(121 Kan. 536, 247 Pac. 875.) It cannot be measured by the nature or character of the offense, unless, of course, it be an offense, inherently criminal, the very commission of which implies a base and depraved nature. The circumstances attendant upon the commission of the offense usually furnish the best guide. For example, an assault and battery may involve moral turpitude on the part of the assailant in one case and not in another. Intent, malice, knowledge of the gravity of the offense, and the provocation, are all elements to be considered. It may well be that an unsophisticated person could be caught in the act of transporting liquor, in violation of law, under circumstances which would not justify the court in holding that the act involved moral turpitude; but this rule can hardly be applied to a police officer of many years' experience, sworn to defend and uphold the law. "At the time plaintiff was convicted of a violation of the Prohibition Law, he was still a member of the police force of the District of Columbia, upon the pay roll of the government, subject, under certain conditions, to be called into service. The Act of 1916 provides that 'any retired member of the police department or fire department of the District of Columbia receiving relief under the provisions of this act may in time of flood, riot, conflagration, during extraordinary assemblages, or unusual emergencies, be called by the commissioners of said District into the service of the department from which he was retired. "When plaintiff entered the public service as a policeman, he took a solemn oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, and to bear true faith and allegiance to the same. It can hardly be said that a police officer, charged with the maintenance of the public peace, can be either defending the Constitution, or bearing true faith and allegiance thereto, when he is engaged in an open violation of the law. As was said by the court in State ex rel. Young v. Ed48 A.L.R.-17. munson, 103 Or. 243, 204 Pac. 619, a disbarment proceeding: "To support is to uphold; to maintain. No bootlegger is a supporter of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the state of Oregon. An attorney at law takes an oath to support the Constitution and laws. of the United States and of this state, and it is made his special duty so to do. He cannot consistently be both attorney at law and bootlegger at one and the same time.'" Pages 362-364. The court holds that the offense perpetrated by Roy Attorneys Bieber was a mis- disbarmentdemeanor involving possession of moral turpitude, liquor. and an order disbarring him from the practice of his profession as an attorney must be made in conformity with the statute. It is so ordered. Johnston, Ch. J., and Mason, Marshall, and Hopkins, JJ., concur. Burch, J., dissenting. Dawson, J., dissenting: We have two wide-awake, up-todate law schools in this state, in which our on-coming generation of lawyers and judges is being taught -as all lawyers have been taught since the time of Cicero-that penal offenses are of two sorts, malum in se and malum prohibitum, which, being translated into the Kansas language, mean an evil in itself, and an' evil forbidden. Misdeeds which are inherently wrong whether forbidden by law or not, like murder, rape, prostitution, burglary, theft, arson, breach of the peace, and the like, are examples of malum in se, and involve moral turpitude. Mere breaches of police regulations such as comprise the great and ever swelling roll of statutes and city ordinances which forbid this, that, and the other thing, and which have no inherent relationship to abstract and generally accepted notions of right and wrong, are examples of the sort of crimes designated as malum prohibitum. The offense of Roy Bieber falls into the classification of misdeeds known as malum prohibitum, which involves no essential element of moral turpitude. The statute which requires this court to strike from the roll of attorneys the name of any lawyer who commits an offense involving moral turpitude was enacted in 1913, while the mere possession of a bottle of whisky was not a crime of any sort, malum in se or malum prohibitum, until 1917 when the "bone dry" act was passed. As our chief justice said in Re Sanford, 117 Kan. 750, 232 Pac. 1053, the disbarment contemplated by this statute is legislative rather than judicial. Very well; let it remain so. We should not expand it by debatable interpretation. Being highly penal, it should be strictly construed. Certainly the act of 1913 providing for legislative disbarment did not contemplate disbarment for a breach of the "Bone Dry" Law, which was not enacted until four years later. I would have no difficulty with this case if the defendant had been found guilty of some violation of the prohibitory law for personal gain, such as manufacturing for sale, or selling, or keeping a nuisance, or even if it were shown in ordinary disbarment proceedings-without his conviction or plea of guilty in a formal prosecution under the Crimes Act-that he had been prostituting his talents as a lawyer to shield offenders against the prohibitory law, such professional misconduct might well be characterized as moral turpitude; but I cannot bring myself to the point of holding that by the isolated fact of having had a bottle of liquor on his kitchen shelf this man has been guilty of moral turpitude and should be deprived of his license to practise law. I therefore dissent. Harvey, J., concurring specially: I concede that the mere possession of intoxicating liquor does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, and yet I think the order of disbarment should be entered in this case. Per haps I am influenced in part by the misinformation furnished us at the time of defendant's admission to the bar-a matter to which I think we are not compelled to close our eyes. To me the oath of an attorney means something. It is an affirmative answer to the following: "You do solemnly swear that you will support and bear true allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Kansas; that you will neither delay nor deny any man his right through malice, for lucre, or from any unworthy desire; that you will not knowingly foster or promote, or give your assent to, any fraudulent, groundless or unjust suit; that you will neither do, nor consent to the doing of, any falsehood in court; and that you will discharge your duties as an attorney and counselor of the supreme court and all inferior courts of the state of Kansas with fidelity both to the court and to your cause, and to the best of your knowledge and ability. So help you God." I have never had much patience with the attitude of an attorney who evidently has studied law for the purpose of seeing the extent to which he himself can evade it, or advise his clients to do so. Considering this case and the history of defendant's fendant's admission to the bar, which is well known to this court, I am convinced that the oath of an attorney does not mean much to him. Until it does he had better occupy his time at some other vocation. Petition for rehearing denied. NOTE. Violation of liquor law as an infamous crime or offense involving moral turpitude is the subject of the annotation following KURTZ v. FARRINGTON, post, 266 and the earlier annotation there referred to. (104 Conn. 257, 132 Atl. 540.) ANNA J. KURTZ V. DANIEL T. FARRINGTON, Appt. Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors — March 8, 1926, (104 Conn. 257, 132 Atl. 540.) Witnesses, § 93 moral turpitude violation of National Prohibition Act. 1. One convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act by the possession of property for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor and the possession of liquor for beverage purposes is guilty of moral turpitude, and, if the conviction carries imprisonment, it may be shown to affect his credibility as a witness under a statute permitting conviction of crime to affect credibility. [See annotation on this question beginning on page 266.] Appeal, § 481-correction of findings. 2. The appellate court will not consider reasons of appeal based on refusal to correct findings of fact, if the correction will not affect the validity of the judgment rendered. Witnesses, § 93 - credibility - violation of National Prohibition Act. 3. Violation of the National Prohibition Act, which can be punished only by fine, is not within a statute providing that conviction of crime may be shown for the purpose of affecting the credibility of a witness. definition of in Criminal law, § 4 [See 8 R. C. L. 52, 53; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 529; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 516; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 441; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 482.] Brokers, § 19 right to profit by sale to principal. 6. An agent for, or one occupying a fiduciary relation to, one desiring to purchase a parcel of real estate, cannot purchase the property himself and resell it to his principal at a profit without disclosing the facts to the principal. [See 21 R. C. L. 829, 830; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1193; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1434; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 1174; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 1287.] Principal and agent, § 5 how relation established. 9. The relation of principal and agent with respect to the purchase of real estate may be established from the words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the particular case. [See 21 R. C. L. 820; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1192; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1431.] Principal and agent, § 2- necessity necessity of compensation. 10. Compensation is not a necessary element in the establishment of the relation of principal and agent with respect to the purchase of real estate. Estoppel, § 99 to deny fiduciary relation. 11. A real-estate broker who, upon being consulted with respect to the purchase of real estate belonging to a stranger, leads the customer to believe that he is in position to act for him, and proceeds to secure the property, is estopped to deny the existence of a fiduciary relation between himself and the customer. APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court for New Haven County (Hinman, J.) in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages for alleged fraud and misrepresentation by defendant in the purchase of certain property. No error. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Bronson, Lewis, & Bronson, for appellee: The conviction for violation of the National Prohibition Act was not a crime involving moral turpitude, and therefore was not such a conviction of a crime as to discredit the witness. Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co. 95 Conn. 500, 111 Atl. 861; Fort v. Brinkley, 87 Ark. 400, 112 S. W. 1084; Ex parte Marshall, 207 Ala. 966, 25 A.L.R. 338, 93 So. 471. "Intention" is an inference of fact, and the conclusion of the trial court is not reviewable unless it was one which the trier could not have reasonably made. Finlay v. Swirsky, 98 Conn. 666, 120 Atl. 561; McDermott v. McDermott, 97 Conn. 31, 115 Atl. 638. An agent who is guilty of bad faith to his principal, to the detriment of the interests of the principal, forfeits all right to commission or compensation, and must account to the principal for any and all profits made at his expense. Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 388; Schleifenbaum v. Rundbaken, 81 Conn. 623, 71 Atl. 899; 2 C. J. 708; Herzog v. Cooke, 99 Conn. 366, 121 Atl. 868. Proof of agency is ordinarily question of fact, but becomes a question of law when the facts are undisputed. a Russo v. McAviney, 96 Conn. 21, 112 Atl. 657; 2 C. J. 960; Siers v. Wiseman, 58 W. Va. 340, 52 S. E. 460. If there is evidence of the intention on one side to confer, and on the oth er side to undertake, the authority given, agency will be presumed. Anson, Contr. 330. A party may be estopped to deny that he acted as the agent of another, where his representations and actions caused such party to rely upon him. International Harvester Co. v. Walker, 138 Iowa, 638, 116 N. W. 706; Reigard v. McNeil, 38 Ill. 401. Haines, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This action was brought on two counts. While the court found the issues for the plaintiff, it is obvious that the damages were assessed on the first count only, for the proof of the allegations of the first count entitled the plaintiff to recover $2,000 damages, plus $192 of interest, which sums comprise the exact amount of the judgment. Since the judgment was rendered on the first count alone, and the defendant has not been prejudiced by the general finding of the trial court, upon both counts, we shall confine our consideration of this appeal to the first count only. That count alleges, in substance, that in October, 1923, the plaintiff entered into negotiations with the defendant for the purchase of certain real estate in Waterbury, then offered for sale by one Strong, it being then well understood between the plaintiff and the defendant that in making the purchase the defendant was acting as the agent for the plaintiff; that the plaintiff instruct (104 Conn. 257, 132 Atl. 540.) ed the defendant to pay no more than was absolutely necessary to obtain the title to the property, to which the defendant agreed; that the defendant then purchased the property of Strong for $29,000, and afterward represented to the plaintiff that the price which he had paid was $31,000, and that the plaintiff, not knowing that the defendant had paid but $29,000, paid the defendant the sum of $31,000; that these representations by the defendant were false, and made with the intent to deceive the plaintiff, and did deceive her; and that the resulting damage to her was $2,000. The defendant asked for the correction of the finding in various particulars, and the refusal of that request is the basis of the first three reasons of appeal. The narrowed limits of our examination make most of these unimportant, for, if made, they would not affect the validity of the judgAppeal-correc- ment rendered, and tion of findings. so do not require consideration by us. Herzog v. Cooke, 99 Conn. 366, 367, 121 Atl. 868; Barber v. Manchester, 72 Conn. 675, 680, 45 Atl. 1014, 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 396; Candee v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 73 Conn. 667, 669, 49 Atl. 17; Gilpatric v. National Surety Co. 95 Conn. 10, 18, 110 Atl. 545. The appeal having been perfected under General Statutes, § 5832, and all the evidence being before us, we have carefully examined the entire record. Our conclusion is that ¶ 2 of the defendant's proposed finding is supported by evidence which is in fact undisputed and should be allowed. Burns v. Telegram Pub. Co. 89 Conn. 549, 94 Atl. 917. So far as we find, there is nothing to show whether the defendant asked for or received compensation for his services in the purchase of the property, and ¶¶ 51 and 52 of the defendant's proposed finding cannot be allowed as requested in reasons 2 and 3. We may add that, in our view of the case, the fact is not of serious importance. This gives all This gives all the consideration necessary to the first three of the defendant's reasons of appeal. The fourth reason relates to the exclusion of the record of conviction of the witness Kurtz in the United States District Court for violation of the National Prohibition Act (U. S. Comp. Stat. §§ 10,1381 et seq. Fed Stat. Anno. Supp. 1919, p. 202), the charge being in two counts; one for possessing certain property designed for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor in violation of this act, and the other for possessing such liquor for beverage purposes. The penalty for these offenses is not specifically prescribed by the act, but falls within the provisions of 29, title 2 (U. S. Comp. Stat. § 10,138 p, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1919, p. 215): "Any person who. violates any of the provisions of this title, for which offense a special penalty is not prescribed, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $500;" for a subsequent offense, a fine of "not less than $500 and be imprisoned not less than three months nor more than two years." Since nothing appears upon this record to indicate that the offense was other than a first offense, we must assume that it was the latter. The penalty for a first conviction for such offenses cannot be imprisonment. Torrey v. United States (C. C. A. 5th) 278 Fed. 177. It can only be a fine of "not more than $500." We have heretofore construed General Statutes, § 5705: "No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action by reason of his conviction of crime; but such conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credit." We held in Card v. Foot, 57 Conn. 427, 18 Atl. 713, that this statute referred to infamous crimes, and that the record of conviction of such crimes might be shown "for the purpose of affecting his [the witness'] credit." We held in the Drazen Case, 95 Conn. 500, 111 Atl. 861, that crimes whose punishment must be imprisonment in the state prison are infamous crimes, within the mean |