Thurston agt. Marsh. confession of judgment, and is so held by the court. (Johnson agt. Sagar, 10 How. 453; Emery agt. Emery, 9 Id. 130.) And he refers to 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 236, which relates only to plaintiff's compelling the defendant to pay money into court, which he admits to be due. Our case is neither, but is simply the defendant's admitting he owes so much and paying it, not confessing a judgment for it. Under the old and present practice, whenever a defendant pleads tender, he must bring the money into court. How? Precisely in which it has been done in this case. (1 Burrill's Pr. 406; 1 Tidd's Pr. 561.) Tidd, p. 564, says, the motion for leave to bring money into court, is a motion of course. And always heretofore the practice was to hand the money to the clerk, take his receipt, and enter rule in the common rule book, and then serve the original receipt and copy rule, on the plaintiff. The plaintiff is never prejudiced by this act of the defendant. There are only two modes in which the plaintiff can be affected by it. 1. Where he takes the money out of court, then his act in so doing it, is what affects him. 2. Where the court finally determines that he is not entitled to any more, and there he ought to be prejudiced. Neither the Code nor the rules, have altered the old practice where a party acknowledges he owes money, and wants to pay it. Who has a right to prevent his paying it? The plaintiff won't receive it from him; he does the next best thing, and that is, pays into court, whence the plaintiff can take it out, whenever he pleases and the defendant never can. To him it is gone forever. He has paid it. The only thing that has caused any embarrassment is this, that now the judges (in this district) will not allow the clerk to enter any common rule which was always entered by the party at his own peril afterwards. And this order is according to the true practice, nothing more than a common order, entered ex parte of course, and entered at the peril of the defendant, and in no way affects the plaintiff, Thurston agt. Marsh. unless he takes it out, or unless the court shall hereafter adjudge in the matter. Therefore it was I advised the attorney to pay the money into court, according to the old practice, and make his application for such relief as the court might grant him; he thus by paying it into court, showing his good faith. There was no per centage apHence the Code even in such tender as distinguished from a ROOSEVELT, Justice. Tender after suit, was confined to "actions at law," (2 R. S. 553.) In those actions costs were fixed and not discretionary. They were adjusted also, to each successive service in the cause. plicable in gross to the whole. actions makes no provision for a confession. It permits the defendant to serve an offer to allow judgment for a specific sum with costs. On such judgment the per centage may be added and the costs thus complete. But no provision is made for a per centage without a judgment. Whether, therefore, a tender can now be made after suit, except in the form of an offer to allow judgment, may at least be doubted. It certainly cannot, as it seems to me, in a foreclosure suit. Such suits, it is well known, were not "actions at law," as understood in the Revised Statutes. They were suits in equity and subject to all the equitable jurisdiction of the court. They are so still. In such suits costs under the Code "may be allowed or not, in the discretion of the court." (Sec. 306.) The defendant has mistaken the practice. He should have offered to pay the interest accrued, and upon its refusal, and a reasonable excuse for the seeming want of precise punctuality, have obtained as he might, an order to stay all proceedings till a further default, if any should occur. Order accordingly. ERRATUM. In the case of John Monroe and others agt. John Pilkington and others ; Wm. B. Scott and others agt. The Same, on page 250, by some mistake Judge MITCHELL'S name was omitted in the opinion. On page 251 beginning at the last paragraph, read, "MITCHELL, Justice," INDEX. ABATEMENT. A defence consisting of matter in abatement only, cannot PAGE be set up in an answer containing matters in bar of the action.. 61 ACTION. By personal representatives of a deceased plaintiff for causing death 42 A cause of action founded in tort, (the unlawful withholding posses- 91 In an action against defendant for damages for personal injuries, murrer Several causes of action upon promissory notes may be united in the 184 There can be no necessity for dividing an action upon two promissory 184 Index. ACTION. Where a defendant a licensee of a ferry was sued for damages, and PAGE 257 AFFIDAVIT. An order extending the time to answer or demur to a com- AMENDMENT. An application to amend a bond, defective in some respects, 313 ... 94 A complaint may be amended by increasing the amount of damages 187 231 Plaintiff was allowed an amendment, upon terms, of the plead- 337 Under section 172 of the Code, a plaintiff cannot amend his complaint ANSWER. An answer which only controverts the allegations of the com- 46 Index. PAGE ANSWER. Statements of new matter in an answer to an action for assault and 46 A defendant's default only admits the material and traversable mat- 46 A defence consisting of matter in abatement only cannot be set up in 61 61 97 97 ... 97 An answer of new matter which does not state facts sufficient to con- 151 305 Where both the complaint and answer are defective in the verifica- ... 311 A verified answer setting up new matter as a defence, may be stricken 406 APPEAL. The statute authorizing prosecutions in forma pauperis, does not extend to appeals under the Code .... 16 To review a decision in a cause tried by the court without a jury, nary questions of law, it will be considered sufficient. And a |