H. OF R.] Amendment of the Constitution-Election of President and Vice President. [DECEMBER, 1823. THURSDAY, December 18. iana, HENRY H. GURLEY and EDWARD LIVINGThree other members, to wit: from LouisSTON; and from New York, JOHN J. MORGAN, appeared, were qualified, and took their seats. FRIDAY, December 19. Widow of Captain Lawrence. Mr. CROWNINSHIELD, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, made a report on the petition of Julia Lawrence, widow of Captain James Lawrence, deceased, late of the Navy of the United States, accompanied by a bill further extending the term of half-pay pensions to the widows and children of officers, seamen, and marines, who died in the public service; which bill was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole. The question being on agreeing to the resolve, Mr. RANKIN observed, that a similar proposition to that now offered had been brought forward by the gentleman from Maryland, at a former session of Congress; and he regretted that it had not, now, been thrown into the same form as when before offered. It was then presented in an affirmative shape, which afforded facility for a more direct and immediate discussion of the merits of the proposition by the House. He was opposed to the reference of this inquiry to a select committee, if it went to a committee at all; not on any special, but on a general principle. It was the well-known and universal usage, in appointing select committees, to compose them of the known friends of the measures proposed; in consequence of which only an ex parte view of subjects was presented to the House in the reports of the committees, and time was consumed in obtaining, by discussion, the views of gentlemen of the opposite opinion. But, a standing committee was a sort of general tribunal, composed neither of the friends nor the opposers of any particular measures such a committee was likely to present a more general view of subjects committed to their consideration, than a select committee; and, should they report against any particular measure, its advocates had still their appeal to the House, and full liberty to discuss its merits. He thought the subject of the resolution had better be referred to the Committee on Public Lands-not because he happened personally to be connected with that committee, but because the nature of the object embraced by the resolution seemed nat-between Florida and the Bahama Banks, does urally to belong to it. Mr. JENNINGS said, he apprehended the resolution was not very well understood by the House. It certainly was not by him, judg- | ing from the remarks which had been made upon it. For further examination of it, he moved that the resolve lie on the table, and be printed. Which motion was agreed to. WEDNESDAY, December 17. Civilization and Education of the Indians. Mr. HEMPHILL presented a memorial of a meeting of the Synod of Philadelphia, embracing the Presbyterian Churches in the southwestern part of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the States of Maryland and Delaware, and the District of Columbia, convened at Georgetown, in said District, in October, 1823, praying for an increase of the annual priation for civilizing the Indian tribes and introducing the knowledge of letters among them; which memorial was referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs. appro MONDAY, December 22. Dry Tortugas-Abaco-Hole in the Wall- Mr. LIVINGSTON laid the following resolutions on the table for consideration on tomorrow, viz: Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to report what progress has been made in erecting light-houses on the Dry Tortugas, and at or the security of the navigation of the Gulf Stream, near Cape Florida; and that he also report whether not require the erection of light-houses, or beacons, or the placing of buoys or floating-lights on some other places, on or near the coast of Florida. Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to negotiate with the Government of Great Britain for a cession of so much land on the Island of Abaco, at or near the Hole in the Wall, and at such other places, within the acknowledged dominion of that power, on the islands, keys, or shoals, on the Bahama Banks, as may be necessary for the ereefloating-lights, for the security of navigation over and tion and support of light-houses, beacons, buoys, or near the said banks, and to be used solely for such purposes. Resolved, That the Secretary of State be directed to ascertain and report to this House, whether the rocks called the double-headed shot keys, or any other of the rocks or desert islets, near the Bahams Banks, but separated therefrom by a deep channel, and on which the security of navigation of the Gulf of Florida requires that light-houses or beacons should be placed, are within the dominion of any and what foreign Kingdom or State, or whether they are not now subject to be appropriated by the right of occupancy. Amendment of the Constitution-Election of Mr. MODUFFIE, from the committee appointed "to inquire into the expediency of recommend DECEMBER, 1823.] Amendment of the Constitution-Election of President and Vice President. ing to the several States the propriety of amending the Constitution of the United States, in such manner that the mode of electing the members of the House of Representatives in Congress may be uniform throughout the United States; also, that the mode of choosing Electors of President and Vice President of the United States may be, in like manner, uniform; and, also, that the election of the said officers may, in no event, devolve upon the House of Representatives;" made a detailed report, accompanied by a joint resolution, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in respect to the election of a President and Vice President of the United States; which resolution was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union, The report and resolution are as follows: The committee, profoundly impressed with the importance of the propositions embraced in the resolution under which they have been appointed, have felt a corresponding sense of the magnitude and difficulty of the duty imposed upon them by the order of the House. To devise a plan for the election of members of the House of Representatives, and of the President and Vice President of the United States, which will correct existing and obviate impending evils, and, at the same time, harmonize the conflicting views of States, variously situated, and variously affected by it, has been the anxious desire and laborious effort of the committee. How far they have been successful in accomplishing these great objects, they submit it to the indulgence and liberality of the House to determine. The Constitution of the United States provides, that "the times, places, and manner, of holding elections for Representatives, shall be prescribed, in each State, by the Legislature thereof; that Congress may, at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations." It also provides, that "each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress." The plan submitted by the committee, proposes that each State shall be divided into as many districts as will equal the number of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress; and that each of the said districts shall elect one Representative. It also proposes, that each of the said districts shall choose one Elector of President and Vice President of the United States; and that the Electors, thus appointed in each State, shall have the two additional Electors to which the State is entitled. [H. OF R. of a written constitution, will lead us to the extraordinary but manifest conclusion that, in relation to the mode of choosing the popular branch of the National Legislature, and of the Chief Executive Magistrate of the Republic, we have no constitutional provision at all. A fixedness and permanence, not liable to be disturbed by ordinary acts of legislation, are essentution. Accordingly, in all Governments having any tially involved in the elementary notion of a constijust pretensions to civilization or freedom, it has been a primary object to secure those fundamental canons which give organization and impulse to the political system, against any changes proceeding from an authority less solemn and weighty than the source of sovereignty itself. To secure liberty against the violent tyranny of successive and temporary factions, and, also, against the more systematic encroachments of ambition, this extraordinary stability of the law, which constitutes the Government, has been found, by universal experience, to be an indispensable safeguard. Yet, in direct violation of this primary and essential principle of regulated freedom, the very foundations of the two most important branches of this Government are permitted to fluctuate with the mutable counsels of twenty-four separate Legislatures. The committee, therefore, believe that the plan proposed is recommended, not less by the consideration that it permanently and uniformly fixes the rule which it introduces, than by the intrinsic superiority of that rule to any other that has been adopted, amidst the changes incident to the existing state of constitutional laxity. Under the existing system, if system that may be called which is without system, the inquiry in the respective States is not, which is intrinsically the best mode of choosing Representatives in Congress, and Electors of President and Vice President of the United States, but what is the best defensive expedient to counteract the regulations of other States, and secure the utmost relative weight in the affairs of the Union. The party which happens to have the ascendency will thus be furnished with pretexts, at least plausible and imposing, for the adoption of measures calculated to deprive the minority of their just rights, and tending to produce, as they invariably have produced, that acrimonious political excitement which inevitably results from injustice and oppression, however disguised or palliated by motives of public expediency. To prevent majorities from exercising this sort of oppression, is one of the primary objects of a written constitution. With these general preliminary views, the committee will proceed to the separate consideration of the amendments embraced in the plan submitted to the House. It has been seen that the "times, places, and manner," of electing the members of this House, are now liable to be prescribed by the Legislatures of the several States, subject to the controlling and superseding power of Congress. In addition to the remarks already made on the political solecism of placing it in the power of every State government virtually to change the constitution of the Union, the committee feel bound to examine briefly the nature and tendency of the power thus vested in Congress. From this collated view of the existing provisions and proposed amendments of the constitution, it will be seen that a fundamental change is contemplated, in reference to the mode of choosing members of the House of Representatives, and Electors of President and Vice President of the United States. It is a change, however, which counts among its strongest claims to our favorable consideration, its absolute efficacy in preventing changes. For it will fix upon uniform principles those creative operations of popular sovereignty, which are now liable to be If it should happen to this, as it has happened to controlled by the diversified and clashing expedients all other free countries, that the administration of of twenty-four States, mutually independent. Indeed, the Republic should fall into the hands of a faction; an attentive consideration of the nature and functions of men who, having acquired power by corrupt H. OF R.] Amendment of the Constitution-Election of President and Vice President. combinations, would be disposed to retain it in opposition to the will of the people, and to exert it in opposition to their interests, the power in question would become exceedingly dangerous. It is in such periods that the barriers of the constitution are most essential; because it is in such periods that those, from whose reluctant grasp the sceptre of dominion is about to be wrested by an indignant people, are exposed to the strongest human temptation to perpetuate their authority by every desperate expedient not absolutely prohibited. And does not the constitution almost literally place in their hands precisely such an expedient in the power of regulating the elections of the members of this body? It is susceptible of demonstration, that the elections might be so arranged by a party in power, that a small minority of the people would elect a majority of the national representatives. The mode of operation would be various, according to varying circumstances. Sometimes the object would be accomplished by changing the district into the general-ticket system; sometimes by an artificial arrangement of districts; and sometimes by a skilful combination of both. As nothing is too desperate for a faction, struggling for existence, let us suppose that they should prescribe, as they would have the unquestionable power to prescribe, that, in all those States where a majority of the people were favorable to their purposes, the representatives should be elected by a general ticket, thus suppressing the voice of the minority; and, that all the States opposed to their domination, should be divided into districts, in such manner that the minority of the people should elect a majority of representatives. As examples of such high-handed proceedings are already to be found in the history of several of the State governments, the supposition that the General Government, with more powerful inducements to mislead it, will, at some future period, pursue a similar course, cannot be considered extravagant or improbable. The committee therefore feel the deepest conviction, that the power now vested in Congress, of controlling the election of its own members, is utterly inconsistent with every just conception of constitutional liberty, and ought no longer to exist. Having thus attempted to show the necessity of a plan of such permanence, as equally to exclude the disturbing influence, both of the General and State Governments, the committee propose to examine the comparative advantages of the general-ticket and district systems of electing the Representatives in Congress. It will scarcely be denied, that a just regard for the relative weight of each State in the affairs of the Union, requires that one or the other of the systems should prevail in all the States. Upon any question of national policy, in relation to which the interests or wishes of two States should stand mutually opposed, it would be obviously unjust that the one should have, by means of a general ticket, an undivided vote in this House; while the other, electing by districts, might be almost neutralized by her divisions. It remains, therefore, only that we inquire which of the two systems is intrinsically the best. In favor of the general-ticket system, it has been urged, with considerable plausibility, that, by extending the sphere of selection, the number of competitors, of competent qualifications, will be proportionally increased, and that the influence of demagogues, who can only operate effectually in a small sphere, will be greatly diminished. [DECEMBER, 1823. It cannot be denied that it sometimes happens that a particular district might select a representative residing out of its limits, better qualified than any residing within them; but, it is to be remarked, that there is nothing in the system proposed, which will prevent a district from electing any resident citizen of the State, without regard to the particular place of his residence. It is true that each district will generally elect one of its own citizens, from obvious considerations justifying the preference. But this, so far from being an objection, would tend to produce a distribution of the talent of the State, in every view desirable; for it has been found that talents, like every thing else, will naturally seek the market which promises the most appropriate reward. That part of the argument under consideration, which assumes that the district system is calculated to give to the arts of demagogues an undue ascendency, is worthy of a more serious consideration. It will be admitted that this system enables the constituent to become better acquainted with his representative than is practicable under the other. Can it be maintained, then, that, in proportion as we increase the opportunities of the people to obtain a knowledge of the character and qualifications of the candidates, we diminish the chances of a judicious selection? Is it true, that, in a fair competition before the people, art and hypocrisy will prevail over talent, integrity, and independence? On the contrary, it is confidently believed that truth will ultimately prevail in all competitions before the people, if maintained with an ability and firmness equal to that by which error is supported. This proposition is the basis upon which only a representative democracy can be sustained. If it be not true, it then becomes expedient to devise some scheme which will virtually take from the people the elective power. And the committee are of opinion that the general-ticket system is precisely of this description. In a State of any considerable extent, almost every candidate must, in the nature of things, be unknown to the great body of the people. They, of necessity, vote by faith, and not by knowledge; and the few distinguished politicians who are selected to concentrate the popular opinion, acquire a control over it little short of the power of absolute dictation. Universal experience teaches us that few men are to be found, of sufficient firmness and purity to resist the temptation to abuse such power. Cabals and factious combinations, stimulated by selfish views of aggrandizement, are the inevitable conse quences. But it is not to be expected that this sort of dominion will be quietly submitted to by those politicians who have no participation in it. A contest for the dictatorship ensues, agitating the community and destroying the harmony of society, by mere personal and family feuds, when there is no difference of principle between the contending parties. Nor would the evil effects of this state of things be confined to the State. As the political course of opposing parties is very much determined by feelings of mutual antipathy, it would frequently happen that when one party supported the existing administration of the General Government, the other would stand opposed to it. Under these circumstances every revolution produced by the alternate successes and defeats of these rival parties, might increase or diminish the supporters of the General Government, by the whole number of the Representatives of the State in Con DECEMBER, 1823.] DEBATES OF CONGRESS. Imprisonment for Debt. gress. Besides the mutability which would be thus communicated to the national councils, the General Government, feeling its power to be identified with the fate of a State party, would be tempted to interfere in the political struggles of that State. And when we consider the effect which might be produced by the judicious distribution of patronage amongst the leaders in such contests, we cannot doubt that the facility and the means of such interference are equal to the temptation. It may be justly said of the plan of voting by a general ticket, that it is not consistent with the true The popular theory of a popular representation. branch of the National Legislature should exhibit a faithful image of the people. When, for example, a State is divided in its interests and opinions, when some districts are agricultural, some manufacturing, and some commercial, and, if you will, when some are republican and some federal, each of those districts of people should have a fair representation in Congress. Because one interest or one party happens to be predominant in a State, it is no adequate reason that the rest should be disfranchised and have no voice the national councils. This, indeed, would not be a representation of the people, but of the States; giving to this House a federal, instead of a popular origin and character. A little reflection will convince us that this is not Every thing that tends to strengthen the peculiar repre [H. OF R. The report concludes with the following resolution: Resolved, &c., That the following amendment to the Constitution of the United States be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, which, when ratified by three-fourths thereof, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said constitu tion: "The person having the highest number of votes a choice. "The Congress may, by law, fix the day for apand the days for giving their votes the first and secpointing Electors for President, and Vice President, ond time, which days shall be the same throughout the United States; and the day for giving their votes the first time, shall be not less than ten, nor more than twenty days from the day fixed for the appoint ment of Electors. "The Legislature of each State shall have power to appoint the places of holding elections for the appointment of Electors, to prescribe the manner of voting, and to provide for the appointment of proper persons to conduct such elections, with authority to declare, definitively, the result thereof; but the Congress may, by law, make or alter such regulations, and may also lay off into districts, for appointing have failed to lay off the same as herein directed." Electors, any State, the Legislature whereof shall TUESDAY, December 23. Another member, to wit, from Virginia, JoпN FLOYD, appeared, was qualified, and took his seat. can States of Spanish origin. European Combinations to re-subjugate AmeriMr. MALLARY laid the following resolution on the table, for consideration to-morrow, viz: Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House such information as he may possess, (which may be disclosed without injury to the public good,) relative to the determination of any sovereign, or combinations of sovereigns, to assist Spain in the subjugation of her late colonies on the American continent; and whether any Government of Europe is disposed or determined to oppose any aid or assistance which such sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, may afford to Spain for the subjugation of her late colonies above mentioned. Imprisonment for Debt. Mr. WEBSTER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill from H. OF R.] South American Colonies. [DECEMBER, 1823. the Senate supplementary to the act "for the in those seas, more than would have sufficed to relief of persons imprisoned for debt," reported cover the expense of the entire system of measthe same, with an amendment, changing theures proposed in these resolutions. whole tenor of the bill. Mr. WEBSTER explained the grounds on which the Committee on the Judiciary had proposed this amendment. The act of 1800, he said, provided that the oath, in the case of insolvent debtors, should be administered by the district | judge; but, if he resides more than twenty miles from the place of imprisonment, then the oath may be administered by a commissioner, to be appointed by the district judge. The bill from the Senate proposes to provide, further, that, where a citation has been issued, in case of absence or inability of the judge, &c., the oath may be administered by a commissioner, according to the mode prescribed by the act of 1800. The committee of this House, on examining the subject, thought it better to provide that in all cases the required oath may be administered by a Judge of the Supreme Court, the district judge of the district in which he resides, or by any commissioner appointed by either of them. In the shape in which the bill came from the Senate, it would not afford a remedy, it was believed, in the very case which gave rise to it. The House concurred in the amendment reported by the committee; and, thus amended, the bill was ordered to a third reading. Light-houses, Beacons, &c., on Bahama Islands. The resolutions submitted yesterday by Mr. LIVINGSTON, calling on the Secretary of the Treasury for information respecting light-houses and beacons, on the Bahama Banks and coast of Florida, and requesting that the President may negotiate for the cession of so much land on Abaco as is necessary for the erection of a light-house, were taken up. In supporting the resolutions, Mr. LIVINGSTON observed, in relation to the first of them, that he was well aware that measures had already been taken by Government, preparatory to the erection of light-houses on two of the points referred to, viz: on the Dry Tortugas, and at or near Cape Florida. But, although the necessary surveys were nearly completed, much time must unavoidably elapse before a report of the proceedings could be laid before the department to which they appertained; and, in the meanwhile, sufficient information might be laid before Congress to authorize them to act upon the subject, so that the Secretary of the Treasury could advertise, the ensuing season, for contracts for erecting the several works contemplated in the resolutions. Those works, Mr. L. said, were of pressing necessity. The navigation of the seas, over and within the vicinity of the Bahama Banks, was exposed to very great danger, and had already suffered much from shipwrecks. Not to mention the losses which had thus occurred to vessels in the merchant service, the United States had suffered, in wrecks of her public armed vessels The second resolution he conceived to be necessary for making the navigation of the Bahama channel, both ways, secure. Ships were continually passing over the Bahama Banks, where the water was shallow, and the neighboring land very low; in consequence of which, they were imminently exposed to shipwreck. The wrecks on Abaco alone would, he said, amount to an immense sum. A lighthouse on that island, at or near the site of the Hole in the Wall, would greatly, if not entirely, remove the danger which now existed, and render navigation safe. But, for the erection of such light-house, previous negotiation would be necessary, in order to obtain the ground on which to build it. Of the success of such negotiation, there could be no doubt. The British Government had no interest hostile to such a measure; but, on the contrary, they were interested in its favor, for the same reason with ourselves, although not to the same extent. Besides the spots on which light-houses were erected, there were others which ought to be designated by buoys. The third resolution, Mr. L. said, was intended to obtain information in respect to a class of islets, concerning the true jurisdiction of which, he confessed himself to be ignorant; he meant those small rocky islands which are separated from the Bahama Bank by deep channels, and therefore might possibly be considered as not included in the British jurisdiction, which confessedly extends over the bank itself. If, on investigation, it should appear that these islets do belong to Great Britain, then they would be included in the range of the second resolution, which relates to the cession of the requisite territory for light-houses and beacons. But if, on the contrary, it should be ascertained that they are not British territory, then a question would arise, whether they were not liable to become ours by right of occupancy. They would afford temptations to occupancy for no other purpose than that proposed in the resolution. They contain, in general, no soil, being little more than bare rocks washed by the sea; yet are of such formation as to admit of the placing of buoys and beacons upon them for the warning and direction of the mariner, &c. The question was then taken on the resolutions of Mr. LIVINGSTON, and they were agreed to, without opposition. FRIDAY, December 26. South American Colonies. The resolution yesterday offered by Mr. MALLARY, calling on the President for any information he may possess (and which may be disclosed without injury to the public good) relative to the determination of any sovereign or sovereigns to aid Spain in regaining her American Colonies; and the disposition of any |