personal good will to the United States for three years, followed now by my friendly attitude, had outbreaks against Americans and American property been prevented; (c) that this feeling had been recently revived by those agitators, politicians, and priests, who insisted on making capital out of your reply to Minister Mendoza's notes; (d) that in Antioquia, Cauca, and the Atlantic Provinces, it had developed in another form into a movement, as already described, for a new republic, until credence was given the report of the secret assistance of the United States, not only in the other parts of Colombia, but in other nations of South America; (e) that Colombia, if peace could be preserved, was about to enter upon a period of great material and commercial development that would be of the highest value and importance to the export and financial interests of the United States; (f) that European trade and money interests recognized the situation and were doing all in their power to get a firm hold on the commercial and material opportunities of Colombia; and (g) that, finally, in a practical desire to obtain results and inaugurate a new era in the foreign relations of Colombia, he now gave up all hope of arbitration or indemnity being conceded by the United States-so dear to the expectations of the Colombian people and proposed the negotiation of new treaties on a basis that the United States, in view of all that Colombia had suffered and lost, must admit was fair and equitable.

Therefore he hoped that you and the President would most carefully consider his intimations and thus open the way to the complete restoration of cordial relations between the United States and Colombia, to the recognition of Panama by Colombia, and to the establishment of permanent accord between the latter nations by means of a treaty of friendship and commerce.

In order to have a perfectly clear understanding in general terms of what he proposed, I then asked the President to summarize them, apart from the memorandum, which he did. as follows:

1. Colombia desires to negotiate a new treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States (to supersede the treaty of 1846), in which, in view of Colombia's former sovereignty and vital interests at stake, the United States shall grant to Colombia the same general privileges in the canal and Canal Zone as provided by the Hay-Herran treaty as they affect trade, commercial intercourse, shipping, or practically the same as now granted to Panama in these respects.

2. Colombia will recognize Panama as an independent Republic within the limits of the old department of Panama (which is now conceded to be the pres ent extent of Panama), and negotiate with Panama a treaty of friendship and commerce, provided Panama will assume a part of Colombia's foreign debt, contracted before the separation of Panama. in proportion not only to population, but to resources and wealth.

3. The United States will use its good offices and its peculiar relation of responsibility to Panama to intervene with that Government and make sure that Panama will treat with Colombia in good faith and do its share and part in arranging a basis of settlement of the foreign-debt question.

4. Prior to the negotiation of the Colombia-Panama treaty. Colombia will arrange privately with the United States, and the latter with Panama, that Panama shall send a confidential representative to Bogota to consider and sign a protocol, before being officially received as minister plenipotentiary, covering the questions to be settled in a formal treaty that will be negotiated immediately after the protocol is signed.

5. The United States Government will give. if possible, an assurance before the Pan American conference of its willingness to undertake negotiations

along these lines in order to prevent any expression of feeling there against the United States, and to thwart any plans for the formation of an interoceanic republic, which would include Panama and the Colombian territory of Cauca, Antioquia, and the Atlantic provinces, thus doing Colombia a great service and strengthening the position of the United States not only in Colombia, but in all South America.

6. The actual negotiations will await the return to Washington of Secretary Root from his trip to South America, and be conducted in the late fall or early part of next year, when the Congresses of both the United States and Colombia will be in session and can consider and ratify the treaties. Although conditions favor Bogota, it is not material whether the actual negotiations take place in Bogota or Washington, but, if in Washington, Colombia will send Enrique Cortes, former minister of foreign affairs, and who went to Washington in June, 1905, as a special representative of President Reyes, to act as its plenipotentiary, Mr. Mendoza being in the meantime granted leave of absence or transferred.

7. The whole question is to be treated as confidential (not even made known to Mr. Mendoza), except as Colombia may telegraph her delegates at Rio Janeiro about the time the Pan American conference assembles, to the effect that preliminary negotiations are begun which will lead to a satisfactory adjustment of all questions at issue over Panama between Colombia and the United States.

In regard to receiving some word from you before the Pan American conference, the President emphasized, in response to my intimation that this suggestion might be misunderstood, that it was in no sense whatever a threat to the effect that Colombia's delegates might in some way bring up the Panama or new republic questions at the conference or quietly approve of its being done by others in the event no favorable answer came from Washington; on the other hand, the delegates of Colombia desired the assurance so as to be able to definitely frustrate any attempt of the kind among other delegates and to remove all cause of suspicion and intrigue based on false reports or jealousy of the United States. The President added that he showed his frankness and fair dealing with me and the United States by informing me that efforts had been made and were being made to have him sanction or assist a movement against the United States in the conference.

In conclusion I would state that my conference with President Reyes and Dr. Calderon extended over several hours. It was characterized with the greatest frankness and friendliness of discussion. Both the President and minister of foreign affairs seemed deeply interested in the subject and most anxious that you and President Roosevelt should appreciate and reciprocate their sincerity of purpose. They were good enough to say that my attitude and policy as minister here had paved the way to their determination to seek a settlement on a new basis of the Panama question and to lay their complete plans in confidence before me for submission to you and President Roosevelt.

In view of its confidential and highly important character, I am marking the dispatch "Confidential" and giving it no number. There is not time to prepare and confirm the telegram I shall send on this subject before the mail closes.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your obedient servant.

JOHN BARRETT.

[Verbatim copy of translation made in Colombian foreign office and handed to Minister

Barrett.]

Memorandum.

BOGOTA, May 23, 1906.

Opinions of a Colombian citizen who loves his country more than anyone else, who wishes for its prosperity and greatness, who recognizes the cessation of Panama as an accomplished fact, who is a friend of the United States, who wishes that the extraordinary civilization reached to by that country may spread itself all over South America by practicing the "American Ideals" of its President, Mr. Roosevelt, that the questions pending between the United States, Colombia, and Panama be arranged in a dignified and honorable manner, and that this last country constitutes itself to the good of its inhabitants and to avoid the scandal and new shedding of blood on Colombian territory on account of the Panama question.

I. It is well known that the negotiations of the Legation of Colombia in Washington, that Messrs. Diego Mendoza and Enrique Cortes initiated, under favorable circumstances, for the settlement of the Panama question, have failed because Mr. Cortes, whose highmindedness, friendly feeling towards the United States, and thorough knowledge of the English language, would have obtained good success in this negotiation, had to separate himself from the Legation; and Mr. Mendoza failed because he determined to insist on obtaining the declaration from the United States that that country had carried out the revolution in Panama. The failure of his mission can be considered as his last offense to the American Government.

II. It is also known that, owing to Minister Mendoza Perez' attitude and to his failure, certain Colombian and Panama citizens have proposed the formation with Panama, the Atlantic coast of Colombia, and the Departments of Antioquia and Cauca, of the Interoceanic Republic with the City of Panama as a probable capital, and that the United States should second this project.

Although at first sight the realization of such a project seems easy, it is not so, for the following reasons:

(a) The popular feeling of hatred of the entire population of Colombia against the United States and Panama, in consequence of the cessation of the last, is so intense that, in order to calm such a feeling, it has been necessary to use all the prestige and energy of President Reyes, and to sustain during three years a campaign of frankness and patriotism to avoid the outbreak of such feelings against the American citizens living in the country; and such an attitude on the part of the President was one of the main causes of the attempt on his life made on the tenth of February. This feeling is so much alive, even at the present day, that, if they intended to carry out the project of the Interoceanic Republic, the popular mass would raise up at once, headed and encouraged by the Catholic clergy that would see its religion menaced by the Protestant creed, and a war would follow, worse in character than the Civil War of three years duration, which was followed by the cessation of Panama and the ruin of Colombia. The consequence of such a war would be the

definite establishment of anarchy throughout Colombia; and the United States would bear before the world and before history the entire responsibility of having caused the anarchic revolution.

(b) Among the measures taken by the Government in the rebuilding of the Nation, one of the principal ones is the construction of railways and two of the main lines are in the hands of American citizens; viz the line from Buenaventura on the Pacific coast to the interior of Colombia, probably to Bogota; and those represented by Mr. Ford: the Cartagena Railway Company and the Magdalena Steamship Navigation Company, both worked with Boston capital. A movement of cessation on the mentioned basis would be a call of attack of the people against the mentioned grantees and their works which the Government would be incapable of avoiding.

III. In the delicate and dangerous position created by the war of three years duration, followed by the cessation of Panama and the ruin of Colombia, which ruin would render easier the outbreak of a social and anarchic revolution that only the energetic will of President Reyes and his moral and military prestige have been able to hold back, in this position rendered worse with the project of the Interoceanic Republic, it seems wise that before seconding such a project that would undoubtedly cause the entire loss of the Colombian Nation as well as the loss of the different Departments that intend to form a nation, it would be patriotic and humane to act as follows:

(a) To bring to Bogota the negotiations pending in Washington in relation to the question of Panama, Colombia, and the United States.

(b) To profit of the presence in Bogota of the American Minister, the Hon. John Barrett, a high minded gentleman and a personal and old friend of President Reyes, who thoroughly knows the interests aspirations, and necessities of Spanish American countries, and who also is a friend of the President of Panama and a genuine representative of the high ideals of progress and civilization of the people and the Government of the United States, to profit of his presence in Bogota to confer with the Government of Colombia and to end in a generous, just, and high minded manner the questions pending between the United States and Colombia and Panama, which settlement could be carried out in the shape of a Treaty among the three countries on the basis hereafter mentioned, or perhaps better in two separate Treaties, one between the United States and Colombia and the other between Colombia and Panama. The first one could be made on the following basis:

1st. Colombia undertakes to recognize the independence of Panama and to celebrate treaties of peace, commerce, and friendship with Panama and consequently to declare null and void the Treaty of 1846 between Colombia and the United States.

2nd. Colombia will celebrate a Treaty of friendship, commerce, etc., etc., with the United States under the most ample and convenient terms to both countries.

3rd. The United States, in consideration that the Zone through which the Canal is being constructed belonged to Colombia, and that Colombia has important towns on both coasts, which towns are called, on account of their situation, to help in the construction and

conservation of the Canal, grants to Colombia the following privileges (Those of the Treaty Herran-Hay and the entrance to the Canal Zone of Colombian products under the same conditions as those coming from Panama.)

Basis on which can be celebrated a Treaty with Panama.

The United States and Colombia would arrange in a private manner that the Panama Government should send a Plenipotentiary Minister to Bogota. General Santiago de la Guardia, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs in Panama would be a desirable candidate, with whom, and before being officially received, a representative of the Colombian Government would sign a protocol or treaty of the questions that would be considered once the Panama Minister was received; which questions could be as follows:

(a) The acknowledgment of the independence of Panama within the limits of the old Department of Panama, before its cessation from Colombia.

(b) That Panama should acknowledge and pay to Colombia a part of the National Debt in proportion to her resources and wealth. (c) The other conditions customary in such treaties.

IV. As can be clearly seen, the form and essential part of the project to put an end to the vexatious situation existing between the United States, Colombia, and Panama since the cessation of the last, takes into consideration the interests of the three countries, those of the cause of civilization of justice, and the good name of the United States, which is today a matter of discussion and comment in an unfavorable manner among South American and Central American countries. At the same time the talents and exceptional conditions of Minister Barrett and the good will of both the Presidents of Panama and Colombia could be profited as it is well to remember that General Reyes is universally liked in Panama, because he always defended the interests of that part of Colombia and in the National Assembly which met in 1885 he had to contend against Senor Caro, the representative for Panama, in order to make of that State a Department, and not a Territory as it was then pretended. It is certain that if General Reyes had been President when the Herran-Hay Treaty was signed, the Treaty would have been approved and the loss of the Isthmus avoided.

V. These opinions, dictated by the love we profess to our country, by the interest of civilization, and also by the good name of the United States which history and world would hold responsible for the misfortuntes that the project of the formation of the Interoceanic Republic would cause if carried out, will be sent to the President of Colombia, to the American Minister, the Honorable John Barrett, and to other persons whom we may think interested in the questions herein related.

VI. It is urgent that, before the meeting of the Pan-American Conference in Brazil the Governments of the United States and Colombia or their Ministers arrive at an understanding in reference to the mentioned basis in order to prevent the enemies of the United States and of the success of the said Conference from carrying out. their design of making believe that the United States are fomenting or patronizing a revolution in Colombia in order to obtain the projected Republic, as it happened in Panama. In reference to the