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opinion is to the negative; and hence, on the same reasoning, children born abroad of citizens of the United States are entitled to their parents' citizenship, with the right, however, in both cases, when the child reaches full age, of rejecting his parents' citizenship and electing the nationality of his actual birth.'


from annexation.

§ 433. It is not only by the formal process prescribed in the statute that naturalization can be worked. The mere fact of the annexation of a country naturalizes all tion results subjects of the country in the country to which the annexation is made. Mere military occupation does not work such naturalization. It takes place, however, when an annexation is brought about by treaty, or by conquest assented to by the annexed state.2

Tribal Indians


§ 434. Indian tribes, under the constitution and laws of the United States, form, in the language of Marshall, C. J., "domestic dependent nations." Members of such tribes, when retaining their tribal rela- are not tions, are not citizens of the United States, unless made so by its particular laws.3 On the one hand, the United States government is sovereign over Indian territory unless included within state bounds. On the other hand, the whole municipal government of the tribal Indians, in relation to each other, is vested in the tribes themselves, subject to the imposition of excise duties by the government of the United

1 Whart. Conf.of Laws, § 10; see supra, §§ 177 et seq., 255, 262. When an alien woman with a child marries a naturalized citizen, she and her child become thereby citizens. U. S. v. Kellar, 13 Fed. Rep. 82.

2 See Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Justice's Opinion, 68 Me. 589; Crane v. Reader, 25 Mich. 303. In Tobin v. Walkinshaw, 1 McAl. 186, it was held that naturalized citizens owing an allegiance merely statutory were released therefrom by a transfer of the territory to another sovereign. See supra §§ 151 et seq.

3 Supra, § 265; see Whart. Conf, of Laws, § 9; Paper by General Walker in International Review for May, 1874, pp. 321-9; 15 Am. Law Rev. 21.

Indians, as will be presently seen, are not made citizens of the United States by the reconstruction legislation, infra, § 585.

Supra, § 26; U. S. v. Tobacco.. Factory, 13 Int. Rev. Rec. 91; 1 Dill.,. 264; 11 Wall., 616; Murch v. Turner, 21 Me. 535; Jackson v. Reynolds, 14 Johns. 335; and see 15 Am. Law Rev.,. 28-29.

States, and to penal jurisdiction of offences in which both parties are not Indians."

Chinese in the U. S. cannot be naturalized.

§ 435. By the naturalization statute of 1804, only white persons could be naturalized. When it was determined, during the late civil war, to confer full political privileges on the African race, a bill was introduced by Mr. Sumner striking out the qualification "white." This, however, excited the opposition of the Pacific states, who were opposed to the naturalization of the Chinese. To avoid this difficulty, the statute was finally shaped so as to confine the privilege of naturalization to "aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African descent." Under this statute it has been held that a Chinese is not entitled to naturalization. And by the fifth article in the Burlingame treaty (ratified November 28, 1868, it is provided that "nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States." The bearing of the recent amendments on the Chinese will be hereafter considered.

1 Supra, § 26; U. S. v. Shawnees, 5 Chic. Leg. News, 352; Cherokee Tobacco Case, 11 Wall. 616.

2 That a non-tribal Indian may be a citizen, see Rogers v. Quinney, 31 Wis. 62, and other cases cited supra, § 265; Whart. Conf. of Laws, § 9; 15 Am. Law Rev., 21.

That the Indians do not own the soil of their reservations, and cannot grant it away, see Cherokee Nat. v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.

The Federal acts of 1802 and 1834 provide for the punishment of crimes in Indian territory, not within state limits, when such crimes are not committed by an Indian or Indians. U. S. v. Yellow Sun, 1 Dill. 271, and cases cited Whart. Crim. Law, 8th ed. § 282 a.

That the Federal government may punish crimes committed by white

men on Indians and Indians on white men, see U. S. v. Martin, 14 Fed. Rep. 817; Whart. Crim. Law, 8th ed., § 282 a.

In Crow Dog, in re, 1883, it was decided by the supreme court of the United States that the United States have not jurisdiction of the murder of one tribal Indian by another of the same tribe.

Rev. Stat. 1875, § 2169; see Supple. Act, p. 1435.

4Ah Yup, 5 Sawyer, 155; State v. Ah Chew, 16 Nev. 50, 61; see infra, § 585. 6 Whart. Con. of Law, § 12.

6 Infra, § 585. In Pennsylvania, however, Chinese have been admitted to naturalization; see Dunne's Case, Philadelphia Times, August 19, 1883. That the act of May 6, 1883, excludes persons of Chinese race, though Eng

titled to rights with

equal civil


§ 436. The question of alien civil disabilities is determined, not by the general government, unless in cases con- Aliens entrolled by treaty, but by the particular states. As a general rule, an alien has the same privileges in resorting to the courts for redress and protection as has a citizen, though an alien, as a non-resident, may sometimes be obliged to give security for costs. Aliens may take by purchase or succession land whose title comes from the Federal government, or is part of the distinctively territorial possession of that government; but their right to land within the borders of states was, under the old rule, determined by state law, unless overridden by treaty. When there is a treaty, permitting an alien from a particular country to hold real estate, this entitles an alien from such country to hold real estate in a state where this would otherwise be prohibited,2 And under the fourteenth amendment, to be hereafter distinctively considered, a state "cannot deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws;" and this clause may abrogate state discriminations in this respect.

Citizenship of a state does not in

volve citi

zenship of States; and

the United

§ 437. "It is quite clear," says Miller, J.," that there is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics and circumstances in the individual. A state may make whomsoever it chooses a citizen, but this does not make such person a citizen of the United States." "Previous to the adoption of the constitution of the United States every state had the undoubted right to confer, on whomsoever it pleased, the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character was confined, of course, to the boundaries of the state, and gave him

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the con


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no rights or privileges in other states, beyond those secured to him by the law of nations and comity of states. Nor have the several states surrendered the power conferring these rights by adopting the constitution of the United States. Each state may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons." Particular states have availed themselves of this right by making non-naturalized foreigners citizens. So, on the other hand, the inhabitants of a district within a state ceded to the United States are citizens of the United States, but not of the ceding state. A distinction, however, has been taken between citizenship and the right to vote, and it has been held that the statutes conferring on aliens the right to vote do not necessarily make them citizens."

Congress has power



§ 439. Congress, also, so the article before us proceeds to state, may establish "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." The as to bank- exercise of this power is discretionary in congress; and to the action of congress in this respect the state authorities must yield." Nor is it necessary that persons to be affected by bankrupt statutes should be exclusively merchants or traders. The local assets, under a bankrupt assignment, pass to the assignee, though the better opinion is that such assignments do not operate extra-territorially. Hence, a Federal bankrupt discharge is effective throughout

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country, if he lives in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, or Georgia, or within twelve months' residence in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin."

3 Com. v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Oh. St. 306.

Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425,

5 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223. 6 California Pac. R. R., in re, 3 Sawy. 270.

the United States; but a state insolvent discharge is only operative as between citizens of the discharging state, and between such citizens and validating creditors. Hence, also, a debt payable in a state to a person not domiciled in such state is not bound by a bankrupt discharge in such state.1


tion ex

tends to all

cases of in

440. The terms of the clause before us, it should be observed, are studiously general. It is not "congress shall have power to pass a bankrupt law;" which would imply that the power is to pass a law somewhat like the bankrupt law of England. But solvency. it is: "Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies in the United States." This gives congress power to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies in the popular rather than in the technical sense, bankruptcies being regarded as equivalent to insolvencies. And this is checked neither by the limitation as to ex post facto laws, which relate solely to criminal prosecutions, nor by that forbidding the impairing of contracts, which applies only to the states. It is true that when there is no Federal law on the topic of bankruptcies in force, insolvent laws may be enacted by the states. But the difference between a state bankrupt law and a Federal bankrupt law is, as already stated, this, that the former only discharges debts as between citizens of the discharging state, or when such discharge of such debts is validated by the creditor, while the discharge under a Federal bankrupt law is absolute throughout the United States. And it is settled that a discharge in insolvency by a state

1 Whart. Conf. of Laws, § 1; supra, be wholly different in one state from § 334.

The bankrupt law of 1867 did not become unconstitutional because it adopted the state laws regulating exemptions and thereby was unequal in operation, though uniform in principle. Beckerford, in re, 1 Dill. 45. It was held in Darling v. Berry, 13 Fed. Rep. 659, that a bankrupt law, which, by its terms, is made applicable alike to all the states, without distinction or discrimination, is not unconstitutional merely because its operations may

another. See, to the same effect, Jor-
dan, in re, 8 Nat. B. R. 180; Everitt,
in re, 9 Nat. B. R. 427; Smith, in re, 2
Woods, 458; contra, Waite, C. J., Eck-
ert, in re, 10 Nat. B. R. 5. Cf. Smith,
in re, 8 Nat. B. R. 401.
2 Infra, § 472.

3 Klein, in re, 1 How. 277; Sackett v. Andross, 5 Hill, 327; Thompson v. Alger, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 428.

4 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122.

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