which the court construed to include a restaurant where dancing to the music of an orchestra was permitted, after 1 o'clock A. M., is a valid exercise of the police power delegated to cities. Chicago v. Green Mill Gardens (1922) 305 Ill. 87, 137 N. E. 126. 2. Due process. Provision in city ordinance that all public dances shall be discontinued and all public dance halls shall be closed on or before the hour of 3 o'clock A. M. is not unreasonable, as going beyond reasonable boundaries of conservation of the right to use property and to indulge in the amusement incident to public dances. Mehlos v. Milwaukee (1914) 156 Wis. 591, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1009, 145 N. W. 882, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1102. An ordinance of the city of Chicago the effect of which is to prohibit dancing, or the permitting of dancing, in public places of amusement a term which the court construed to include a restaurant where dancing to the music of an orchestra was permittedafter 1 o'clock A. M., is not unreasonable as denying to the owner of a restaurant where dancing is permitted the use of its property as it may desire. Chicago v. Green Mill Gardens (1922) 305 Ill. 87, 137 N. E. 126. Said the court: "We may take judicial notice of the fact that the city of Chicago is a densely populated city, and that restaurants and places of the kind that appellee conducts are not in isolated portions of the city, where residents and other persons might not be disturbed and annoyed by music and dancing at as late an hour as 2:30 A. M. We may assume, also, that the fact that other people would be disturbed and annoyed and deprived of necessary sleep and rest entered into consideration in the passage of this ordinance. But evidently that was not the sole consideration. Continued dancing till such a late hour would in itself tend to endanger the health of the patrons engaged therein, and such public places conducted at such late. hours would tend to attract and congregate evilly disposed persons at hours when the city would be least prepared with police to guard against the acts of such persons. Appellee not having shown any ground for claiming that the ordinance is unreasonable or invalid, and it appearing that the ordinance is a reasonable one, authorized by the legislature, violating no provisions of the state or Federal Constitution, we hold that it is valid and binding, and that appellee is guilty as charged." But an ordinance making it unlawful for any person, etc., in control of any room or hall, any part of which, or any window of which, is within 25 feet of any part of any building used by another as a residence, to conduct or permit, between the hours of 10 o'clock P. M. and 8 o'clock A. M., dancing or the performance of any dance music in such room or hall, has been held to be unreasonable and oppressive, in that it unduly and unwarrantably interferes with personal rights and the right to the enjoyment and reasonable use of property guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and likewise by § 1 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state of California. Re Hall (1920) 50 Cal. App. 786, 195 Pac. 975. Said the court: "The ordinance does nct confine the prohibited acts to any particular locality, or to buildings in any particular part of the city; nor does it differentiate between public dance halls-admittedly proper subjects for reasonable regulation in the exercise of the police power-and rooms in private homes wherein dancing may be conducted or dance music performed for the amusement and enjoyment of the householders, members of their families, and guests. Instead, the ordinance covers and includes any and all rooms and halls within the boundaries of the municipality, any portion of which or any window of which is within 25 feet of any portion of any other building used as a residence. So that if, forsooth, the owner, lessee, or lawful occupant of any private residence should so far forget himself as to permit members of his own family or invited guests to indulge in the innocent amusement of dancing in any room in his own home that happens to be within 25 feet of any part of his neighbor's residence, or permits them to listen to the soft strains of waltz music played in such room, his temerity possibly may cost him a fine of $500 and six months in jail as a common malefactor. To construe the ordinance as covering only public dance halls, or as inhibiting only boisterous dancing and loud and discordant music, would be but a mere arbitrary decision of the court, and, in effect, amount to a redraft of the ordinance to make it conform to what, in the view of the court, the city commissioners ought originally to have made it." "The ordinance cannot be upheld upon the theory that it is a reasonable regulation designed to prevent a disturbance of the slumbers of the occupants of near-by residences during the hours usually devoted to sleep. Not only must the inhabitants of cities put up with such ordinary sounds as are the customary and usual incidents to such community habitation, accepting the inconveniences of urban life along with the benefits derivable therefrom, but, what is equally to the point, legislation of this character, imposing an onerous burden upon a lawful and innocuous amusement by absolutely prohibiting it in all rooms that may chance to be within 25 feet of other buildings used as residences, cannot be justified by the mere possibility that disturbing and annoying sounds will endanger the public welfare. It must rest upon the fact that experience has demonstrated that the danger of such disturbance and annoyance, in the absence of such legislative regulation, is one which may reasonably be anticipated as the probable result of permitting any dancing whatever, or performing any kind of dance music, in any hall or room any portion of which or any window of which may happen to be within 25 feet of any portion of any other building used as a residence. . . . By suitable regulation, far less drastic than the prohibitory ordinance before us, such an innocent recreation as dancing and such an intrinsically. harmless amusement as the perform ance of dance music can be so conducted and performed as not to give reasonable cause for complaint even to persons of 'dainty modes and habits of living.' The total prohibition, therefore, of these innocent amusements, during any of the twenty-four hours, is an arbitrary and unreasonable invasion of private rights. "The law,' says the supreme court in Re Farb (1918) 178 Cal. 592, 3 A.L.R. 301, 174 Pac. 320, 'does not tolerate the prohibition of something which may be regulated in such a manner as to overcome any evils which may be incidentally connected with it.'" Ibid. The ordinance is unreasonable because it prohibits what, in general, is perfectly lawful; it reaches and passes the limits of the city's police powers; it should, therefore, be declared unreasonable and void, leaving the city commissioners free to enact, instead, some other more specific and definite regulation. Ibid. 3. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter or statute. An ordinance the effect of which is to prohibit dancing, or the permitting of dancing, in public places of amusement, a term which the court construed to include a restaurant where dancing to the music of an orchestra was permitted,-after 1 o'clock A. M., is authorized by the provisions. of a statute conferring upon cities the power to regulate amusements and places of amusement. Chicago v. Green Mill Gardens (1922) 305 Ill 87, 137 N. E. 126. Such an ordinance is also authorized by other provisions of the statute, conferring upon cities the power to pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances, and to do all acts and make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease. Ibid. Provision in city ordinance, that no dancing shall be permitted at any public dancing school after 11 o'clock in the evening, has been held to be authorized by legislative authority conferred upon the common council of a city to enact any ordinance that "shall be deemed expedient for the good government of the city, the protection of its property, the preservation of peace and good order, the suppression of vice, the benefit of trade and commerce, and the preservation of health." Conley v. Buffalo (1909) 65 Misc. 100, 119 N. Y. Supp. 87. See also Geyer v. Buck (1919) 175 N. Y. Supp. 613, in which the court said that it fully concurred with the decision in that case. 4. Presumption of validity. One attacking the validity of an ordinance forbidding dancing in restaurants, etc., after 1 o'clock A. M., on the ground that it is unreasonable, is under the duty of pointing out and showing wherein or in what particular the ordinance is unreasonable or invalid, the presumption being in favor of the validity of the ordinance; failing in this, the ordinance will not be declared invalid. Chicago v. Green Mill Gardens (1922) 305 Ill. 87, 137 N. E. 126. b. Places coming within prohibition of statute or ordinance. A restaurant maintaining an orchestra, and permitting its patrons to dance to the music thereof, though charging an entrance fee to the restaurant, is a "public place of amusement," within the meaning of a penal ordinance the effect of a provision of which is to prohibit dancing, or the permitting of dancing, in public places of amusement after 1 o'clock A. M.; and this notwithstanding a former section of the ordinance defining the term "public place of amusement" to include and mean those places to which the general public may be admitted without the payment of an admission fee; this intent being further emphasized by a subsequent section limiting the hours for the sale and receipt of tickets at places of public amusement as defined by the ordinance. Chicago v. Green Mill Gardens (1922) 305 Ill. 87, 137 N. E. 126. VI. Forbidding attendance of infants, or prescribing hours at which, and conditions under which, they may attend. a. Validity of statute or ordinance. 1. Generally; in exercise of police power. A statute making it a misdemeanor for the owner, keeper, or manager of a "dance house" to permit persons under twenty-one years of age to be or remain therein is not unconstitutional, as not being a proper exercise of the police power; it clearly is a proper exercise of the police power. State v. Rosenfield (1910) 111 Minn. 301, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 331, 137 Am. St. Rep. 557, 126 N. W. 1068. 2. Due process. Provision in city ordinance making it unlawful, after 10 o'clock P. M., to permit any person to take part in any public dance who has not reached the age of eighteen years, unless accompanied by a parent or natural guardian, is not unreasonable, as going beyond reasonable boundaries of conservation of the right to use property and to indulge in the amusement incident to public dances. Mehlos v. Milwaukee (1914) 156 Wis. 591, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1009, 146 N. W. 882, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1102. 3. Equal protection; discrimination. The constitutional guaranty of equal rights is not infringed by a police regulation making it a misdemeanor to permit any person under twenty-one years of age to be or remain in a dance house, on the ground that it discriminates between women who have arrived at the age of majority under the age of twenty-one, and those over the age of twenty-one. State v. Rosenfield (1910) 111 Minn. 301, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 331, 137 Am. St. Rep. 557, 126 N. W. 1068. Said the court: "The purpose of the statute is to protect the youth of the state from corrupting influences, and it was necessary for the legislature to fix an age limit. It was a matter of legislative discretion whether such limit should be the common-law limit of minority, and apply alike to the youth of both sexes, or whether a distinction should be made of females by fixing the age limit of females at eighteen years, the statutory limit of minority of females. The fact that the legislature did not make such distinction affords no ground for inferring that the statute is an arbitrary exercise of the police power, or an improper classification, for it applies alike to all persons, male and female, under the age of twenty-one years." 4. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter or statute. Provision in city ordinance, that no girl under sixteen years of age shall be admitted to any public dancing school, unless accompanied by her parent or guardian, has been held to be authorized by legislative authority conferred upon the common council of a city to enact any ordinance that "shall be deemed expedient for the good government of the city, the protection of its property, the preservation of peace and good order, the suppression of vice, the benefit of trade and commerce, and the preservation of health." Conley v. Buffalo (1909). 65 Misc. 100, 119 N. Y. Supp. 87. See also Geyer v. Buck (1919) 175 N. Y. Supp. 613, in which the court said that it fully concurred with the decision in that case. b. Places coming within prohibition of statute or ordinance. In the absence of a definition, the term "dance house," as used in a statute making it a misdemeanor to permit any person under the age of twentyone years to be or remain in "any dance house, concert saloon, place where intoxicating liquors are sold or given away, or in any place of entertainment injurious to the morals," must be construed in accordance with its ordinary usage; so construing it, a "dance house" is a place maintained for promiscuous and public dancing, the rule of admission to which is not based upon personal selection or invitation. State v. Rosenfield (1910) 111 Minn. 301, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 331, 137 Am. St. Rep. 557, 126 N. W. 1068. From the language of the statute, it is clear that dance houses are within its prohibition, whether or not in fact they are conducted in a manner injurious to morals. Ibid. c. Other matters. Under a statute making it a misdemeanor to permit any person under the age of twenty-one years to be or remain in "any dance house, concert saloon, place where intoxicating liquors are sold or given away, or in any place of entertainment injurious to the morals," a complaint for permitting a person under twenty-one years of age to remain in a "dance hall" need not describe the character of such hall, nor allege that it was a place injurious to the morals. State v. Rosenfield (1910) 111 Minn. 301, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 331, 137 Am. St. Rep. 557, 126 N. W. 1068. (This was held to be true because of the principles stated in subd. VI. b, supra.) A complaint charging one with the public offense of permitting a person under twenty-one years of age to be or remain in a dance house, and couched in the language of the statute creating the offense, states a cause of action (provided the statute is valid), since it thereby sets forth all the essential elements necessary to constitute the offense. Ibid. To sustain a conviction under a statute making it a misdemeanor for the owner, keeper, or manager, whether in whole or in part, of a dance house, to permit a person under twenty-one years of age to be or remain therein, it is not necessary that a part owner who personally assisted in conducting a public dance hall should have been present at the dance on the night alleged in a complaint for permitting a minor to remain therein in violation of the statute, where it appears that such part proprietor had frequently been in charge when the minor named in the complaint had been present. Ibid. In a prosecution for violation of the statute, it was not error, therefore, to refuse a requested charge to the effect that, in order to find both defendants guilty, the jury should find that both of them knew that the minor named in the complaint was present on the night alleged, and that they were both present and permitted her to remain. Ibid. Knowledge of the age of the person named in the complaint is not essential to the violation of a statute making it a misdemeanor for the owner, keeper, or manager of a dance house to permit any person under twenty-one years of age to be or remain therein, when not so provided by the statute; in a prosecution for violation of the statute, it was not error, therefore, to refuse a requested charge to the effect that defendant could not be found guilty unless the jury should find that he knew, or ought to have known from the appearance of the person named in the complaint, that she was a minor. Ibid. VII. Forbidding sale, etc., of liquors at or in, or prohibiting dancing, etc., at, place where sold; validity of statute or ordinance having that effect. a. Equal protection; discrimination. A provision of the state Constitution, that no person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation, or profession, is not violated by an ordinance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors in dance cellars or dance halls or other places where musical and theatrical entertainments are given, and where females attend as waitresses. Ex parte Hayes (1893) 98 Cal. 555, 20 L.R.A. 701, 33 Pac. 337. In Geyer v. Buck (1919) 175 N. Y. Supp. 613, the question of discrimination was raised. There ordinances of long standing had been passed providing for the licensing and regulation of public dances and dance halls, among other things forbidding the sale of liquors therein; by an amendment subsequently enacted, it was provided that those ordinances should not apply to a hotel having upwards of fifty bedrooms. Plaintiff, the proprietor of a cabaret restaurant where a public bar was maintained and music furnished for dancing, sued out an injunction to restrain enforcement of the ordinances, on the ground that they were illegal and void in that they unjustly discriminated against him in favor of hotels having over fifty bedrooms. The court held that, even should the amendment be held void because of illegal discrimination, this did not invalidate the other sections, which still remained in force and prohibited plaintiff from permitting public dancing in his restaurant so long as he permitted intoxicating liquors to be served in connection therewith. This view, it was said, rendered unnecessary passing on the question whether the amendment referred to constituted, in law and in fact, an illegal discrimination in favor of certain hotels. As to this point, the court, however, said: "Much has and can be said to sustain the contention. But it is not every discrimination which will render an ordinance or statute illegal or void. Generally speaking, an ordinance, to be valid, does not necessarily have to operate on all alike, provided it operates equally on all embraced within its provisions. . . . We must recognize the fact that all statutes and ordinances, by their very nature and general application, must work hardships in some individual cases. . . . But the validity of such laws cannot be determined by the test of individual hardship or inconvenience, for, if such tests were applied, hardly any statute or ordinance would stand. The consideration which should govern is whether or not they, within the sphere of their operation, affect alike all persons similarly situated. We can well see that certain considerations of weight and moment might well have influenced the council in exempting hotels with fifty rooms from the operation of the ordinance, where the evils attendant on public dances are not so evident, and the guaranties against the abuse of the privileges conferred are greater." b. Power of municipality as dependent upon construction of charter, statute, or state constitution. An ordinance prohibiting the sale of |