held to be vacated whenever any provision of any ordinance with regard to public dances and public balls is being violated, or whenever any indecent act shall be committed, or when any disorder of a gross, violent, or vulgar character shall take place. Mehlos v. Milwaukee (1914) 156 Wis. 591, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1009, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1102, 146 N. W. 882. The court said it apprehended authority of this kind to be common. That discretionary power is conferred upon the police officials to act without any opportunity for any sort of a hearing does not involve an undue restraint upon liberty or property, but is a reasonably necessary provision for the preservation of good order, since it would be utterly useless to attempt to suppress such acts as that feature of the ordinance is designed to reach, if, before action, some sort of a judicial hearing were required (ibid., the court observing that there was nothing novel about this feature of the ordinance); nor is a provision of the ordinance, that every licensed owner of a dance hall shall, immediately upon application being received by him from any person, club, or society to lease or rent his hall for the pur pose of holding a public dance or ball therein, report (to the mayor) the name and address of such person, club, or society, and the date when such public dance or ball is proposed to be held (ibid.); nor is a provision of the ordinance making it the duty of the owner, etc., to prevent, during any use of the premises for a public dance, any gross behavior of a disorderly, violent, or vulgar character (ibid.). Town boards, having statutory authority to regulate public dances and public dance halls, are also empowered to impose penalties for the violation of their regulatory measures; otherwise the power to regulate would be nugatory, it being the experience of the centuries that no law regulating human conduct is self-regulating. State v. Hoffman (1924) 159 Minn. 401, 199 N. W. 175. That an ordinance providing for the licensing and regulation of public dance halls incidentally decreases the profits from the sale of liquors and the receipts of rent for a dance hall, upon its going into effect, does not render it unreasonable as being confiscatory in any legal sense. Koettegen v. Paterson (1917) 90 N. J. L. 698, 101 Atl. 253. L. S. E. CLEVELAND TRUST COMPANY et al., Plffs. in Err., V. HARRY R. SCOBIE, Admr., etc., of Jerome C. Green, Deceased. Banks, § 226 Ohio Supreme Court - March 2, 1926. (114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E. 373.) joint account death of one depositor Where a person opens a savings account in a bank to the joint credit of himself and another, payable to either, and balance at death of either payable to survivor, the authority to remain in full force until receipt by the bank from the depositor of written notice of its revocation, and the record shows that the depositor intended to transfer to the person to whom he made the account jointly payable a present joint interest equal to his own in the account, and the pass book has been left in the possession of the bank for withdrawals by either party on the joint account, a joint interest is created in the right of the depositor in the deposit, and the perHeadnote by the COURT. (114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E. 373.) son to whom the deposit is made payable jointly with the depositor, upon the death of the depositor without his having revoked the authority to draw, is entitled to the balance of the account. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 189.] ERROR to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to obtain payment of the balance of a savings account consisting of funds deposited in the defendant bank by plaintiff's decedent. Reversed. Statement by Allen, J.: This is an action brought by Harry R. Scobie, administrator, against the Cleveland Trust Company and Annie Richardson, in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, to obtain payment of the balance of a savings account which consisted of funds deposited in the bank by one Jerome C. Green, the plaintiff's decedent. The action arises out of the following facts: On February 29, 1924, the Lake Shore branch of the Cleveland Trust Company, one of the defendants below, issued its pass book in the names of "Jerome C. Green or Anna Richardson;" the pass book containing the following entry: "Either may draw balance at death of either payable to survivor." In February, 1924, and prior to making the deposit, Mr. Green and his sister, Annie Richardson, one of the defendants below, signed a signature or bank file card in the usual form required by the Cleveland Trust Company for deposits of this kind. On the face of the signature card appears the statement: "Either May Draw-Balance at Death of Either Payable to Sur vivor." with your company. This authority to remain in full force until you receive written notice from me of its revocation. "Signed x "Jerome C. Green." Annie Richardson signed her own name in the body of this document. The pass book and the signature card were both deposited by Green with the Cleveland Trust Company, were never out of the possession of the Cleveland Trust Company, and were in possession of that company at the date of Green's death on September 15, 1924. At the time the account was opened, on February 29, 1924, Green deposited $4,735.30 to the credit of himself and Mrs. Richardson. He died on September 15, 1924, at which time there was the sum of $5,980.32 to the credit of the account. The possession of and title to this sum of money constitute the subject-matter of this suit. In February, 1924, Green wrote his sister, Annie Richardson, certain letters which were put in evidence upon the trial. On February 7, he wrote: "Sister Annie "Cleveland Feb. 7 1924 "Will I am sending you 2 cards to sign wright under my name so if anything happned me as you no how John & Josiph went and of course I am their bro the same might hapen me & prhaps not but nevrles its best to be on the safe side by dong this you could draw the mony in this Bank it would avoid a lot of trouble there are 4,700 there if you should draw it and I am gone it will be yours but for god sake use it for your silf furnush your house up fine the best of evrythng dont be fool enough to give it to other so thy can enjoy it untile you are gon of course I might out live you as I dont want that mick of a Green to get what I have worked hard for not in your tin tipe if anything did ocur your bank could do busenis for you but for god sake leave Josh to home git some of your advise from Clayton because he is a darn smart follow in fact the smartest in your family sin these and return to 2149 E 19 Cleveland by return of mail "I had Florence's name there but discontinued the name "Goodby best of luck on 2 side of of on card JC Green 2149 E 19 Cleveland Ohio "dont till Murny or he would say if the old devil died I could git an auto as I prity well no him Ha Ha.” In a subsequent letter, dated February 24, 1924, Green said in the pertinent parts of the letter: "I am returning those cards as thy must be signed on the other side also of course. thy mean safty for the depositor the reason I am having your name if I should happen to get killed or drop of suddnily it will be in shape that you could draw it all which is nearly 5 thousand be sure and keep the address of Bank and if anything should happen go to you bank & let him do you busines for yo of course as John & Josiph droped off suddnily I might do the same & of course my life longer than you of course. "I going to just give you an idea of what I got then you will no where your at and keep the slip "J. C. Green "ANNIE RICHARDSON. "2 Houses "The Houses are worth 6500 each Thats what thy can be sold for." Prior to the opening of the account in the name of Mrs. Richardson and himself jointly, Green had opened a joint account at the same bank to the credit of himself and another sister, Florence Desmond, under the same rules and regulations of the bank under which the account in question here was opened, and Florence Desmond had signed a signature card for that account similar to the signature card signed by Annie Richardson for the account covered in the instant case. This account in the name of himself and Florence Desmond, Green closed, revoking Florence Desmond's authority to draw, at the time he opened the account in the name of Mrs. Richardson and himself jointly. In his will, which was dated July 7, 1924, Green made no bequest of the deposit in the Lake Shore branch of the Cleveland Trust Company. Upon Green's death in the summer of 1924, the administrator of Green's estate brought an action praying that the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county find that the balance of the account in the custody of the trust company was the property of the estate. The defendant below, Annie Richardson, filed her answer and cross petition, setting forth the facts above outlined, and alleging that she is the legal and equitable owner of the funds now in the possession of the trust company, and is entitled to possession thereof. The trust company filed an answer to the petition and a separate answer to the crosspetition of Annie Richardson, which practically admits all the allegations of the cross petition. The court of common pleas ren (114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E. 373.) dered judgment for the administrator. On appeal, the court of appeals rendered similar judgment. The case comes into this court upon allowance of motion to certify the record. Messrs. Garfield, MacGregor, & Baldwin, for plaintiffs in error: Independently of the statutes, it has never been held in Ohio that there is any public policy which should prevent the creation of the right of survivorship, when the parties desire it. This court has in fact approved devises which created a right of survivorship, and the principle applicable would certainly be the same. Collins v. Collins, 40 Ohio St. 353; Taylor v. Foster, 22 Ohio St. 255; 7 C. J. 640; Chippendale v. North Adams Sav. Bank, 222 Mass. 499, 111 N. E. 371; Erwin v. Felter, 283 Ill. 36, L.R.A.1918E, 776, 119 N. E. 926; Donnelly's Estate, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 196. Two persons may contract for the benefit of a third person. Tilney v. Board of Education, 23 Ohio N. P. N. S. 465; Emmitt V. Brophy, 42 Ohio St. 82; Copeland v. Summers, 138 Ind. 219, 35 N. E. 514, 37 N. E. 971; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268. Mr. Harry R. Scobie, for defendant in error: Mrs. Richardson was precluded from exercising dominion while Mr. Green held the card which entitled him to control over the deposit. Wyville's Estate, 30 Pa. Dist. R. 987; Wortman v. Robinson, 44 Hun, 357, affirmed in 113 N. Y. 628, 20 N. E. 877; Flanagan v. Nash, 185 Pa. 41, 39 Atl. 818; Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177, 1 L.R.A. 535, 9 Am. St. Rep. 83, 15 Atl. 470; Main's Appeal, 73 Conn. 638, 48 Atl. 965. Where it may be shown that the account was not in reality made up of the funds of both persons, but rather the money of one person only, the court is justified in looking to the real merits of the case in coming to a decision as to the disposition of the funds which make up the account. Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N. Y. Supp. 536; Re Buchanan, 184 App. Div. 237, 171 N. Y. Supp. 708; Re Tripp, 206 App. Div. 61, 200 N. Y. Supp. 881; Bradford v. Eastman, 229 Mass. 499, 118 N. E. 879; Anson v. Savings Bank, 155 App. Div. 939, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1017. Right of survivorship in an account in two names is not to be presumed, but to be determined by the facts in the case. De Puy v. Stevens, 37 App. Div. 289, 55 N. Y. Supp. 810; Wood v. Zornstorff, 59 App. Div. 538, 69 N. Y. Supp. 241; Gansberg v. Sagemohl, 67 App. Div. 554, 73 N. Y. Supp. 984; Bradt v. Bradt, 143 App. Div. 863, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1114; Corcoran v. Hotaling, 164 App. Div. 75, 148 N. Y. Supp. 302. There was no intention on the part of Mr. Green to part with possession of the account. Re Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626; Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550, 30 Am. Rep. 486. Allen, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The court of appeals, with one judge dissenting, decided in favor of the administrator, on the ground that upon the facts of the record no gift appeared to have been made, and that the deposit of Green's funds in a savings account to the credit of himself and Mrs. Richardson, the deposit being made payable to either or survivor, was intended to be of a testamentary character, which, as it was not executed with the formality of a will, was invalid. Viewing the transaction as a testamentary disposition, it, of course, lacks the requisites of a valid will, and viewing it as a gift, it may be questioned whether the delivery essential to constitute a completed gift was present. However, the particular form of deposit found in this case was a general deposit account, into which Green paid his money from time to time, to be repaid on demand, in whole or in part, as called for, in current money. In this kind of deposit the title to the money deposited passes to the bank from the depositor. The depositor is not entitled to have the identical thing deposited returned to him, but the bank becomes the depositor's debtor in the amount of the deposit. 7 C. J. 628; Fayette County v. People's & D. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503, 10 186 L.R.A. 196, 25 N. E. 697; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60, 31 L.R.A. 653, 56 Am. St. Rep. 700, 42 N. E. 700; Covert v. Rhodes, 48 Ohio St. 66, 27 N. E. 94; Bank of Marysville v. Windisch-Mulhauser Brewing Co. 50 Ohio St. 151, 40 Am. St. Rep. 660, 33 N. E. 1054. Hence the specific question before us is not whether Green made a gift of the fund in specie, but whether he created in his sister a joint interest in the deposit equal to his own. Now while Annie Richardson was authorized to withdraw all or any part of the balance at any time after this account was opened, so also was Jerome C. Green. The record shows that withdrawals and deposits were made only by Green; that no deposits or withdrawals whatever were made by Mrs. Richardson during Green's life. In other words, Green exercised control of the account up to the time of his death. It was because of this retention of control that the Court of Appeals held there was no delivery, actual or constructive, of the fund to his sister. This control, however, was not exclusive. It was just the same control that Mrs. Richardson herself was authorized to exercise. The sister's interest was equal to Green's. She could withdraw all or any part of the funds upon deposit at any time during Green's life. While the account remained in the bank and the authority to pay remained unrevoked, Green himself could make no more withdrawals than his sister. It is true that Green retained the power to revoke Mrs. Richardson's right to withdraw, but until her power was terminated by him according to the arrangement to which she had assented her authority over the deposit was equal to his own. Although Green retained control of the account she had equal control thereof subject only to his right to terminate the same. The intent to leave to his sister the balance of the account upon his death was clearly manifested by Green's letters. Now when the de- with all the rules of the bank, se- Being immediately executed, this Mrs. Richardson was notified in writing of the creation of the joint interest and assented thereto in writing. The bank book was left at the bank, where, as the record shows, payment would have been made to Mrs. Richardson during Green's lifetime if she had appeared to make a withdrawal. Being joint owner of Green's chose in action against the bank, with a right equal to Green's, at Green's death Mrs. Richardson was entitled to possession of the money due upon the account, as against the administrator. There is authority contra to this holding. Carr v. Carr, 15 Cal. App. 480, 115 Pac. 261; Drinkhouse v. German Sav. & L. Soc. 17 Cal. App. 162, 118 Pac. 953; Brown v. Brown, 23 Barb. 565; Wolfe v. Hoefke, 124 Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1047; Pearre v. Grossnickle, 139 Md. 274, 115 Atl. 49. However, the weight of authority supports our present conclusion. It is generally held that an intent to transfer a present interest in the fund must be shown. Skillman v. Wiegand, 54 N. J. Eq. 198, 33 Atl. 929, and Raferty v. Reilly, 41 R. I. 47, 102 Atl. 711. Here there is no question as appears in the letters given above, but that this intent existed. Under these circumstances the weight of authority is to the effect that a joint interest has been created. This is shown by the following cases: Where an account in a savings bank was made in the name of the donor and donee jointly, it was held |