Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social SituationsCUP Archive, 27. 6. 1986 - Počet stran: 314 This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner. |
Obsah
1 | 10 |
1 | 16 |
Morality and social welfare | 48 |
6 | 61 |
Some basic concepts of game theory | 87 |
Rationality postulates for game situations | 113 |
The four basic problems facing the players of a game | 124 |
the Nash solution | 141 |
nPerson simple bargaining games | 196 |
the modified | 212 |
the general case | 244 |
discriminatory solutions | 263 |
Noncooperative and almostnoncooperative games | 273 |
Conclusion | 289 |
305 | |
General twoperson cooperative games | 167 |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations John C. Harsanyi Náhled není k dispozici. - 1977 |
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations John C. Harsanyi Náhled není k dispozici. - 1977 |
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations John C. Harsanyi Náhled není k dispozici. - 1977 |
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A₁ accept achieve actual agree agreement alternative assume assumption Axiom B₁ bargaining game behavior boundary called choice choose coalition components concept concession Consequently consider consistent cooperative game corresponding course decision defined definition depend determinate discussed dominance equal Equation equilibrium point equivalent event example expectations extended fact follows game G given Hence independent individual interests joint joint strategy least Lemma maximin maximize means moral moves n-person Nash obtain offer outcome pair particular payoff space payoff vector played players positive possible postulates preferences principle probability problem Proof prospects quantity rational rational behavior rationality postulates reason regarded relations represent requirement result risk risk-dominance rules satisfy simple social situations solution specific stage strong subjective Suppose Theorem theory threat strategies tion true trying two-person u₁ u₂ utility function variables various yield