(Letter No. 8)

ARTICLE III

This is the larger organ of the League, the one in which all the members are represented; by three delegates apiece if they please, so that if all the forty-five countries named in the Annex to the Covenant should join the League, and each of them should send its full complement of three, the Assembly would fill one hundred and thirty-five seats. Since statesmen and others in all lands have a strong desire to be of service on such occasions it is probable that the delegates present will not be much less than this, a number well fitted for debate, but not for confidential interchange of opinions on delicate matters.

The Assembly will, indeed, probably attract more popular attention than any other organ of the League; and yet its actual functions, which are to be found scattered through various articles of the Covenant,

are extremely limited. Besides regulating its own procedure and appointing its committees, it is empowered to select the four smaller states to be represented on the Council; to approve of enlargements of the Council; to confirm the selection of the Secretary General; to report upon disputes between nations referred to it by the Council or by either of the disputants; to advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties that have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions endangering the peace of the world; and by a two-thirds vote to admit new members to the League. Except, therefore, for some definite powers relating to the organization and membership of the League, its authority in international affairs is confined to making a report in certain disputes, and giving to the members advice on a few subjects.

What then is the meaning of the third clause of the article which provides that “the Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League, or affecting the peace of the world." Clearly this does not mean that it can deal

only with the subjects to which its authority extends by the special provisions of the Covenant, for that would reduce its field of discussion to almost nothing. Nor, on the other hand, does it mean that the Assembly can take action binding upon the members in all matters within the sphere of action of the League, because specific provisions are made for dealing with those matters, and the interpretation suggested would render all such provisions futile. The Assembly would have power to overrule them all. Moreover, Article V declares that except where otherwise expressly provided decisions of the Assembly or Council shall require the consent of all the members of the League represented at the meeting. But a unanimous decision of forty-five countries can never be attained where there is any serious difference of opinion, and where there is not it is needless. To authorize the Assembly to deal unanimously with any subjects they pleased would, therefore, be simply conferring a power that cannot be used.

In view of the other specific provisions of the Covenant the intention of the clause is

perfectly clear. It means that the Assembly is authorized not to decide, but to discuss, all matters within the sphere of action of the League or that affect the peace of the world. In this it is the successor to the conferences at the Hague. Save for the very limited authority expressly vested in it the function of the Assembly is discussion, and that is of immense importance. The mere fact that any nation, however small, can bring its grievances and its aspirations before a general body of representatives gathered from all the free, orderly and civilized peoples of the earth is of inestimable value. It is a fertile means of creating that enlightened public opinion on international questions which has been heralded as one of the chief objects of a league. International distrust often arises from misunderstanding which can be removed by open conference; and points of contact are points of mutual comprehension.

The greater part of the objections raised to the Covenant appear to be based on a misconception of the Assembly. We are told, for example, that if we accept the Cove

nant, the United States will be outvoted in a body in which the British Empire has six votes to our one, and in which the majority of members will be delegates from small or backward countries, perhaps even of Asiatic or African race. Similar objections are not raised against the Pan-American Congress, although the United States could be immeasurably outvoted there by countries whose domination we should be unwilling to accept. No such objection is raised in the case of a Pan-American Congress because it has no power to do anything but talk. In other words, it is a purely consultative body, with no legislative authority whatever. Yet it is not useless, because it brings the countries in this hemisphere together, gives a chance to air and remove grievances, and produces a more friendly feeling.

The position of the Assembly under the League of Nations is closely analogous to that of a Pan-American Congress, for it has power only to debate, and is not given authority to bind the members. Nevertheless, it also is not useless; and as the Pan-American Congress was established with a view to pro