would be bombarded. This kept up the truce as to the pacific attitude of the fleet and the city batteries with respect to each other. General Merritt officially says: "The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.

"It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indicated fully in the orders and memorandum of attack hereto appended. It was believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his entrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city.

'About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and before 10 a. m. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy.'

At 10:25 a. m. the fleet had done its work, so that when our troops advanced at that hour the fort, which was the key of the city, was found deserted; also the flanking trenches, but the second line of the Spaniards was defended for a few minutes, and among our men killed was the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. General Merritt records his "appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and the plan of occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a

city of 300,000 people, filled with natives hostile to European interests, and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish.”

The insurgents were "dusted out of the way," and there was developed among them a good deal of resentment. Three days after the Spaniards had surrendered, the final article of the capitulation being:

"This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army." That is to say, on the 16th the President's proclamation directing a suspension of hostilities was cabled.

The casualties in the Army of the United States during the operations before Manila were seventeen enlisted men killed, ten officers and ninety-six enlisted men wounded. The insurgents were much irritated because they were not permitted to be joint occupants of the city. They have continued their false pretenses of ability to capture Manila, but the only thing to say of that is that it would be extremely discreditable to the military spirit of the Spaniards that they, when equal in numbers to the native assailants, allowed themselves to be driven into Manila, holding only the suburbs, but for the facts the Filipinos had been supplied with arms by the Americans and allowed to help themselves at the arsenals of Cavite to cannon and ammunition, and the Spaniards were aware when their fleet was destroyed and our fleet anchored in the bay and reinforcements had arrived, that the Americans were masters of the situation. The Spaniards were disheartened by the fire of the American fleet on the first of May, which was more rapid, certain and crushing than they imagined possible. It was this special dejected condition of the Spaniards and their general weakness on the offensive that caused them to permit the insurgents to press upon them and at last forced surrender.

It was necessary to suppress the Filipinos in their ardent desire to assume the rôle of conquerors at the expense of the Americans, precisely as it has been required by common sense and decent humanity to chill the tropical temper of the alleged Cuban army, since their bombardment of Havana by Key West reports of fake fights was extinguished by the news of the surrender of the Spanish armies and the obliteration of Spanish

fleets by the American army and navy on the shores of Cuba-the Cubans looking on.

General Merritt's proclamation to the people of the Philippines was a document concerning the construction of which the Filipinos were not consulted. The General used this language assuring "the people" of the islands -not alone the army that was of far more considerable force than appeared to represent the Cuban "Nation," when they were excited to do military workbut all the peaceably disposed people, that "so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines."

Here are the paragraphs of promise in the proclamation:

"The government established among you by the United States is a government of military occupation and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force so far as is compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals. substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

"The Port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation."

There is a likeness between the disturbance of mind of General Aguinaldo at Manila and that of General Garcia at Santiago, a great difference to note in the men. Both Aguinaldo and Garcia wanted to participate as representatives of an independent power in an American triumph. Also they desired to figure in the procession, to participate in the ceremonies, to put their names into the papers as parties to the transaction.

The insurgents wanted at Manila and Santiago, after an almost imperceptible show of themselves in the fields during the sieges, to have a joint occupation.

General Garcia expected to be Governor of Santiago, General

Aguinaldo would be dictator at Manila. In the two cities the military supremacy of the United States tolerated no companionship. The Americans had conquered in Cuba and Luzon, and divided authority and responsibility with no pretenders to statesmanship, given to proclamations as in the Philippines; and not even a character heroic as that of Garcia could be made an exception to an imperative and inviolable rule.

The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles-Sharp but Courteous Correspondence with General Shafter, Closing Cuban Experiences-Place of Landing in Porto Rico Changed at Sea-The Progress of the Campaign Ended by the Peace News-The Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms-Some of the Cablegrams that Passed that Remain of Historical Interest.

We have been at pains to trace the plans and the movements of the Major General Commanding from the earliest evolutions of campaigns in his mind. to the surrender of Santiago, and we have found that he began with the idea of thoroughly preparing a great army of fifty thousand in a mass, to be supported by a Cuban auxiliary force of equal number and reinforcements as might be required. It was in the General's view absolutely necessary to keep the main body of our troops out of Cuba until the rainy season was over and the virulence of the yellow fever had abated. This meant the commencement of decided operations in the late autumn, and it was proposed to strike blows meantime at the Isle of Pines, Porto Rico and the north shore of the east end of Cuba, and also clear the West India seas of Spanish ships so that all salt water would serve for a secure basis of operations. However, it was held to be essential that we should use our regular army of something over twenty thousand effective soldiers as soon as our sea power was established, and press the organization, equipment and advancement of volunteers, so as to push forward and aid whatever enterprises lingered, owing to the lack of numbers of the regular force.

The country could not have tolerated the course of preparations that the Commanding General recommended, and he was overwhelmed by the Administration and the course of events. It was the visible line and logic of the plan of the Commanding General, that while movements of secondary consideration interested the public and harassed and damaged the Spaniards, the grand army, to be commanded by himself, should be in due time landed in the west