Competition in Telecommunications

Přední strana obálky
MIT Press, 2001 - Počet stran: 315

Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a natural monopoly no longer reflect reality. As a result, policymakers often lack the guidance of economic theorists. Competition in Telecommunications is written in a style accessible to managers, consultants, government officials, and others. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book opens with background information for the reader who is unfamiliar with current issues in the telecommunications industry. The following sections focus on four central aspects of the recent deregulatory movement: the introduction of incentive regulation; one-way access (access given by a local network to the providers of complementary segments, such as long-distance or information services); the special nature of competition in an industry requiring two-way access (whereby competing networks depend on the mutual termination of calls); and universal service, in particular the two leading contenders for the competitively neutral provision of universal service: the use of engineering models to compute subsidies and the design of universal service auctions. The book concludes with a discussion of the Internet and regulatory institutions.

Copublished with the Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute.

 

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Obsah

Setting the Stage
1
12 A Brief Guided Tour through the Telecommunications Industry
9
13 Regulatory Reforms
16
Incentive Regulation
37
PerformanceBased Regulation
38
Pricing Services to the Consumer
60
23 Practical Aspects
84
Essential Facility and OneWay Access Theory
97
48 Global Price Cap and Incentives to Exclude
173
Multiple Bottlenecks and TwoWay Access with Patrick Key
179
52 Ineffectiveness of Noncooperative Access Price Setting
184
53 Do Wholesale Agreements Promote Retail Collusion? The Patent Pool Analogy
187
54 Application to TwoWay Access Pricing in Telecommunications
189
55 Four Reasons Why High Access Charges May Not Facilitate Collusion
196
56 Unbundling and FacilitiesBased Entry
207
57 Alternative Policies
213

32 Economic Principles
100
Lack of Instruments and Multiple Coals for Interconnection Charges
124
34 Two Specific Concerns and Some Common Misperceptions about Ramsey Access Pricing
131
Essential Facility and OneWay Access Policy
137
42 BackwardLooking CostBased Pricing of Access
141
The Problem of CrossSubsidies
144
44 ForwardLooking CostBased Pricing of Access
148
45 CostBased Access Pricing and Exclusion
161
46 ECPR and Its Applications
166
47 Global Price Cap
170
Universal Service
217
62 The Foundations of Universal Service
219
63 The US Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Universal Service Obligations
231
64 Universal Service Auctions
243
Concluding Remarks
265
72 Regulatory Institutions
272
Glossary
281
References
289
Index
299
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Strana 289 - The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation.

O autorovi (2001)

Jean-Jacques Laffont was Professor of Economics at theUniversité des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and the InstitutUniversitaire de France and Director of the Institut d'EconomieIndustrielle.

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