seems to have had some influence in the mind of the court at special term in awarding his custody to his grandmother. But the other children appear to have been well cared for in the custody of their mother, and no reason is apparent why Robert would not have just as affectionate and tender care with her as where he is at present. The care which the respondents have given to him during the time he has lived with them, and their affectionate regard for him, are commendable; but the fact that they are somewhat more well-to-do from financial point of view than the mother is not alone a sufficient reason to sever the sacred bonds of kinship and maternity which naturally bind this a mother to her child, nor to deprive him of the nurture and care of a mother and the society of his brothers and sister. The court should not compel this child to be brought up a comparative stranger to his nearest kin, except for adequate reasons looking to his welfare, and we think no such reasons have here been shown." As between legal guardian and aunt. Considerations affecting the health and welfare of a child may justify a court in withholding its custody, even from its legal guardians, and in leaving the child temporarily in the custody of an aunt to whose care it has been committed by the mother. Re Welch (1878) 74 N. Y. 299. W. M. Amusements, § 2-police power - application to dances. 1. The police power of a municipality does not extend to the suppression of public dances, merely because an admission fee is charged. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 144.] Appeal, § 59-jurisdiction - conviction under municipal ordinance. 2. The supreme court has jurisdiction of an appeal from a conviction under a municipal ordinance, regardless of the amount involved, where the question of the validity of the ordinance is properly raised and overruled. [See 2 R. C. L. 35; 1 R. C. L. Supp. 369.] Amusements, § 2- municipal authority to suppress dances. 3. Authority given municipalities to suppress dance houses, in a statute involving disreputable and gambling houses and other disorderly practices, does not, by reason of the rule noscitur a sociis, confer power to suppress a public dance merely because an admission fee is charged. [See 19 R. C. L. 867; 26 R. C. L. 698.] APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Mayor's Court for the Town of Jonesville (Lazarus, M.) convicting him of violating an ordinance prohibiting the holding of public dances at which an admission fee is charged. Judgment annulled and set aside. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. St. Paul, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The town of Jonesville is incorpo rated under the provisions of the general Municipal Corporation Law, Act 136 of 1898, p. 224, commonly known as the "Lawrason Act." (161 La. 278, 108 So. 481.) On September 16, 1925, said town adopted its Ordinance No. 6, declaring: (1) That "the giving or holding of public dances . . . at which an admission fee is charged is hereby declared a public nuisance, and is prohibited;" (2) that any violation of the ordinance shall be punished by fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100, "or imprisonment in the town lockup for not more than 30 days;" (3) that, "the public welfare demanding immediate enforcement of this ordinance," it shall go into effect immediately after its first publication in the official town journal. I. On February 20, 1926, defendant was charged with having violated said ordinance on the day before, "unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, and of his malice aforethought." On February 24th he was tried and convicted before the mayor's court of said town, and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and costs, from which sentence he appeals. Appeal-jurisdiction-conviction under municipal ordinance. II. His appeal presents a contest over the legality of the ordinance under which he was convicted, i. e. over the legality of a fine imposed by a municipal corporation; hence our jurisdiction in the premises, regardless of "the amount thereof" (Const. 1921, art. 7, § 10, ¶ 5, p. 40); the issue as to the legality of said ordinance having been raised by way of a motion to quash, timely filed, and duly overruled by the court below. III. Of the grounds urged against the legality of the ordinance only one need be noticed; that ground being that there is no law of this state declaring, nor authority [express or implied] delegated by law to municipalities to declare, a public dance ["at which an admission fee is charged"] to be a public nuisance. IV. We know of no state law which distinguishes between public dances at which an admission fee is charged and public dances at which no admission fee is charged. We refer of course to criminal legislation only. ly. There may be some revenue statute on the subject, but with that we are not presently concerned. Nor do we know of any law which, in express terms, delegates to municipal corporations authority to distinguish (unless perhaps for revenue purposes), between public dances at which an admission fee is charged and public dances at which no admission fee is charged; to put the one under the ban of the law as a public nuisance, and exempt the other as not so. Hence it follows that, if there be any such authority in municipalities, it must be by virtue of some power implied in the law, or else inherent in the very nature of municipal government. houses and public dances be conducted in a decent and orderly manner, or in a manner indecent and disorderly; and there is, therefore, no authority thereunder to prohibit and suppress a public dance merely and solely because an admission fee is charged thereto. VI. And "it is not now disputed that municipal corporations may adopt laws and regulations touching the good order [and public morals] of the community," by virtue solely of the police power inherent in the very nature of municipal government. Shreveport v. Roos, 35 La. Ann. 1010; 12 C. J. 918, Verbo, Constitutional Law, § 428. But such power extends no further than is reasonably necessary to secure the end for which it exists; nor can it be used arbitrarily and unjustly, but, "like other governmental authority, is to be used for the common welfare-impartially and without arbitrary or unjust discrimination to the prejudice of private rights and individual liberty." State ex rel. Galle v. New Orleans, 113 La. 371, 67 L.R.A. 70, 36 So. 999, 2 Ann. Cas. 92. And hence our conclusion is that a municipality cannot prohibit and suppress public -police power dancing on the sole application to ground that an ad- dances. mission fee is charged to the dance. For "municipalities are not general guardians of the public morals, and therefore may not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen by ordinances forbidding acts not unlawful or harmful per se." 28 Cyc. 710, Verbo, Mun. Corp. Decree. The judgment and sentence appealed from are therefore annulled and set aside, and the defendant is now discharged. ANNOTATION. Public regulation of dancing, dance halls, dancing schools, etc. I. Introduction; scope; definitions, 146. II. Right of regulation in general; as proper subject for exercise of police power, 148. III. Prohibiting entirely, or declaring a nuisance per se; validity of statute or ordinance having that effect: a. Generally; as proper exercise of police power, 149. b. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter or statute, 150. IV. Forbidding in restaurant or public place of refreshment other than licensed dance hall; validity of statute or ordinance having that effect, 151. V. Forbidding dancing, or the keeping open of places where dancing is engaged in, after certain hours: a. Validity of statute or ordinance: 1. Generally; in exercise of police power, 151. 2. Due process, 152. 3. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter or statute, 153. 4. Presumption of validity, 154. b. Places coming within prohibition of statute or ordinance, 154. VI. Forbidding attendance of infants, or prescribing hours at which, and conditions under which, they may attend: a. Validity of statute or ordinance: 1. Generally; in exercise of police power, 154. 2. Due process, 154. 3. Equal protection; discrimination, 154. 4. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of char- b. Places coming within prohibition of statute or ordinance, 155. VII. Forbidding sale, etc., of liquors at or in, or prohibiting dancing, etc., at, place where sold; validity of statute or ordinance having that effect: a. Equal protection; discrimination, 15€. b. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter; statute, or state constitution, 156. VIII. Requiring place to be fit, as regards health, convenience, safety, etc.; validity of statute or ordinance, 157. IX. Regulations concerning persons conducting, or employed therein: a. Limiting number of teachers or dance partners; validity of ordinance having that effect, 158. b. Requiring persons conducting to be of good character; power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter or statute, 158. X Licenses and permits: a. Validity of statute or ordinance requiring: 1. Generally; in exercise of police power, 158. 2. Due process, 159. 3. Equal protection; discrimination, 160. 4. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter, or statute, 161. b. Administrative features: 1. Validity of legislation (statute, ordinance, or police regulation) as conferring discretion upon administrative body or officer, 162. 2. Legislation construed as conferring discretion upon administrative body or officer, 165. 3. Compelling issuance or renewal of license or permit; mandamus, when allowed, 165. 4. Circumstances warranting exercise of discretion conferred upon administrative body or officer, 167. 5. Other matters; English cases, 168. c. Conditioning issuance upon consent of property owners: 1. Validity, 169. 2. Construction, 169. d. Conditioning issuance upon compliance with provisions relating to health, safety, convenience, etc., 170. e. Fees and penalties: 1. Power to impose, 170. 2. Reasonableness thereof, 170. 3. Recovery of penalty by informer, 171. 4. Voluntary payment of fee, what amounts to; right of recovery in case of, 171. f. Nature of license; tranferability, 171. g. Forfeiture or revocation: 1. Right of; constitutional objections, 172. 2. Necessity for notice, hearing, or conviction, 172. 3. Recovery of portion of fee upon, 173. 4. Reissuance or renewal after, 173. h. Statute or ordinance, as requiring in particular case: 1. Generally; American cases, 173. 2. Cases arising under English statute, 175. i. Cases unclassified, 177. 48 A.L.R.-10. XI. Sunday laws, with respect to dancing, etc.: 1. Generally; in exercise of police power, 177. 3. Equal protection; classification, 178. 4. Authority of municipality; statute, etc., construed, as authorizing municipality to legislate, 180. 5. Other cases, 180. b. Construction and application, 180. • XII. Miscellaneous, 181. 1. Introduction; scope; definitions. It has been declared generally that any practice or business the tendency of which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt the morals of those who follow it, or encourage idleness instead of habits of industry, is a legitimate subject for regulation or prohibition by the state. See 6 R. C. L. 207 (Constitutional Law, § 201). The regulation of dancing, dance halls, schools, etc., with which the present annotation is concerned, has been generally referred to the police power. The present annotation purports to cover all questions involving public regulation of dancing, etc., in which persons other than professional dancers participate. Generally, it is not concerned with questions involving statutes or ordinances providing for the licensing, or other regulation, of theaters, restaurants, saloons, etc., at which professional performances, including dancing and the like, are given for the entertainment of patrons (see, for example, the following cases: State v. Becker (1878) 30 La. Ann. 682; State v. O'Hara (1884) 36 La. Ann. 93; State v. Schonhausen (1885) 37 La. Ann. 42; State v. Wenger (1890) 42 La. Ann. 556, 7 So. 795; People v. Martin (1912) 137 N. Y. Supp. 677; People ex rel. McShane v. Keller (1916) 96 Misc. 92, 161 N. Y. Supp. 132, 34 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 523; Gartenstein & Sindel's License (1881) 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 612, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 37; Re Hastings (1882) 15 Phila. (Pa.) 420; Com. v. Donnelly (1912) 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 61); nor is it concerned with questions involving the construction and validity of statutes or ordinances forbidding or regulating the employment of infants as dancers in theatrical exhibitions (see, for example, the following cases: State v. Rose (1910) 125 La. 462, 26 L.R.A.(N.S.) 821, 51 So. 496; Taylor v. State (1924) 112 Neb. 112, 199 N. W. 22; People v. Meade (1890) 24 Abb. N. C. 357, 10 N. Y. Supp. 943; People ex rel. Sanders v. Grant (1893) 70 Hun, 233, 24 N. Y. Supp. 776; Re Stevens (1893) 70 Hun, 243, 24 N. Y. Supp. 780; People v. Ewer (1894) 141 N. Y. 129, 25 L.R.A. 794, 38 Am. St. Rep. 788, 36 N. E. 4, affirming (1893) 70 Hun, 239, 24 N. Y. Supp. 500, writ of error dismissed in (1896) 41 L. ed. (U. S.) 1181, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993). On the question of whether a dance hall or pavilion is within civil rights statute, see the following cases: Johnson v. Auburn & S. Electric R. Co. (1918) 222 N. Y. 443, L.R.A.1918F, 824, 119 N. E. 72, reversing (1915) 169 App. Div. 864, 156 N. Y. Supp. 93 (holding a dancing pavilion, for admission to which a small fee was charged, maintained by an electric railway company in a public park also owned and maintained by it, to be a "place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement," within the meaning of the New York Civil Rights Law); Youngstown Park & F. Street R. Co. v. Tokus (1915) 4 Ohio App. 276, 22 Ohio C. C. N. S. 417 (holding a public dancing pavilion to be a "place of public accommodation and amusement," within the meaning of the Ohio statute). For dance hall or public dance as nuisance, see annotation in 19 A.L.R. 1441, supplemented in 28 A.L.R. 1173 [Nuisances, § 29]. And for amusement park as nuisance, see annotation in 33 A.L.R. 725 [Nuisances, § 57], one of the objectional features in several |