such contractor or a subcontractor in the construction of the ditch. We held that, in so far as the statute requires a surety company bond and creates a personal liability for other things than labor and materials which actually go into the work and thereby enhance the value of the property, it is unconstitutional and void and interferes with the liberty to contract, is a taking of property without due process, and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. We fail to see the application of that case. The statute referred to therein deals with contracts between private individuals. Section 329, supra, deals with bonds in connection with contracts made by public officials under the control of the state. The contract in this case was let by one of the departments of the state itself. We are unable to see why the state may not let its own contracts upon any -liability for materials not used in work. conditions, of benefit to the public, which it deems fit to impose, or why the legislature should not have the power to require the agents of the state to let such contracts only upon such conditions. No authority to the contrary has been called to our attention. It has frequently been held that municipalities or other public bodies have the right to require a bond in connection with public work, even though none is authorized to be taken by the statute, and that they have a further right to exceed the requirements of a statute in that regard. If that holding is sound, certainly no possible question exists that the legislature has the power to require a bond in such cases, and of a tenor which is reasonably designed to protect the public. Notes in 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1028, and 18 A.L.R. 1227; 29 C. J. 611. In Pacific Wood & Coal Co. v. Oswald, 179 Cal. 712, 178 Pac. 854, it was argued, as in Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Bancroft, 167 Cal. 185, 138 Pac. 742, that the requirement of a bond, similar to that in the case at bar, was unconstitutional because not for a public purpose. The court, however, held to the contrary. In Parker-Washington Co. v. Kansas City, 73 Kan. 722, 85 Pac. 781, the court held that the legisla ture might authorize a municipality to require a surety company bond in connection with municipal work. In the case of Wilson v. Whitmore, 92 Hun, 466, 36 N. Y. Supp. 550, affirmed in Wilson v. Webber, 157 N. Y. 693, 51 N. E. 1094, a bond was taken by a municipality conditioned for the payment of all claims "for materials furnished in and about such improvement." The bond was given pursuant to § 207, chap. 120, Laws 1886, and the point raised was, whether the legislature had authority to require such bond which would protect third parties as well as the city. The court, among other things, said: "So far as the city of Lockport is concerned there can, of course, be no question as to the right and duty of the lawmaking department of the state to incorporate into the charter, which is its fundamental law, such provisions as will adequately protect the municipality itself but I think it may go much further than that, and provide a means by which the individual members of the municipality itself and all other persons may be protected in their rights. The very 'municipal lien law,' to which reference has already been made, is an instance in point where to a certain class of men is furnished an easy and inexpensive method for the recovery of their just claims, which was not available to them prior to its enactment, and the means provided by the Lockport charter is simply more direct and easy of attainment. It would seem, therefore, that when it incorporated the provisions of $ 207 into the charter of the city of Lockport, the legislature not only did not transcend the limits of its authority, but that it provided an easy, suitable and inexpensive method by which a certain class of creditors could obtain their pay of a party to whom a contract for city improvement had been awarded." Wyo. -,246 Pac. 30.) -) The specific point raised in the case at bar by counsel for the surety company has not, perhaps, been directly raised before, but is substantially disposed of by the case last cited. Further, there are numerous cases, as will be shown hereafter, in which items such as are sued for in the case at bar have been held protected under statutes, and bonds in conformity therewith, and no question was raised as to the constitutionality of such statutes or the validity of such bonds. We think that the foregoing contention of counsel for the surety company cannot be sustained. 3. We must, accordingly, determine whether the items disallowed by the court should have been allowed under the provisions of the statute above set forth and under the bond executed in conformity therewith. The case is one of first impression in this state. Many cases like it are apt to arise in the future, and we have felt constrained, in order to arrive at a just and proper conclusion, to make a rather exhaustive investigation of the authorities on the subject. We might say, at the outset, that perhaps most of the cases construing mechanic's lien laws have held that materials of the character furnished in the case at bar, or as discussed herein, do not, inasmuch as they do not directly become a component part of a structure or improvement, give rise to a lien under such laws. Notes in 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 509; 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 585; 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 746; 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 85; 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 311; 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 872; 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1040; and L.R.A. 1915E, 986; 27 Cyc. 45-47. We should first of all, accordingly, determine as to whether or not the right of recovery, under § 329, supra, is, as claimed by counsel for the surety company, limited to those items which would be lienable under the mechanic's lien laws of the state. It cannot be denied that some of the courts, particularly those of Pennsylvania, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Arkansas, have made this limita tion. Other cases, on the contrary, have construed such statutes, and the bonds in conformity therewith, according to their natural meaning, and have allowed recovery for all labor and material coming within the meaning and contemplation of the statute and the bond. In this connection we might mention the fact that the supreme court of Washington has held that there is a difference in the meaning of "supplies" and "material;" that the latter is such as becomes an actually component part of a structure. Mitchell v. Berlin-McNitt Co. 91 Wash. 582, 158 Pac. 264. But the supreme court of California, upon mature consideration, refused to acknowledge the distinction drawn by the supreme court of Washington. Pacific Wood & Coal Co. v. Oswald, 179 Cal. 712, 178 Pac. 854. And the supreme court of Oregon says that "material," as used in such statutes, includes both "supplies" and "provisions." Fitzgerald v. Neal, 113 Or. 103, 231 Pac. 650. Further, the provisions of § 329, supra, which states that recovery may be had for labor and material furnished "in the execution of such contract," are not materially different from similar provisions in many other statutes. The United States statute on the subject provides for payment for labor and material furnished "for the prosecution of the work." It was held in Fitzgerald v. Neal, supra, that there is no difference in the meaning of the phrase, "for carrying on the work," and the phrase, "for the prosecution of the work." In Fidelity & D. Co. v. Charles Hegewald Co. 144 Ky. 790, 139 S. W. 975, it was held that the provision for payment of labor and material "used in the carrying out of said contract" means the same thing as the phrase employed in the foregoing statute of the United States, and to "carry out," out," of course, means no more nor less than to "execute," the word used in § 329. supra. Again it has been held that the phrase, "in the performance" of the work, is substantially equivalent to the phrase, "for the prosecution" of the work. Hilton v. Universal Constr. Co. 202 Mo. App. 672, 216 S. W. 1034; Sherman v. American Surety Co. 178 Cal. 286, 173 Pac. 161. And many courts, in construing statutes containing such or similar phrases, have placed a liberal interpretation thereon, in order to carry the beneficial purpose thereof, namely, to provide for the payment of the labor and material, furnished in connection with contracts entered into pursuant to such statutes, into effect. 29 C. J. 611; Brogan v. National Surety Co. 246 U. S. 257, 62 L. ed. 703, L.R.A.1918D, 776, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 250; United States use of Hill v. American Surety Co. 200 U. S. 197, 50 L. ed. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; City Trust, S. D. & Surety Co. v. United States, 77 C. C. A. 397, 147 Fed. 155; Clatsop County v. Fidelity & D. Co. 96 Or. 2, 189 Pac. 207; French v. Powell, 135 Cal. 636, 68 Pac. 92; Sherman v. American Surety Co. 178 Cal. 286, 173 Pac. 161. Many other cases might be cited. It was, for instance, said in United States use of Hill v. American Surety Co. 200 U. S. 197, 50 L. ed. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168, where the question was as to whether a subcontractor was protected by the statute: "If literally construed, the obligation of the bond might be limited to secure only persons supplying labor or materials directly to the contractor, for which he would be personally liable. But we must not overlook, in construing this obligation, the manifest purpose of the statute to require that material and labor actually contributed to the construction of the public building shall be paid for and to provide a security to that end." In Sherman v. American Surety Co. supra, it was said: "It would be inequitable to subject an owner of property to a lien for that which did not enter into and become a part of such property. Hence, in construing mechanic's lien statutes, they are generally held to cover only what has been incorporated into the substance of and added to the value of the property against which the lien is asserted. . . In American Surety Co. v. Lawrenceville Cement Co. (C. C.) 110 Fed. 717, the court, in construing a bond given pursuant to the provisions of the section, said: "The underlying equity of lien statutes relates to a direct addition to the substance of the subject-matter, building, or other thing to which the lien attaches, while the statute in question concerns every approximate relation of the contractor to that which he has contracted to do. Plainly, the act of Congress and the bond in the case at bar are susceptible of a more liberal construction than the lien statutes referred to."" So, too, it was said in Portland v. O'Neill, 98 Or. 162, 192 Pac. 909, and Multnomah County v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. 87 Or. 198, L.R.A.1918C, 685, 170 Pac. 525, that the statute requiring a bond, in cases like that at bar, contemplates every proximate relation of the contractor to the work which he has contracted to do. In the case at bar there is nothing to indicate that the legislature intended by § 329, supra, to limit the labor and material furnished in connection with a con -scope lien. tract to such as material subject would be lienable to mechanic's under the mechanic's lien statutes. The statute passed in 1909, which was in part declared unconstitutional in George Bolln Co. v. North Platte Irrig. Co. 19 Wyo. 542, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 868, 121 Pac. 22, clearly intended the bond therein required to go beyond the requirements of mechanic's lien statutes. While we cannot say that that statute indicates that § 329, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1920, supra, also goes beyond the requirements of the mechanic's lien laws, particularly since the reading of the two statutes is dissimilar, yet it shows that it cannot be said that the legislature had the limitations of the mechanic's lien laws in mind when it enacted § 329, supra. In other words, we (- Wyo. - 246 Pac. 30.) are compelled, we think, to construe § 329, supra, in the light of its own language, bearing in mind the ultimate and beneficial purpose for which the law was designed. 29 C. J. 611. While the surety company cannot be held liable beyond the terms of the bond, executed pursuant to the statute, yet it should be held liable for any breach fairly coming within the terms thereof. 29 C. J. 612. 4. Broadly speaking, and giving a natural meaning to the language used, labor and material furnished "in the execution of -what cover. a contract" include, we think, all labor and material which contribute, directly or indirectly, to the completion of the work. Machinery, horses, and material of every kind, whether owned by the contractor or not, but used for the purpose of completing the contract, contributes thereto. Yet, as has been stated by some of the courts, there must be some limit to the liability of a surety company. It would, clearly, be unfair to hold such company liable for material that is neither proper nor necessary in connection with the work to be performed, and it would seem further that no liability ought to exist for items which cannot be fairly said to have been in contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of the bond. Thus it has been held that it is the labor and material supplied for the execution of the work which is protected, and not some obligation incurred by the contractor which does not approximate the construction contracted to be done. Portland v. O'Neill, supra. Material, furnished under contracts like that at bar, falls naturally into certain definite groups. Some of those only are involved in the plaintiff's claim herein, but, without reference to that, we shall consider some of the main groups which have come under consideration by the courts, so that we may have a general view of the whole subject: (a) First, then, courts seem to be agreed that necessary explosives, used in the performance of a contract, must be paid for under statutes and contracts under consideration here, and they have, in fact, generally held that a lien exists for such items even under the meNotes in 5 chanic's lien statutes. Ann. Cas. 446, and 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 288; Johnson v. Starrett, 127 Minn. 138, L.R.A.1915B, 708, 149 N. W. 6. On the other hand, courts also are generally agreed that no liability exists for certain other items. (b) Thus a bonding company is held not to be liable for the purchase price of machinery or other material which constitutes a part of the plant or outfit of a contractor, and which is not, from its nature, necessarily wholly consumed in the work, and this is true even though it may be wholly consumed in a particular work. Empire State Surety Co. v. Des Moines, 152 Iowa, 531, 131 N. W. 870, 132 N. W. 837; Beals v. Fidelity & D. Co. 76 App. Div. 526, 78 N. Y. Supp. 584; Kansas City use of Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Youmans, 213 Mo. 151, 181, 112 S. W. 225; Miller v. American Bonding Co. 133 Minn. 336, 158 N. W. 432; Heltzel Steel Form & I. Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co. 168 Ark. 728, 271 S. W. 325; United States Rubber Co. v. American Bonding Co. (United States Rubber Co. v. Washington Engineering Co.) 86 Wash. 180, L.R.A.1915F, 951, 149 Pac. 706; notes to 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 165, and L.R.A.1915F, 951; Nye-SchneiderFowler Co. v. Bridges, H. & Co. 98 Neb. 27, 151 N. W. 942. The reason for this holding, which seems sound, is clearly stated in Beals v. Fidelity & D. Co. 76 App. Div. 526, 78 N. Y. Supp. 584, as follows: "Its purpose [that of the statute] was to afford protection to those whose labor performed the work under contract and to those who furnished material which entered into and became a part of, or was naturally consumed in or about the completion of, the work in question. That, however, is as far as its provisions go. terms are not broad enough under Its any reasonable construction to cover tools and implements. Unless the liability under the bond was almost unlimited, it would be unfair to those who furnished labor and material legitimately and naturally entering into the construction of a given piece of work, that the liability under the bond should be employed in paying for tools and materials which perhaps might be used upon a hundred contracts. If plaintiff's contention in this case is correct, that the defendant became liable to pay for hand shovels used in and about the work, there is no reason why it would not have been liable if the contractor had seen fit, instead of purchasing a few hand shovels, to secure a steam shovel costing many hundreds of dollars." And in Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co. v. Bridges, H. & Co. supra, where it was contended that all parties becoming creditors of a contractor were protected under a bond like that in the case at bar, the court, in denying such claim, and in speaking of the plant or outfit of a contractor, said: "If the contractor whose business was to take such contracts from time to time should, while engaged in this particular work, purchase wagons with which to deliver his materials, with the expectation of using them similarly in other works for years afterwards, the bill for such wagons might in some sense, perhaps, be said to be in connection with this contract, but surely not within the contemplation of the parties." In fact it is said in Kansas City use of Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Youmans, 213 Mo. 151, 181, 112 S. W. 225, approved in Standard Boiler Works v. National Surety Co. 71 Wash. 28, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, 127 Pac. 573, that a contract presupposes that the contractor will furnish his outfit. We fear, however, that this statement has been disregarded by those courts which, as hereinafter mentioned, hold that payment of rental for a portion of an outfit is protected un der statutes and contracts here considered. (c) Again, courts seem to hold that loans made to a contractor are not, at least in the absence of an assignment of protected claims-a subject which we pass without considering-covered by such statute and cannot be considered to have been within the contemplation of the parties. American Sav. Bank & T. Co. v. National Surety Co. 104 Wash. 663, 177 Pac. 646; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. State, 147 Md. 554, 128 Atl. 641; People use of Western Acceptance Co. v. Southern Surety Co. 76 Colo. 141, 230 Pac. 397; United States use of Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Rundle, 52 L.R.A. 505, 46 C. C. A. 251, 107 Fed. 227; United States use of Norfolk S. R. Co. v. D. L. Taylor Co. (D. C.) 268 Fed. 635; Hardaway v. National Surety Co. 80 C. C. A. 283, 150 Fed. 465, affirmed in 211 U. S. 552, 53 L. ed. 321, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202; Carr Hardware Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Surety Co. 190 Iowa, 1320, 181 N. W. 680; United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Henderson County, 253 Tex. Civ. App. —, S. W. 835: State use of Southern Maryland Nat. Bank v. National Surety Co. 126 Md. 290, 94 Atl. 916. The few holdings to the contrary were under contracts and bonds apparently broader than those in the case at bar. Puget Sound State Bank v. Gallucci, 82 Wash. 445, 144 Pac. 698, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 767; Title Guaranty & S. Co. v. State, 61 Ind. App. 268, 109 N. E. 237, 111 N. E. 19; note in 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 171. In People use of Western Acceptance Co. v. Southern Surety Co. 76 Colo. 141, 230 Pac. 397, the court said: "The surety company entered into this obligation with regard to the ordinary matters which concerned, or were connected with, the performance of the contract. The bond is to secure the performance of the contract, and not the performance of any duties outside the contract, though incidentally connected with it. The borrowing of money to carry out the contract is |