settlement, and by enforcement of covenants restraining war until three months after such machinery for peaceful settlement has failed. By Articles XVI and XVII a breach of such covenants is to be penalized by an immediate and universal boycott of the covenant-breaking nation and then by such military expeditions as the members of the League shall determine necessary on the recommendation of the Council. Unless, therefore, the external aggression in violation of Article X occurs three months after attempts at peaceful settlement under Articles XII to XV have failed so that the covenants of those articles are not broken by it, the penalizing provisions of Articles XVI and XVII would apply to the aggression, whether for the purpose forbidden in Article X or not. In other words, Article X only increases the obligations of the members of the League beyond those of Article XVI in respect of wars which do not violate the covenants of Articles XII, XIII or XV. Article X becomes practically important, therefore, only after the purpose of the war has been clearly disclosed. A war only for punitive purposes without taking territory

or overthrowing a government would not violate Article X

We have seen this exemplified in our construction of our own Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, as originally declared by Monroe, was Article X limited to the aggression of non-American nations against countries of the Western Hemisphere. When Spain attacked Chili during Mr. Seward's incumbency as Secretary of State and Chili called on the United States to defend her, Mr. Seward replied that our policy did not look to our defending an American state against any punitive war by a non-American power, but only against one intended to take territory or to destroy independence. Mr. Roosevelt laid down the same limitation of the Doctrine in the Venezuela case as to wars begun merely to collect financial obligations when they did not seek appropriation of territory or deprivation of independence.

The intervention of the League under Article X is, therefore, likely to be invoked only in cases where the victor in a war "legal" under Articles XII, XIII, and XV, seeks to impose terms on its enemy contrary to the

undertaking of Article X. In all other cases, resort to Article X will be unnecessary because action under it will have been anticipated under other articles. Article X, therefore, enlarges the scope of the obligations of the League much less than has been generally assumed.

Second, should a violation of Article X occur, and the Council advise a plan for fulfilling its obligation by the members of the League, this plan will have to be unanimously agreed upon by the Council. We have constantly one representative in the Council, who must thus join in advising the plan. We can reasonably assume, therefore, that the plan recommended will not involve us in military expeditions unreasonably remote or inconvenient, and that it will advise our action in that part of the world where we can most promptly furnish aid and in respect to wars in which by reason of proximity we naturally have a direct interest.

The discussion of this article will be continued in the next letter.

(Letter No. 14)

ARTICLE X (Continued)

There is a third answer to people who object that Article X is likely to involve us in wars all over the world.

Those who look to the successful operation of the League do not expect war at all. The obligation of the members of the League to impose in the first instance a universal boycott against a recalcitrant faithless member constitutes a most formidable threat against any member seeking to violate Article X or the covenants of the following Articles. Such a boycott will be a withering ostracism and isolation of a nation that few could endure. No single nation, unless it be the United States or some of the greater South American nations, could live if denied food and raw materials from the rest of the world, and if forbidden the use of a foreign market for the sale of their products.

Second, no nation would willingly face the overwhelming force of the world organized to punish it for violation of its covenants. The minatory influence of a world League with its members obligated to unite in economic pressure, and proposing if need be to use military force can hardly be exaggerated. Of course if a number of nations entered into a conspiracy to fight and subdue the rest of the world, then this minatory influence might not be controlling, but in that case all the members of the League would wish to join in the war, just as they did in this, and defeat such a conspiracy and vindicate the power of the League for its useful ends.

What we are now answering is the objection that there will be a lot of little wars all over the world, in which we shall be engaged, which will claim our money and our men. It is in restraint of the smaller war in which a large nation attempts to bully a weaker one that the minatory effect of the League will be so controlling. The result will be that the League having the power completely to suppress the bullying nation will not need to exercise that power. Indeed it is hardly