in practice.

Restrictive Rules of Procedure and the Committee System. While there are great differences in the practices and the procedure in the various state legislatures, a few general characteristics may be briefly noted. One of the special features of American legislatures is the extraordinary power of the speaker based upon:

a. The right of recognition and the right to make rulings which can be reversed only by majority vote.

b. Power of appointment which includes the selection of chairmen and members of the committees.

c. Power of reference-selection of the committee to which a bill is referred.

With these powers and the control of all the important committees the speaker and a few of the members practically control the business of a session.

A feature which differentiates American legislative procedure is the division of the houses into numerous committees upon which devolve a large part of the burden of sifting evidence, of passing on various proposed bills, and of making recommendations favorable or unfavorable to passage. Perhaps nothing indicates so well the cumbersome methods of American legislatures as the number and size of the committees. The number of committees varies from about thirty to seventy and the members of each committee, from ten to forty. Each member is expected to serve on five or more committees.

Such an endless multiplication of committees would of course be impossible if it were not that the burden of work is confined to a few of the more important, while others meet but irregularly throughout the session. Everywhere the committees on appropriations, judiciary, and municipal affairs will be found crowded with work. Of less importance, although with plenty to do, will be found committees dealing with

agriculture, banking, county affairs, education, corporations, railroads, fish and game, and roads and bridges. Then follow the, committees, whose work is almost negligible. It has been stated by members of experience that twenty-three of the forty-one committees of the Pennsylvania House are of no importance and could readily be abolished. Of the thirty-eight committees of the Ohio House of 1915 there were sixteen which considered less than ten bills each out of a total of nine hundred and twelve introduced. In the session of the same year twelve committees of the Vermont House, eleven of the Senate, and six joint committees, received less than ten bills each. Evidently some readjustment is needed. A few committees are overwhelmed; others never meet.1

This division into committees seems to have been necessary, owing to the great amount and variety of matters presented to American legislatures, but it has tended to divide and disperse responsibility and thereby to weaken the power and influence of the body as a whole. The chairman of such committees frequently can decide whether or not a public hearing shall be held, and committees have the privilege of reporting bills or of refusing to make any report. It is evident that numerous large committees mean a lack of responsible action and of open public discussion. The actual work of committees is usually accomplished in what is known as "executive session." Here the few legislators vitally interested in or opposed to measures are afforded an opportunity either to push them through the committee or to kill the measures, with little possibility of being held responsible for the action and with little concern as to what the majority of the legislature may approve or disapprove. The committee system in American legislatures has taken, to a great extent, the place of the rule of the majority of the house. While it is possible to bring proposals before legislatures when an unfavorable report is made by a committee, the process is in most cases so difficult as to prove well-nigh prohibitive.

1 H. W. Dodds, "Procedure in State Legislatures," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1918, pp. 40-41.

2 For a good account of the committee system see A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (The Macmillan Company, 1916), pp. 253 ff.

The committee system and the elaborate rules of procedure designed to bind legislative action have had the following results:

I. The real work of the legislature is performed through committees. II. Toward the end of the session the business of the House is largely in the hands of the Speaker with the Committee on Rules and a steering committee whose duty it is to save as many as possible of the important public bills.

III. The elaborate rules which bind the Houses during the early part of the session are pretty consistently ignored during the closing days, when by unanimous consent numerous bills are hurriedly rushed through. IV. There is little real debate on the floor.

Almost universally [says Professor Holcombe] the actual work of the committees is done in secret or executive session, and there is no provision for roll-calls on contested measures, or for any record of committee proceedings. A more irresponsible procedure could not be devised.1

The Lobby and the Dominance of Special Interests.-A primary cause of the decline in prestige of American legislatures is the conviction that much legislation is secured through special interests which maintain lobbies for the purpose of influencing legislation. It is generally recognized that a citizen who is interested in any proposed legislation has a right to employ an agent to collect evidence and to present it to the committee or to the members of the legislature in a fair and open manner. But the sinister nature of the lobby has been described suggestively by Governor Russell of Massachusetts:

There exists in this state, as in other states, an irresponsible body, known as the lobby, representing or preying upon special interests, which professes and undertakes for hire to influence or control legislation. Its work is wholly distinct and different from the advocacy of one's cause in person or by counsel or agent, which is the constitutional right of everyone. It seeks often to control nominations and elections and to subject the individual legislator, directly or indirectly, to secret and improper influences. It throws suspicion upon the honest and temptation in the way of the dishonest. Professing power greater than

A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 258.

it has, it frequently extorts money as the price of silence or unnecessary assistance. It has initiated legislation attacking the interests of its clients, in order to be hired to defend those interests. It has caused the expenditure of large sums of money to obtain or defeat legislation. It cares little for the merits of a measure or the means employed to make it successful. In my judgment improper measures have, by its influence, been made law against the public interests and just measures have been defeated. These criticisms have not been based upon rumor or conjecture, but upon facts reported after a most thorough investigation by your predecessors who denounced the evil in unsparing terms and diligently sought a remedy.1

Various methods have been tried to overcome, or at least to lessen, the evils resulting from the practice of lobbying, but they have met with little success. Chief among these attempts has been the policy of making public the names of lobbyists, together with the compensations which they receive for their services. Some states also require that the names of such paid agents, as well as the names of the persons employing them and the nature of the measures for which they are working, be registered with the sergeant-at-arms. Further efforts have been made to secure even more drastic legislation against the lobby, but in the main little has been accomplished except to prevent lobbying in the legislative halls and corridors, to require registration, and to secure a certain element of publicity in connection with personal solicitation. It is recognized, however, that the laws enacted against the lobby have accomplished little in the way of improving the methods of influencing legislation.2

Although it is generally taken for granted that legislatures are lawmaking bodies, the part which they perform is to an increasing degree little more than registering the ends sought and planned by those desiring government assistance and protection. It has been said that legislatures

1 From a message to the Massachusetts legislature, January, 1891, quoted in P. S. Reinsch, Readings on American State Government, p. 79.

2A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 275.