Orleans, Mobile and Manila, but in those cases the navy was foremost in the fray, and gloriously cleared the path for the army; so it was not unreasonable to feel that the spirit of aggression at Santiago in handling our ships was not according to the most illustrious precedents. General Shafter, however, had been painfully willing to allow the Spanish troops to get away, without insisting upon the "U. S." preliminary insisted upon at Fort Donaldson by U. S. Grant, that of "unconditional surrender," but the President supplied the deficiency, and used the very words, as there were none suitable or stronger. Shafter had been keenly disappointed by the Cubans, who became at last more numerous than valuable when they were fed, armed, clothed, and treated with much consideration, but they were still deficient in every military service but that of scouting, and managed to be in at the coffee and out of the fight, They were not adapted, as Shafter said, to severe fighting. They let Spaniards into Santiago, and did not help to put them out. The fifty thousand Cubans General Miles had regarded as one wing of his grand army when he planned a great campaign, dissolved, except in a small way, when their bodies needed nourishment. However, as General Miles arrived late at Santiago, and did not take command, for he found Shafter able to ride, he managed to retain his early kindness for the Cubans as soldiers. The last and worst blow to Shafter was the dreadful presence and rapid development of the yellow fever, with the "blue rains," the torrents from the skies that threatened the pork and cracker line. It cannot be denied that there was a combination of discouraging circumstances. General Miles, according to his soldierly way, supported the views of Shafter, and gave him wholesome encouragement. Indeed, the arrival of the General at Santiago was as timely as it had been carefully and wisely planned. The presence of the military head of the army of the United States meant to the Santiago Spaniards that while they were utterly forsaken, all the forces that seventy million people could array were centering there. The arrival of the head of the army was an appeal to the imagination, and the watchmen of the beleaguered city at the signal stations by the sea reported fifty-seven ships, many of them swarming with troops. General José Toral had to say in his explanation that, in his opinion, the garrison could have held the reserve lines against Shafter's army, but there was no hope as against the fresh forces pouring in. And so Santiago surrendered. "All is well that ends well."

Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General-His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant Sketches with Expert Information-Tribute of Breckenridge to Shafter-The Volunteers in Camps-Chickamauga as an Illustration-The Location of the Wrongs that the Soldiers Suffered Unduly-We Must Build Regiments as We do Battleships-The Fault of Poor Preparation not Personal-Let Congress for the Country Mend it.

There is extraordinary value, professional and literary, in the official papers of Major General of Volunteers, Inspector General J. C. Breckenridge. His military intelligence is constantly manifested in what he says, and his vigor of expression presents information clear-cut and in a strong light, the outlines sharp, the color vivid. He said of the earliest military expedition out of this country, that to Santiago, that it was composed of "the flower of the American army"-and writing as it was getting under way, he said:

"Despite the newspaper freedom of assertion, its purpose is said to be definitely known to but few, but it is doubtless worthy of its high quality. America has no fighting force of equal size, worthy to represent her, if this is hot. Every general and line officer has come up through the different grades in her military service, and is as ripe as any we have for their respective commands; and many of the staff officers have had broad experience perhaps even in their present particular positions. The adaptability of Americans is illustrated by the admirable work being done by many officers outside their own legitimate field. Officers of the line are doing every kind of staff duty in a manner it is impossible to too highly appreciate. The elasticity and adventurousness of youthful vigor may occasionally be somewhat lacking, and the siege artillery material may lack preliminary adjustment and practice in expeditions seaward, or even in the ordinary experience in the practical maneuvers of large bodies of men, and under a questionable policy is particularly deficient in military transportations. An immobile army is ridiculous.

"Many foreign countries are also studying every detail and the varying phases of this expedition with most critical care, for few are exempt from similar possibilities. The Fifth Corps is not alone in need of all the benefits that can be gleaned from such experience; the whole army should derive full advantage from it. The difficulties have been immense, and have been overcome with remarkable energy. Only the ultimate result can fully approve how well or how ill every possible contingency has been provided for and met. The careful, painstaking preparation and study of every detail of the problem to be met, and the persistent exertion to fully meet it to the utmost limit of the powers of a great department of the government, and with the combined provision and united effort of every bureau, which was so admirably illustrated in the naval expedition to the Philippines, is, of course, also to be expected in this."

One of the lessons of the war of the sections and states was sharply applied by General Breckenridge to this:

"It is believed that special attention should be called to the general absence of intrenching tools as a regular part of the equipment of the troops. Hardly any intrenching tools, save the usual small number of picks and shovels for public purposes, accompany this expedition; though this nation, in the war of the rebellion, brought the use of hasty intrenchments into such prominence as to materially affect the tactics and strategy of its armies. If the use of the bayonet or other makeshifts for this purpose was formerly inadequate, it is no longer so. The modern shelter trench for skirmishers is normally 21⁄2 feet in thickness, for protection against the penetration of modern small arms, and this would seem to require the use of a tool specially adapted for the purpose required. So patent has this need become that one young company commander is said to have purchased masons' trowels at Tampa, for the use of his company in Cuba."

In regard to the volunteers, General Breckenridge refers to their "zeal, rare intelligence and adaptability and the having of many of them in some of the more excellent schools of the National Guard," and remarks that these qualities are evident all along the line, and that "every advantage should be taken of all the military instruction which our military system affords, and perhaps full use is not being made of the graduates of our hundred of military colleges, nor of the army itself as a training school for young officers. Doubtless we could promptly commission several hundred bright young citi