appears that from first to last of this Creek War, we called into the field not less than 15,000 men."

The effect of this policy in destroying human life was not limited to our citizen soldiers. It encouraged the Indians to strive with a superior power, till in the battle of the Horse Shoe, they were nearly annihilated.

OPPERATIONS OF THE NAVY.

The failure of our military operations on land were, as in 1812, partially retrieved by the exploits of the Navy.

In February the Hornet captured the Peacock; in June the Chesapeake was captured by the Shannon; in August, the Argus was captured by the Pelican; after these two reverses, victory again inclined to our side; September 5 the Enterprise captured the Borer, followed on the 10th by Perry's victory on Lake Erie. In addition, our privateers on every sea carried consternation and destruction to the enemy's commerce. The disaster to the Chesapeake, like so many of our disasters on land, was ascribed to a new and undisciplined crew.

TROOPS EMPLOYED IN 1813.

The false economy of making in time of peace no preparation for war, was made increasingly apparent by our experience in the foregoing campaign.

Exclusive of volunteers and rangers, in reference to whom data for the campaign is wanting, the number of troops called out during the year numbered:

Regulars.
Militia..

Total

19,036 130, 112

b 149, 148

Of this number of militia, 66,376 from Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia were employed from time to time, in observing the 2.600 regulars and mariners on board the British fleets in Chesapeake and Delaware Bays.

The only compensation for the employment of so many troops during the campaign, was the destruction of Proctor's force of 800 règulars, a feat that would have been impossible, but for the victory of Commodore Perry on Lake Erie.

Instead of accomplishing the cherished scheme of conquest, the second year of the war closed with our expulsion from Canada, succeeded by an invasion and burning of the villages, along the whole Niagara frontier.

Calamities apparently so uncalled for could no longer be tolerated, and as our failure was largely ascribed to incompetent and superannuated commanders, Wilkinson and Hampton were soon compelled to

a The actual number of militia called out from Georgia, Tennessee, and the Territory of Mississippi during the years 1813-14, was 25,779 (A. G. O.). During the same period there were also called out from North and South Carolina 18,142 militia, many of whom were employed in garrisoning forts along the frontiers of the Creek Nation.

b A. G. O. The number of regulars is taken from the return of the Army for February, 1813.

follow in the footsteps of their predecessors, Van Rensselaer, Smyth, and Dearborn.

This change of leaders, however, was no sufficient remedy for the evils inherent in our military system.

The conduct of the regular troops on several occasions, gave abundant proof that the officers, just appointed from civil life, were little better than officers of militia, and that with no standard of discipline fixed in their minds, many of them were incapable of imparting to their soldiers the firmness expected of regulars in the hour of battle. Nevertheless, a few young officers like Brown, Scott, and Ripley were slowly acquiring, in the sure but expensive school of war, the military knowledge that was destined in some degree to retrieve the honor of our arms.

CHAPTER XI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1814.

MILITARY LEGISLATION.

During the war of 1812, the legislation in regard to the Regular Army shows a marked advance in wisdom over the Revolutionary enactments relating to the Continentals. From the beginning, Congress showed its appreciation of the value of long periods of service, and although it erred in fixing the term of enlistment at one year for the 20 regiments created by the act of January 29, 1813, it corrected this mistake by subsequently authorizing the President to extend the term to five years, a step which prevented repeated dispersals of the only force we could rely upon.

The necessity for hastening enlistments prompted another appeal to the country. On the 27th of January, 1814, the law was modified so as to offer $124 to each man enlisting for five years, in lieu of the $16 bounty and three months' pay previously allowed, a measure which more than tripled the cash secured upon enlistment."

Under the provisions of this act $2,012,439.33 was paid out in bounties between January 27 and October 26, and 13,898 recruits were obtained between the 1st of February and the 1st of October, the number available on the 1st of April, two days after the repulse at La Colle Mill, being only 3,337.

Although Congress did not act until it was too late for the men enlisting to be of service during the ensuing campaign, the failure of this scheme of recruitment was more especially due to that feature of our system which, by tolerating two kinds of troops, encourages citizens and townships to offer greater bounties to the militia than the Government is willing or able to pay to recruits for the Regular Army.

Nothing could be more explicit than the Secretary of War's statement to the Military Committee that "many of the militia detached for six months have given a greater sum for substitutes than the bounty allowed by the United States for a recruit to serve for the war."

Three regiments of rifles, enlisted for five years or during the war, were added to the Army on the 10th of February, and on the 30th of March, three regiments of artillery were formed into a corps of 12 battalions, the regiment of light artillery retaining its individual organiza

a Three months' pay of a private amounted to but $24. American State Papers, vol. 1, p. 519.

Report to the Senate Military Committee of October 26. vol. 1, p. 519.

American State Papers,

tion. The latter act also reduced the light dragoons from two regiments to one. As reorganized by this and former laws, the Army, in March, 1814, consisted of 44 regiments of infantry, the corps of artillery (12 battalions), 1 regiment of light artillery, 1 regiment of dragoons, 4 regiments of rifles, the Corps of Engineers, the Rangers, and Sea Fencibles.

Although the paper aggregate reached 62,773, an increase of more than 5,000 over the previous year, despite the actual tripling of the bounty, the strength of the Army in September was but 38,186 men. In December the grant in land, due after the soldier's discharge, was doubled, making it 320 acres; yet, notwithstanding this encouragement, the Army dwindled away until it was only 33,424 strong in February, 1815. This falling off was largely due to desertion, which, as was the case during the Revolution, every increase of the bounty seemed to stimulate.

The figures just given are but another proof that voluntary enlistments, even when aided by extravagant bounties, can not be depended upon in a war of any duration. Forced to devise various schemes for raising men, the Government, in this instance, was only able to avoid a draft by the speedy termination of the war.

a

Although not adopted, two of the plans submitted in October, 1814, by the Secretary of War to the chairman of the Senate Military Committee recognized the principle of drafting, then known as "conscription." The first plan formed all free male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 into classes of 100 each, each class to supply four men for the war and to replace them in case of casualty. If the class failed to supply the four men, a draft was to be made in the entire class, permission being given to the drafted men to furnish substitutes. The second plan proposed to divide the militia into three classes, embracing, respectively, men between the ages of 18 and 25, 25 and 32, and 32 and 45, the President being authorized to call out any class for the period of two years. The third plan exempted every five men from militia service who would furnish one soldier to serve for the war. This plan was not thought judicious, lest it should interfere with recruiting by reason of the large bounties that might be given by the rich. The fourth plan, to be adopted in case the three others were rejected, was to adhere to the existing system of raising troops, granting each recruit 100 acres of land for each year the war lasted, in addition to the 100 acres allowed by law.

Not yet prepared to exercise its sovereign powers to the fullest extent, Congress, as we have already seen, increased the bounty in land to 320 acres.

Happily the conclusion of peace prevented a recourse to the draft, which must have followed as the next war measure.

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NIAGARA FRONTIER.

The regular troops at Buffalo passed the winter and spring of 1814 in drilling and improving their discipline. Appreciating the importance of this vital work, brigade commanders like Scott, personally taught their officers the elements of squad drill, so that they in turn might more thoroughly instruct the men.

@ American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1, p. 515.

Pending preparation for renewing hostilities, the British flag still floated over the walls of Fort Niagara. Keenly alive to this national indignity, our army crossed the Niagara in July, took Fort Erie, gained the victory of Chippewa, fought the drawn battle of Lundy's Lane, fell back on Fort Erie where it was invested, raised the siege by a successful sortie, returned to the American shore after demolishing the fort, and went into winter quarters.“

Although the failure of this invasion must be admitted, the splendid conduct of our army fairly entitled it to the highest praise. Composed largely of regulars who had seen service in the field, and led by Brown, Scott, and Ripley, the troops proved that American soldiers, thoroughly trained and ably commanded, were equal, if not superior, to the veteran troops of England.

At the battle of Lundy's Lane our losses, out of about 3,000 men in action, were: Regulars killed and wounded, 691; volunteers, 57; total, 748.

The British force engaged, including 1,200 militia and 500 Indians, was 5,000; their losses were 878.

The losses on both sides in this the most hotly contested battle of the war of 1812, did not reach 25 per cent.

In our late civil war a veteran regiment that lost less than 25 per cent would scarcely have considered itself seriously engaged.

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.

The first invasion of Canada in 1814 was planned from the northern frontier.

On the 30th of March, Wilkinson, with nearly 4,000 regulars, crossed the boundary and attacked La Colle Mill, but being repulsed with a loss of 154 killed and wounded, he fell back on Plattsburg.

The order for this movement, dated March 29, reveals this general's opinion of the troops under his command.

* * *

The army will enter Canada to-morrow to meet the enemy. Let every officer and every man take the resolution to return victorious or not at all; for with double the force of the enemy this army must not give ground.

In each platoon, he added, "a tried sergeant will form a supernumerary rank and will instantly put to death any man who gives back.”› The following day, without putting the courage of his soldiers to a severe test, the commander suffered himself to be checked by 180 men stationed in a stone mill, and shortly after retired from the Ariny.

On the 29th of August his successor, General Izard, in obedience to orders from the Secretary of War, marched from Plattsburg at the head of nearly 4,000 men for Sackett's Harbor.

This detachment of the main army at the moment the enemy was preparing to advance up Lake Champlain, reduced our military strength at Plattsburg to 1,500 effectives.

In this official report General Macomb states:

I had commanded a fine brigade which was broken up to form the division of Major-General Izard, ordered to the westward. Being senior officer he left me in

a After the siege was raised our army was increased to nearly 6,000 men under General Izard, who had arrived from Plattsburg. This commander, although a regular officer of more than usual experience, lacked the self-confidence to avail himself of his superior numbers, and therefore withdrew unmolested between the 1st and 5th of November.

b Wilkinson's Memoirs, vol. 3, Appendix No. XI.