. he prepared with profound secrecy to pass his army in the night to Gloucester, garnishing the works with his convalescents, leaving behind his baggage of every sort, his sick, wounded, shipping, and stores. To Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, the officer selected still to hold York, a letter was delivered addressed to General Washington, commending to his humanity his abandoned comrades. As soon as he passed the river, the British general determined to envelop Choisé with his whole force, and seizing all the horses. in his enemy's possession to mount his army and to press forward by forced marches, preceded by his numerous cavalry, the corps of Simcoe, and the Legion of Tarleton, about four hundred. Horses were to be taken everywhere as he passed, until his whole force was mounted. He intended to keep a direct course to the upper country, with the view of leaving it doubtful whether his ultimate object was New Jersey or North Carolina; hoping thus to distract the motions of his adversary, if not to draw him to one point of interception, when he might take his decision as circumstances should warrant. This bold conception bespoke the hero, and was worthy of its author. Nor can it justly be deemed so desperate as was generally conceived. Washington could not possibly in time seize the northern and southern route; and without availing himself of horses, he never could overtake his foe. This aid could not have been instantly procured; and when procured, must have been limited to a portion of his force. It is probable he might, with all the horses in the camp and in the neighborhood, have mounted four thousand men in four days ;* more could not have been collected in time. He could readily, by the aid of water-conveyance at his command, with prosperous gales, have transported his major force to the head of the Chesapeake, so as to have brought it in contact with the retreating foe on the confines of the Delaware, should Cornwallis have taken the northern route; but he must and would have calculated on the interposition of Sir Henry Clinton, who certainly would have moved through New Jersey to Easton, on the Delaware, ready to support the retreating army. *This would have comprehended all the horses in camp to be spared from other indispensable services, as well as all to be afforded by the country; and no doubt, upon such an occasion, every horse in the neighborhood and along the route of march would have been proffered, but such a collection in four days could not be effected but by great exertions. The American army under Heath would have followed Clinton, but in this condition of things our prospect could not be considered cheering. Clinton and Cornwallis marching in a straight line to each other, Heath upon their upper flank, and the army from the Chesapeake on the lower flank, placed our whole force in hazard. Washington would not have risked such a game. No hope could be indulged that troops would assemble from the country through which the enemy passed, capable of serious opposition. We had seen Arnold the year before with nine hundred men seize the metropolis of Virginia, and return to his shipping, twenty-five miles below, uninjured. We had afterward seen Simcoe possess himself of the Point of Fork, high up James River, unhurt; and Tarleton in Charlotteville, not far from the Blue Ridge, almost capturing the governor and legislature of the State. What chance then could exist of stopping Cornwallis by any intermediate force from the country? Passing the Potomac, this expectation, faint always, considerably diminished. In the part of Maryland through which his course lay, a considerable portion of the people had been considered affected with an ardent attachment to the British government; and Pennsylvania, the next State in his progress, whose union with Maryland might have yielded a force, destructive to the enemy, held a population averse to war. A great body of its citizens, from religious principles, resist not at all; another portion was certainly inclined rather to aid than oppose the British general; the remainder, not more than one half, solid, sincere, and resolute in our cause, were scattered over that extensive State, and consequently could not have been embodied in season. It is therefore probable that the enemy could not have been stopped by the militia; for in addition to the above causes there was a want of arms and ammunition in all the lower country; and the riflemen west of the mountains were too remote to be brought to act in time. Should the British general find his enemy's chief efforts directed to occlude him from the north, he would turn to the south; and what here stood in his way? In a very few days he would reach North Carolina, and in a few more he would encamp on the Cape Fear in the midst of his friends. From this view of the country it is evident that Cornwallis would have made good his retreat, unless out-speeded by Washington. Every exertion would have been essayed by the commander-inchief, and our willing countrymen would have contributed with alacrity to support the man of their heart. Yet difficulties stub born and constant were to be surmounted. But we will presume that these were overcome, and that Washington, detaching Rochambeau with the army of France up to the Chesapeake, should be enabled to mount in time a superior force, and follow upon the heels of the British general. This is the most flattering situation we could expect. He would not, could not, overtake him south of the Potomac, if shaping his course northwardly; nor could he overtake him north of the Dan, if proceeding to the south. Whenever he did approach him, action would ensue; and thus Cornwallis would be brought to a field battle, with a force rather inferior to his enemy. How much more to be desired was such change to him than his present condition. Victory gave him safety, and victory was not impossible. He fought and destroyed Gates; he fought and forced Greene out of the field with a greater disparity of force against him. The issue of the action would decide his fate. If adverse, he was destroyed; if successful, he was safe. Who, then, comparing his lordship's present condition with the worst that could befall him in the execution of his heroic decision, can withhold his admiration of a determination so bold and wise. Early in the night the first division of the army passed unperceived to Gloucester, the other division ready to embark for the same shore as soon as the boats returned. This done, the arduous attempt would have commenced by falling upon De Choisé. But Providence had decreed otherwise: a furious storm suddenly arose, and forced the returning boats down the river considerably below the town. Day appeared before the boats reached their destination, and the forenoon was occupied in bringing back the division which had passed. Disconcerted by this uncontrollable difficulty, Cornwallis nevertheless continued to make head against his enemy with his divided force; cutting new embrasures to remount his dismounted guns, and expending his last shells in maintaining the unequal contest. Our second parallel was now completed; and its numerons batteries, stored with heavy ordnance, opened with the day. The enemy's shattered defences, could not afford for many Oct. 17th. hours even shelter to the troops, much less annoyance to the assailant. In every direction they were tumbling under our destructive fire; and it was evident that the town was no longer tenable. Washington had only to order his troops to advance to bring his foe to unconditional submission; nor would this measure |