Rebellion," urged that recruits should join their regiments when they could be under the control of the officers who would command them, stopped part of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville owing to "difficulty of finding suitable camping ground with abundant water supply."

On this last dispatch Corbin telegraphed that the Secretary of War wanted "further recommendation on this line as to distribution of troops, with view to their comfort and their ultimate transport from Tampa.”

The Seventy-first New York regiment attracted the attention of Shafter, who telegraphed:

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 22, 1898.

(Received, Washington, 6:33 p. m.)

Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :

Upon personal report to me by colonel of the Seventy-first New York that 300 of his men have never fired a gun, I have ordered 15,000 rounds of ammunition be given that regiment for target practice. Will do same with other volunteer regiments that I find uninstructed.

SHAFTER, Major-General.

General Corbin telegraphed Shafter asking him to take up and solve the question of organization of the Fifth and Seventh corps and "do a very great service." The dispatch from Shafter, one of the important papers, is as

follows:

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 24, 1898.

(Received, Washington, 2:45 p. m.)

The Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. :

Recommend brigades to consist of three regiments of infantry, three brigades to a division. Regular regiments to be brigaded together, adding two volunteer regiments to the sixteen regular regiments already here to form first and second divisions of Fifth Army Corps, the other corps to be formed in like manner from volunteer regiments. General officers in order of rank of respective corps to command divisions as fast as organized; others to command brigades. Staff officers recently appointed to be assigned as far as practicable with the volunteers, in order to give brigade commanders the benefit of their experience. The five cavalry regiments here now to be formed into two brigades of three and two regiments respectively. Should cavalry volunteer regiments be assigned here, brigades then to be formed with two regiments each. The number of regiments for each brigade as I

have indicated is approved by General Wheeler. Other general officers whom I have consulted agree with me as to the number of regiments to constitute a brigade. Recommend placing all the regular regiments in one corps, so that they may be taken first for service in Cuba. If this is not satisfactory, half of the regulars can be assigned to each corps, and in event of an advance on Cuba the regulars in each corps formed for the advance. I think, however, that it would be better to have all, regulars in one corps. The light artillery should (remain), as at present, all together under charge of Colonel Randolph. They should accompany the advance, and then be assigned one battery to each division and one to cavalry corps, the remainder to constitute the reserve. If this project is approved, I request early order, and I will immediately proceed to complete the organization. I have been led to make the recommendations in view of an early advance, and from the fact that I believe the first battle will be the decisive one and that the best troops should bear the brunt, supported as strongly as possible by the volunteers. SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding.

This dispatch is a model of executive statement and the last sentence not only contains the outlines of the Santiago campaign, but is marked by the sagacity that solved the situation-"the first battle will be the decisive one, and the best troops should bear the brunt." It was sound military sense in Shafter to discern six weeks ahead of the fact that the decisive battle would be the first one, and he wanted no mistake about that. General Shafter thus emerged from the moonshine of distant speculation, and put himself in the place of the critical command and mapped the event, without knowing where on the island the fateful field was located.

In the wars that may hereafter come upon us, this is an example to be quoted. It is a line of sunlight to be distinguished in the morning, followed to the noon of victory. The importance of the increase of the regular army is tremendously increased by the truth, plain now and to be more and more made known to the comprehensive assimilation of the intelligence gathered by prescient observation, that the decisive battles will be the first ones, or at least that the losers of the opening engagements will find the cost of the restoration of fallen fortunes intolerably augmented by the education of sufficient armies, after the wars are on. In the campaigns of modern warfare there is no instance but that in our war of States in the United States in which the winners of the first serious combat were not those who gained the

closing triumph; and it was a terrible road to travel from Manassas to Appomattox. In the Crimean war the allies held the field of battle of Alma. In the Franco-Austrian war Marshal McMahon was the victor at Magenta, and it was followed by Solferino. The Prussians won the first events in the advance into Silesia in the combat with Austria, and Sadowa was the finish. In the Franco-German war the French lost the skirmishes on the frontier, the battles of Woerth and Saarbrück, and the end was Gravelotte, Sedan, and the capitulation of Paris. The same fatality was visible in the English invasion of Egypt, the Chilean assault upon Peru, the Japanese advance into China, the Turkish humiliation of the Greeks.

These object lessons all tell the same story. They mean the necessity that is imposed upon a nation of great resources-a fine place for looting, as Blucher said of London-to have a competent army; first for the insurance of peace with dignity and honor, second to guard against the misfortune of insufficiency at the start when the red flame of war bursts through the roofs and the walls of the world, and one disaster makes way for another-following fast and following faster-all modern improvements hastening and extending the original impulse to ruin. Every decent sentiment of national duty demands of the people of the United States that they shall be an armed nation. It turned out at Santiago as Shafter said it would somewhere, that the decision would be made where the armies of the belligerents first met in battle array. It was the foresight that put the regulars to the front where the swords crossed, that enabled us to close the campaign with a clap of thunder and a blaze of glory.

Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown and Became a Mystery and a Menace-He Appeared and Disappeared and Was at Last Found at Santiago by Commodore Schley-Imperative Demands for Information Answered-The Orders of General Shafter and Plans of General Miles-Dramatic Scenes at Tampa-Just as the Great Fleet was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet was Announced-After All a Prosperous Voyage, and Easy Landing.

The fleet of Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde Islands April 29th, four armored cruisers, and three torpedo gunboats. The destination. could only be conjectured. The surface indications were that the Spaniards had done the best they could, but the Cadiz squadron was not in form for fighting. The Cervera fleet was obviously unequal to raising the blockade of Cuba, and must have for its objective an appearance on our North Atlantic coast, with the view of exciting an alarm that would be a diversion, or to maneuver in the West Indies, to disturb the disposition of those destined to invade Cuba.

The Spanish cruisers had a high reputation for speed, and were undoubtedly swifter than the fleet of Admiral Sampson, which was limited in movement to the rate at which the monitors could be towed, and for a time it was held by those who gave time to conjecture that the real object of the Spaniards was to capture the Oregon, whose voyage from the Pacific to the Atlantic was of universal knowledge, and the interest in it constant and keen. There was a hawk in the sky, and it might strike anywhere. May 7th Admiral Sampson was informed at Cape Haitien that the Spanish squadron was reported at St. Thomas. May 14th the roving cruisers of Spain were off Curacoa. The bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico, by Admiral Sampson's fleet, took place on the 10th of May. On the 22d was received a dispatch from Key West that Cervera's fleet was in the Santiago harbor. The Naval Department had information that-we quote the Secretary of the Navy-the

"Spanish fleet had munitions of war destined for the defense of Havana, and was under imperative orders to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected with Havana by rail; and that as Cienfuegos appeared to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, the Flying Squadron would be instructed upon arrival at Key West to proceed to Cienfuegos. Instructions were at the same time given to Admiral Sampson to increase the Flying Squadron by such armored ships as he might deem desirable."

It turned out that for a time Cervera's fleet, which had taken refuge at Santiago, because short of coal and provisions, occupied the attention of both our superior squadrons, and detained the army that was going to Cuba. May 27th, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War: "If the Spanish fleet is in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I expect absolute information to that effect from our naval commanding officer at any moment. On receipt of that information, the movement to Santiago should be made without a moment's delay, day or night," and of this he had advised Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. The Secretary telegraphed Sampson:

"If Cervera's division is proved to be in Santiago, it is intended to make immediately a descent upon that port with 10,000 troops, landing about eight miles east of port. You will be expected to convoy the transports, probably fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking with you New York, Indiana, Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be gathered."

This was partly in apprehension of the torpedo vessels. The blockade of Havana was to be provided for by the monitors and gunboats.

The Secretary's telegram to Commodore Schley was:

"The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether Cervera's division is in Santiago harbor, as, if so, an immediate movement against him and the town will be made by the navy and a division of about 10,000 of our troops, which are all ready to embark. Your difficulties regarding coaling must be surmounted by your own ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, and the Department relies upon you to give quickly information as to Cervera's presence, and to be all ready for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered to St. Nicolas Mole."

The coast line of Cuba is almost as long as that of our country on the Atlantic. The island is nearly eighteen hundred miles from east to west, and there are many islands and reefs. Blockading vessels looking for a hostile