Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political ScienceWhat can the disciplines of political science and economics learn from one another? Political scientists have recently begun to adapt economic theories of exchange, trade, and competition to the study of legislatures, parties, and voting. At the same time, some of the most innovative and influential thinkers in economics have crossed the boundaries of their discipline to explore the classic questions of political science. Competition and Cooperation features six of these path-breaking scholars, all winners of the Nobel Prize for Economics, in a series of conversations with more than a dozen distinguished political scientists. The discussions analyze, adapt, and extend the Nobelists' seminal work, showing how it has carried over into political science and paved the way for fruitful cooperation between the two disciplines. The exchanges span all of the major conceptual legacies of the Nobel laureates: Arrow's formalization of the problems of collective decisions; Buchanan's work on constitutions and his critique of majority rule; Becker's theory of competition among interest groups; North's focus on insecure property rights and transaction costs; Simon's concern with the limits to rationality; and Selten's experimental work on strategic thinking and behavior. As befits any genuine dialogue, the traffic of ideas and experiences runs both ways. The Nobel economists have had a profound impact upon political science, but, in addressing political questions, they have also had to rethink many settled assumptions of economics. The standard image of economic man as a hyper-rational, self-interested creature, acting by and for for himself, bears only a passing resemblance to man as a political animal. Several of the Nobelists featured in this volume have turned instead to the insights of cognitive science and institutional analysis to provide a more recognizable portrait of political life. The reconsideration of rationality and the role of institutions,in economics as in politics, raises the possibility of a shared approach to individual choice and institutional behavior that gives glimmers of a new unity in the social sciences. Competition and Cooperation demonstrates that the most important work in both economics and political science reflects a marriage of the two disciplines. |
Co říkají ostatní - Napsat recenzi
Na obvyklých místech jsme nenalezli žádné recenze.
Obsah
1 | |
Chaos or Equilibrium in Preference and Belief Aggregation | 33 |
Comments on the Commentaries | 51 |
HERBERT A SIMON | 57 |
Bounded Rationality Political Institutions | 85 |
The Potlatch Between Economics and Political Science | 112 |
JAMES M BUCHANAN | 120 |
Buchanans Contribution to Public Economics | 137 |
Comments | 190 |
DOUGLASS C NORTH | 197 |
Response to Geddes and Keohane | 247 |
REINHARD SELTEN | 253 |
Reflections on Seltens Dualist Methodology | 273 |
Response to Shepsle and Laitin | 303 |
and Economic Theory | 314 |
Reflections on Political Science | 321 |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics ... James Alt,Margaret Levi,Elinor Ostrom Náhled není k dispozici. - 1999 |
Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a sousloví
actors aggregation alternatives American Political Science Amos Tversky analysis argument Arrow assumptions Becker behavior benefits bounded rationality boundedly rational Buchanan Calculus of Consent Cambridge University Press Chicago coalition cognitive competition constitutional constraints Daniel Kahneman decision decisionmakers defined definition Democracy difficult distribution economic theory economists edited efficient empirical equilibrium essay evolutionary example experimental field figure find findings firms first game theory Gordon Tullock groups Herbert Simon heuristics human ideology individual influence institutions interest interpersonal capital Kahneman Kazakh majority maximize Nash equilibria neoclassical nomics normative North office one’s organizations Ostrom outcomes Pareto party Political Economy political science Political Science Review political scientists preferences privatization problem Public Choice reflect regimes Reinhard Selten role rules Schofield scientific Selten significant Simon situation social capital social choice specific strategies structure theoretical tion transaction costs Tversky utility function voting welfare York