The other Virginia case relied upon is Bank of Phoebus v. Byrum, 110 Va. 708, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 436, 135 Am. St. Rep. 953, 67 S. E. 349. In that case the plaintiff sought by attachment to subject money belonging to the defendant, Byrum, deposited in a local bank, upon the ground that the defendant was not a resident of the state of Virginia. Byrum was then an enlisted soldier in the army of the United States, at Fortress Monroe. It was held that the attachment could be maintained, and that Byrum, who had been domiciled in another state and came to Fortress Monroe for the purpose of enlisting, having enlisted in the army, did not thereby acquire a residence in this commonwealth so as to defeat the right of a creditor to issue an attachment against him as a nonresident. The question here at issue, however, is whether the land in Arlington county, purchased for an approach to the Key bridge, by the United States, with the consent of the state of Virginia, is land over which the Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction, just as it has over the District of Columbia and over lands purchased by consent of the state for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. If it can be so held, then Congress having the exclusive legislative power, the state of Virginia has no jurisdiction and cannot impose a fine upon the accused for refusing to pay a state license tax for transacting business in that territory. In Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. ed. 264, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 995, and Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 29 L. ed. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005, the constitutional provision cited and relied upon is strictly construed, and it is held that the word "purchase," as used in the clause of the Constitution under consideration, has not the general technical meaning attached to it at common law as including any acquisition of lands by some other way than such actual purchase, and that, if the United States acquires land by direct cession from a state of its own land (as distinguished from a purchase by consent), it may be upon such conditions as the state may determine to impose, not inconsistent with the free and effective use of such land for the purposes intended. Applying this construction, the state of Kansas having ceded a part of its territory for the Ft. Leavenworth military reservation, and having in the conveyance retained "the right to tax railroad, bridge, and other corporations, their franchises. and property, on said reservation," such retention of this power to tax was upheld. Taxes-power Federal land. of That the right of a state to tax the property of others located upon lands owned by the United States, al- state to tax though it cannot tax property on such lands, will not be held to be abandoned by the state, except for the most compelling reasons, is quite manifest from several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Thomson v. Union P. R. Co. 9 Wall. 579, 19 L. ed. 792, it was held that the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Eastern Division, incorporated by the territory of Kansas, authorized to construct a railroad under the direction and authority of Congress for the use and purposes of the United States, is not exempt from taxation by the state, in the absence of any legislation by Congress to that effect. In this connection, Chief Justice Chase said: "We perceive no limits to the principle of exemption which the complainants seek to establish. It would remove from the reach of state taxation all the property of every agent of the government. Every corporation engaged in the transportation of mails, or of government property of any description, by land or water, or in supplying materials for the use of the government, or in performing any service of whatever kind, might claim the benefit of the exemption. (— Va. —, 131 S. E. 236.) The amount of property now held by such corporations, and having relations more or less direct to the national government and its service is very great. And this amount is continually increasing, so that it may admit of question whether the whole income of the property which will remain liable to state taxation, if the principle contended for is admitted and applied in its fullest extent, may not ultimately be found inadequate to the support of the state governments." In Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5. 21 L. ed. 787. it is held that the Union Pacific Railroad Company, although created by Congress as an agent of the Federal government, designed to be employed, and actually employed in the legitimate service of the government, both military and postal, is not exempt from taxation by the state of Nebraska; that the taxing power of a state is one of its attributes of sovereignty; it exists independently of the Constitution of the United States, and may be exercised to an unlimited extent, except in so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal government; and that there are no constitutional implications which prohibit a state tax upon the property of an agent of the government, merely be cause it is the property of such agent. The distinction between taxing the agencies of the Federal government and taxing the property of such agents is thus indicated: "It is therefore manifest that exemption of federal agencies from state taxtion is dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no such necessary effect. It leaves It leaves them free to discharge the duties they have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their operations is a direct obstruction to the exercise of federal powers." A more recent case is Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 49 L. ed. 242, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. There land which was conveyed by the United States to a corporation for dry dock purposes is held not entirely exempt from state taxation as an agency of the United States, by reason of the fact that there was a reservation in the conveyance of the right to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision therein for forfeiture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for use, or the use of the land for other purposes. Mr. Justice Holmes concludes the opinion there with this language: "Furthermore, it seems to us extravagant to say that an independent private corporation for gain, created by a state, is exempt from state taxation, either in its corporate person, or its property, because it is employed by the United States, even if the work for which it is employed is important and takes much of its time." In Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 42 L. ed. 740, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340, and Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588, 42 L. ed. 1155, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, the taxation of cattle, although kept for grazing purposes upon an Indian reservation in Oklahoma, the land being exempt from state taxation, does not violate any right or invade the jurisdiction and control of the United States over the Indians and their lands. In Crook, H. & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co. (C. C.) 54 Fed. 604, the question was whether a mechanic's lien could be enforced against the Chamberlin Hotel at Old Point Comfort, located upon the government reservation there. It appearing that the Virginia statute invoked did not conflict with any law of the United States relating to forts, and did not interfere with the military control, discipline, and use. by the United States of Fortress Monroe as a military post, the liens. were enforced, and it was held that the general laws of Virginia, other than criminal, are in force at Old Point Comfort, and are especially in force in those parts and places at Old Point Comfort which have been appropriated to other than the military purposes of the United States. It appears from the records of the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, Alexandria division, that on July 21, 1923, in the case of Burke v. Texas Company, the learned judge, Hon. D. Lawrence Groner, held that the tax imposed by the state upon gasoline used as motor fuel had been lawfully collected of Burke, who had a gasoline pump upon the land owned by the United States in the county of Arlington, Va., known as the United States Military Road, extending from the south end of the United States highway bridge through the United States Experiment Farm to the Arlington National Cemetery. That a bridge is not a building has been frequently decided, and it States-jurisdiction-building defined. seems hardly necessary to say that an approach to a bridge which is a public highway is not a building. In order to be accorded immunity from state taxation, the accused Taxes-immunity-what_necessary to show. ed States, but one or more of -property on bridge approach immunity. must not only show that the land is acquired by the Unitalso that it is for the purposes so clearly indicated in article 1, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution. We are clear in our view that he is not entitled to any such immunity. It is suggested in the brief for the accused that the sole test is whether or not the land has been acquired in the manner referred to in the clause cited; that is, over "places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the state in which the same shall be." Clearly, however, this is not the sole test, because it is manifest that the land must also be acquired for one of the specific purposes which are indicated in the clause, namely, for a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building. While the land of the United States upon which the station building is located is exempt from taxation by the state of Virginia, because it is the property of the federal government, neither the property of others located thereon nor the business of others conducted thereon for their private gain, can be held to be so exempt. As to these others, the state statutes have full force and effect. That this is the generally accepted rule is well indicated by the cases which we have cited, as well as by Rice v. Hammond, 19 Okla. 419, 91 Pac. 698, 14 Ann. Cas. 963, and note. The same rule is quite generally recognized. 26 R. C. L. § 75, p. 100. The state appears to have ceded no right or jurisdiction as to this land except such as are inconsistent with ownership of the property by the United States, and this imposition of a merchant's license tax is entirely consistent with the federal right and power. Our conclusion then is to affirm the judgment. ANNOTATION. Applicability of state license tax law to property or business of individual on land owned by Federal government. [License, § 21.] While it is settled beyond question that a state has no power to tax the means and instrumentalities of the Federal government (see 26 R. C. L. 95, § 71), a state may, nevertheless, impose a personal property tax on property situated on government reservations within its limits, not belonging to the United States or to tribal Indians or otherwise exempt from tax ation. 26 R. C. L. 100, § 75. The question presented by this annotation is whether a state may impose a license tax on the business of an individual being conducted on land owned by the Tederal government. The reported case (NIKIS V. COM. ante, 219) appears to be the only decision dealing with this power. In that case the court holds to be subject to a state license tax, a business carried on in a railroad station situated on land ceded to the Federal government for an approach to an interstate bridge. This decision is placed on the somewhat technical ground that a bridge approach is not a "building" within article 1, § 8 of the Constitution (10 Fed. Stat. Anno. 838), giving the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction over lands ceded for "forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." Being outside this provision, the court points out that the only other available source of exemption, the act exempting property of the United States from taxation, is not applicable to property of an individual on land belonging to the United States. Related and analogous holdings and an unreported decision of the Federal district court are set out in the reported case. W. A. S. HELEN A. WRIGHT, Plff. in Err., V. ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit — February 3, 1926. (10 F. (2d) 281.) Insurance, § 688 automobile rider injury in jumping from car. 1. A provision in an automobile rider attached to an accident insurance policy in a mountainous country, insuring against bodily injuries while riding in an automobile, covers injuries received by jumping from the car when it gets out of control on a steep grade. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 230.] the insured to obtain should be preferred. re Insurance, § 156 construction solving ambiguity against insurer. 4. If, by omitting an exception from an accident insurance policy, the insurer has couched the policy in such terms that reasonable men could reasonably contend that it applied to and covered a situation for which the insurer is sought to be held liable, the ambiguity will be resolved against the insurer. [See 14 R. C. L. 926; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 316; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 931; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 787.] (Woolley, Circuit J., dissents.) ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Middle District A.L.R.-15. Argued before Buffington and Woolley, Circuit Judges, and Clark, District Judge. Messrs. F. W. Wheaton, P. F. O'Neil, and John P. Kelly, for plaintiff in error: The policy having been written by the defendant company, the construction of it must be that construction most favorable to the other party to it, the insured and his beneficiary. Depue v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (C. C.) 166 Fed. 183; Burkhard v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 102 Pa. 262, 48 Am. Rep. 205. Any accident that originated through the insured riding in an automobile which is the proximate cause of the injuries should entitle the insured to the benefit of the double indemnity clause. King v. Travelers Ins. Co. 101 Ga. 64, 65 Am. St. Rep. 288, 28 S. E. 661; Preferred Acci. Ins. Co. v. Muir, 61 C. C. A. 456, 126 Fed. 926; United States Mut. Acci. Asso. V. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 33 L. ed. 60, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755; Primrose v. Casualty Co. of America, 232 Pa. 210, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 618, 81 Atl. 212. The whole trip down the mountain side, with the driver unable to control the speed of the car, the insured in apparently great peril, his jumping or falling from the automobile, were all part of the accident and part of his riding in an automobile. Although the actual injuries were received when he struck the roadway, they were nevertheless due to his riding in the automobile. Tooley v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co. 3 Biss. 399, Fed. Cas. No. 14,098; Gibson v. Casualty Co. of America, 156 App. Div. 144, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1045; Barber v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 165 Ill. App. 239; Bohaker v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 215 Mass. 32, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 543, 102 N. E. 342. Messrs. James P. Harris and W. A. Valentine, for defendant in error: Under the plain language of the double indemnity clause, double liability was imposed if, and only if, the decedent sustained injuries by accidental means while riding in an automobile. Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Vandecar, 30 C. C. A. 48, 57 U. S. App. 446, 86 Fed. 282; Anable v. Fidelity & C. Co. 73 N. J. L. 320, 63 Atl. 92, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 117; Van Bokkelen v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 34 App. Div. 399, 54 N. Y. Supp. 307; Wallace v. Employers' Liability Buffington, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: On October 9, 1907, the Etna Life Insurance Company, in consideration of the payment to it of a premium of $25, issued to Thomas A. Wright an accident insurance policy for $5,000, insuring him "against disability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means." The policy continued in force until the death of the insured under circumstances hereafter noted. Suit was brought on such policy and recovery of the full amount had in the court below. The company conceded its liability therefor, so that with that policy we are not concerned. On October 31, 1910, the company in consideration of the payment to it of a premium of $10 issued to the insured an additional policy-in form an automobile indorsement or rider on his foregoing policy-for indemnity against "bodily injuries through external, violent, and accidental means, while he is riding in, operating, or carrying for a private automobile," and for "an additional principal sum of $5,000." On this latter policy the beneficiary declared in the same suit. A yerdict and judgment in favor of the insurance company was entered fo plaintiff on the first policy & fr 46 de |