Competition in TelecommunicationsMIT Press, 2001 - Počet stran: 315 Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a natural monopoly no longer reflect reality. As a result, policymakers often lack the guidance of economic theorists. Competition in Telecommunications is written in a style accessible to managers, consultants, government officials, and others. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book opens with background information for the reader who is unfamiliar with current issues in the telecommunications industry. The following sections focus on four central aspects of the recent deregulatory movement: the introduction of incentive regulation; one-way access (access given by a local network to the providers of complementary segments, such as long-distance or information services); the special nature of competition in an industry requiring two-way access (whereby competing networks depend on the mutual termination of calls); and universal service, in particular the two leading contenders for the competitively neutral provision of universal service: the use of engineering models to compute subsidies and the design of universal service auctions. The book concludes with a discussion of the Internet and regulatory institutions. Copublished with the Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. |
Obsah
Setting the Stage | 1 |
12 A Brief Guided Tour through the Telecommunications Industry | 9 |
13 Regulatory Reforms | 16 |
Incentive Regulation | 37 |
PerformanceBased Regulation | 38 |
Pricing Services to the Consumer | 60 |
23 Practical Aspects | 84 |
Essential Facility and OneWay Access Theory | 97 |
48 Global Price Cap and Incentives to Exclude | 173 |
Multiple Bottlenecks and TwoWay Access with Patrick Key | 179 |
52 Ineffectiveness of Noncooperative Access Price Setting | 184 |
53 Do Wholesale Agreements Promote Retail Collusion? The Patent Pool Analogy | 187 |
54 Application to TwoWay Access Pricing in Telecommunications | 189 |
55 Four Reasons Why High Access Charges May Not Facilitate Collusion | 196 |
56 Unbundling and FacilitiesBased Entry | 207 |
57 Alternative Policies | 213 |
32 Economic Principles | 100 |
Lack of Instruments and Multiple Coals for Interconnection Charges | 124 |
34 Two Specific Concerns and Some Common Misperceptions about Ramsey Access Pricing | 131 |
Essential Facility and OneWay Access Policy | 137 |
42 BackwardLooking CostBased Pricing of Access | 141 |
The Problem of CrossSubsidies | 144 |
44 ForwardLooking CostBased Pricing of Access | 148 |
45 CostBased Access Pricing and Exclusion | 161 |
46 ECPR and Its Applications | 166 |
47 Global Price Cap | 170 |
Universal Service | 217 |
62 The Foundations of Universal Service | 219 |
63 The US Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Universal Service Obligations | 231 |
64 Universal Service Auctions | 243 |
Concluding Remarks | 265 |
72 Regulatory Institutions | 272 |
Glossary | 281 |
289 | |
299 | |
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Competition in Telecommunications Jean-Jacques Laffont,Jean Tirole Náhled není k dispozici. - 2000 |