court said that, for all that, these agents were to a marked extent instrumental in bringing about the award, for, while no doubt other and wholly independent forces vouched for the contractor and helped, it could not be denied that the campaign of publicity promoted by the agents gave the contractor a conspicuous prominence over the multitude of competitors, and had much to do with his selection.

While the New York courts do not follow the United States courts so far as the latter hold that any agreement for commissions in obtaining contracts from the government are against public policy and cannot be enforced, they do hold that where the agreement to obtain government contracts contemplates that the contracts are to be obtained by the use of improper and corrupt means, or by undue influence, it becomes one against public policy and unenforceable in the courts of that state. McCraith v. Buss (1921) 198 App. Div. 524, 190 N. Y. Supp. 597.

A contract between two individuals or two companies, by which one of the parties to the contract, for a money consideration or its equivalent, agreed to use his influence to aid the other party in procuring a charter for a railroad from the state board of railroad incorporation charged by statute with the duty of investigating and determining whether or not it may be to the interest of the public to grant the proposed charter, which statute confers upon the board plenary power and absolute discretion in the matter of incorporating and chartering railroads, necessarily tends to exert a corrupting influence and is void, regardless of any inquiry as to whether the board, in the particular instance under consideration, was incorruptible, or whether the contract had any effect in fact on the conduct of the public officials, as it is to be judged by its tendency, and not by the actual results. Bryant Lumber Co. v. Fourche River Lumber Co. (1916) 124 Ark. 313, 187 S. W. 455. The court said that sound public policy forbade that the foundation source from which charters must emanate shall be subjected to contaminating influences; that a

contract of the character above described is of no greater validity than a contract by which one agrees, for a money consideration, to assist in obtaining a decision in favor of another on an issue that may be pending before a judicial tribunal, or than a contract by which one party agrees to assist another in procuring advantageous legislation.

In Carr-Harris v. Canadian General Electric Co. (1920) 48 Ont. L. Rep. 231, the plaintiff, who was a civil engineer and contractor, and entirely unfamiliar with the manufacture of war munitions, interviewed the general manager of a large munitions plant and suggested to him that owing to family connections in England, particularly the then Lord Chancellor, he could procure from the British government orders for munitions to be manufactured and supplied by the manufacturer, whereupon the plaintiff was employed on a commission basis to assist in endeavoring to procure such orders; it appeared that, as the plaintiff was not familiar with the manufacturer's plant and its capabilities, a competent man, more capable than the plaintiff to procure a contract from the manufacturer's standpoint, was sent with the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the court held that the plaintiff was employed solely because of his supposed influence with high officials in the British government, and that, therefore, the agreement by which he was to receive commission on contracts secured through his efforts was contrary to public policy and void.

Reconciling its conclusion with Obenchain v. Ransome-Crummey Co. (1914) 69 Or. 547, 138 Pac. 1078, 139 Pac. 920, the supreme court of Oregon, in Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Co. (1914) 74 Or. 1, L.R.A.1915C, 823, 144 Pac. 1160, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 941, held that a contract to pay commission for obtaining a contract from a municipality for public work, which obligates the employee to do everything in his power to accomplish the success and aid in the business of its employer, is invalid as against public policy, since it might include the use

pointment of another as special counsel of the United States in certain litigated cases, in consideration whereof the agent is to receive one half the fees received by the counsel, is fraudulent and void as against public policy, it appearing by evidence of a solicitor of the treasurer that the agent had urged upon him the employment of his principal as special counsel, that at the instance of the agent he had called the attention of the Secretary of the Treasury to the subject, and that the appointment was thus brought about. Meguire v. Corwine (1880) 101 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 899.

In Murray v. Wakefield (1881) 9 Mo. App. 591, it was held that money paid in consideration of an undertaking to influence the police commissioners to prevent police interference with a lottery cannot be recovered back, though the lottery was not illegal.

A contract by which a bank agreed to extend time on a note held by it in consideration of the maker procuring the county treasurer to deposit public funds in the bank for a period of two months is in violation of public policy and void, and forms no basis for an enforceable agreement to extend time for payment of the note. Boyd v. Cochrane (1897) 18 Wash. 281, 51 Pac. 383.

V. Contracts for professional services.

As in the case of lobbying contracts, one may legally enter into an agreement to prepare and present petitions. Valdes v. Larrinaga (1914) 233 U. S. 707, 58 L. ed. 1163, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750.

And one may legally employ an attorney to appear before a departmental official, and advocate some action on the part of the latter. Stanton v. Embrey (1877) 93 U. S. 548, 23 L. ed. 983; Bergen v. Frisbie (1899) 125 Cal. 168, 57 Pac. 784. See also Mulligan v. Smith (1904) 32 Colo. 404, 76 Pac. 1063; Houlton v. Nichol (1896) 93 Wis. 393, 33 L.R.A.166, 57 Am. St. Rep. 928, 67 N. W. 715.

Contracts to pay for professional services in advocating just claims against the United States government, before officers of the various depart

ments thereof, are legal if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness, notwithstanding that the compensation is not fixed. Stanton v. Embrey (U. S.) supra. The court states: "Professional services to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation are as legitimate as services rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or jury that the claim presented, or the defense set up against the claim presented by the other party, ought to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases require advocates, and the legal profession must have a right to accept such employment and to receive compensation for their services; nor can courts of justice adjudge such contracts illegal if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness."

So, a contract whereby the services. of an attorney are engaged for the purpose of having certain timber entries pending before the Secretary of the Interior in Washington ratified and declared valid, but containing not stipulation for the use of improper means or methods, is valid upon its face and enforceable, notwithstanding that the compensation is contingent upon success, inasmuch as the employment of persons to influence decisions of the Land Department is perfectly legitimate in the eyes of the law, unless the means and methods resorted to are improper. Bergen v. Frisbie (1899) 125 Cal. 168, 57 Pac. 784.

So, there is no objection to employ. ing a lawyer to procure a draft of a proposed resolution of the board of aldermen of a city which would give the defendant permission to erect an iron railing, to present the resolution to the board, see the various aldermen and explain to them the reasons of necessity for favorable action on the resolution, and explain its purport to the mayor so that it would meet with his approval, and a recovery may be had for these services. Eisenstein v. Maiden Lane Safe Deposit Co. (1909) 113 N. Y. Supp. 967.

It is competent for a paving company to employ attorneys and agents to give legal advice, to collect and

affidavits prepared and verified, and the circumstances presented to him to show that the prisoner is a proper subject for executive clemency, and there is no reason why a contract to do these things should be declared void as against public policy. Bremsen v. Engler (1883) 17 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 172, supra.

Such

from

As said in Chadwick v. Knox (1855) 31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329: “A person imprisoned can do little to aid himself in bringing his case to the consideration of the executive. For everything that must be done without the walls of the prison the convict is compelled to rely on the assistance of those who have their liberty. assistance may be afforded motives of charity and compassion, or the motive may be in part kindness and in part an expectation that the party relieved will be ready to afford a suitable compensation for the services and expenses; or the party in prison may employ another to do such acts as may be rightfully and properly done for his relief, and contract to pay him for his services and to repay him his expenses. Such a contract, if the parties contemplate only a resort to legal and proper measures, is free from any just exception, and binding upon the parties."

And a contract to aid in securing the parole of a prisoner, which does not contemplate the use of illegal means, but merely the presentation to the board of parole of the necessary papers and evidence, is not against public policy, although a statute imposes a penalty on any person who shall for reward aid or assist in procuring a pardon from the governor. Gordon v. Gordon (1916) 168 Ky. 409, L.R.A.1916D, 576, 182 S. W. 220, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 886.

In Moyer v. Cantieny (Minn.) supra, the court, after stating that there are considerations which properly might be brought to the attention of the governor and influence his action in the exercise of his constitutional power of granting pardons, and which suggest the propriety of employing professional services of attorneys for that purpose, goes on to say: "For in

stance, it would be proper, and often expedient, that an attorney at law examine the case upon which the conviction was based, to see whether, notwithstanding the final judgment of the law, the case may not be of such a nature as to justify the exercise of the extraordinary power of pardon. He may direct investigations to the discovery of facts bearing upon the question of guilt not discoverable at the time of the trial. . . . Whatever considerations may properly affect the action of the executive may be urged upon his attention."

In Meadow v. Bird (1857) 22 Ga. 246, the supreme court of Georgia held that a note given for professional services rendered by an attorney on an application for a pardon to the legislature, explaining to the members legal principles, and explaining testimony, and arguing its legal effect in such language as one gentleman would use to another in discussing the merits of the subject, was not illegal because contrary to the public policy.

There is nothing necessarily immoral in an application for a pardon; a person may therefore be legally employed to prepare a petition, collect evidence showing the right to a pardon, and submit the same, with proper arguments addressed to reason and judgment, to the governor or other officer or department having authority to grant pardons; contracts for the performance of such services, carried out in the manner contemplated, are valid. William Deering & Co. v. Cunningham (1901) 63 Kan. 174, 54 L.R.A. 410, 65 Pac. 263.

But it has been held that a distinction should be made between an employment of an attorney and a contract to secure a pardon made by a person who is not an attorney; the latter, it is said, would be objectionable because it would not appear on its face that the means to be employed were not influence or personal solicitation or some other equally objectionable means, while an employment of one to perform services in the line of his profession would not be objectionable. Bremsen v. Engler (N. Y.) supra.

And according to the South Dakota