This table, although the best available, has some inaccuracies. The public owned railways of the United States in Panama and Alaska are not included, and the purchase of the Grand Trunk Pacific system by Canada increases the government railways of that country by more than 15,000 miles.

It will thus be seen that most of the leading countries of the world own and operate their railway systems. England and the United States are the chief exceptions.

The friends of public ownership contend that through public ownership the following improvements have resulted: The conditions of labor have been meliorated; rates have been reduced; the service has been improved; travel and

transportation are safer, with less loss of human lives; the railroads are better financed; great economies have been introduced; and railroads have been taken out of politics.1

But the testimony on these counts is far from conclusive. Many of those favoring private ownership see in the publicowned railways a continuous round of failures. And the supporters of private ownership have been continuously presenting their case to the public by means of a systematically organized campaign to "educate the people." It is a noteworthy fact that two of the best railway systems and a large part of the world's mileage are privately owned and managed. Furthermore a few important countries such as Germany and France nationalized the railways as a measure of public defense and not because private ownership was regarded a failure. It is very difficult indeed to secure a fair and unbiased presentation of the cause of public ownership. Many of those who undertake to inform the public are biased on one side or the other. And then the conditions vary so much in the separate countries that comparisons often have relatively little weight. For the citizen the problem is one on which reliable information should be demanded in order that an intelligent and fairminded judgment may be formed. In this as in numerous other government problems the matters involved are of such a complex character that specialists alone can form really intelligent judgments.

Objections to Public Ownership.3-Numerous objections have been advanced by the opponents of the policy of government ownership of public utilities. It is claimed that such a policy is contrary to the fundamental principles of our system of government, and that our political institutions, as they now exist, are not adapted to the manage

1 Cf. Carl D. Thompson, "Public Ownership of Railways," Bulletin No. 12, Public Ownership League of America, pp. 8 ff.

2 Cf. Yves Guyot, Where and Why Public Ownership Has Failed (The Macmillan Company, 1914).

Cf. pamphlet by The Merchants' Association of New York, "Opposing Government Ownership and Operation of Public Utilities," November, 1916,

ment of large economic concerns. Moreover, it is maintained that the assuming of the proprietorship of public utilities by the government would mean a great financial loss. Especially would this be the case if the railroads should be taken over and be operated by the national government. Extravagances incident to the management of large business projects by persons holding their positions through political appointment or through popular election have been contrasted with the economical methods used by business experts employed by the heads of large utility corporations.

The basis for these objections, given somewhat in detail, is that the fundamental principles of our system of government require frequent changes, both in the executive and law making bodies. From these periodical changes would follow, after the advent of government ownership utilities, undesirable if not deplorable conditions. It is conceded that frequent changes in the administration of great economic concerns are invariably accompanied by inertia and hesitancy, due to conflicting policies and inexperience and to the critical attitude assumed toward the methods which are in operation at the time of the change in officials. The final outcome of this vacillation is great financial loss. Moreover, the legislature or, in the case of a city, the council or commission, through its power to prescribe by law or ordinance the regulations governing the management of utilities, has an opportunity to place hampering restrictions and limitations upon executives or managers. These restrictions or limitations would prevent prompt action in cases of emergency or in the disposition of important questions of policy which frequently arise in the handling of large economic enterprises.

Another argument advanced against national control of a utility is the evil incident to the sectional demands made upon Congress. Sectional interests have had no inconsiderable influence in bringing about legislation for the benefit of particular localities rather than in the interest of

the country at large. The tendency of Congress to yield to the demands of political expediency and to sectional appeal, it is held, is only too clearly manifested in the policy of Congress toward river and harbor improvements. As a result large appropriations have been made for unrelated projects, to the neglect of any unified and comprehensive plan for a national system of waterways.

In addition to the extravagances already mentioned that, it is believed, would be sure to result from the periodical change in the directing personnel of the service, together with the waste resulting from conflicting policies in management, serious loss and inefficiency would result, likewise, from the failure of the law or ordinance-making bodies to make adequate appropriations for the general up-keep and betterment of the utilities. It is maintained that, as a general rule, when a public utility has been taken over by a local government, there has resulted, through lack of funds and the failure of the public to realize the legitimate needs of efficient management, a deterioration in the service rendered by the utility. Old and inadequate machinery is often kept, in spite of manifest loss both in money and efficiency, because the necessary funds to install new and better machinery are withheld by the city officials, who are supported by the public sentiment, unappreciative of what would constitute an appropriation sufficient for the maintenance of the utility and heedless of the fact that such an appropriation would mean ultimately a cutting down in the present excessive cost of operation. Successful managers of private enterprises adopt the policy not only of keeping abreast of the times in the management of economic enterprises, but also of looking ahead toward the future development of the projects. Governments, owing to their political organization and to the fact that they are backed by a prejudiced or conservative public opinion which is loath to support large expenditures, however necessary, are accused of lagging behind in the installation

of modern machinery and up-to-date methods in the management of public utilities.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO UTILITY PROBLEMS

The problems, then, which have developed in connection with the ownership and regulation of public utilities are at present unsolved. Though it is generally acknowledged that under existing conditions some form of public control or regulation is desirable, the nature of that control and the proper extent of public regulation remain to be determined. The utility owners themselves have recognized the need of proper and effective regulation and have become advocates of the policy of regulation by commissions. But the establishment of the commission, the determination of its powers, the relation between state and local commissions, are still in the experimental stage. Judging from the experience of New York, the commission may become the tool of the very interests for the regulation of which it has been established. In fact, it is openly charged that the great public utilities have directed and influenced the appointment of commissioners who were known to favor corporate interests. The few striking instances of this character which have come to light, and the fact that the utilities have become such ardent advocates of utility commissions, have led some of the leaders interested in the public welfare to question the usefulness of state commissions. On the other hand, there are few who would favor the abolition of commissions and a return to the old order. It has not yet been determined how a commission may be constituted and empowered so as to deal fairly by the capitalist and the investor and at the same time attain its main object, namely, the protection of the small user of the utility.

On the other hand, the problem of public ownership looms constantly greater. There has been a steady growth