The instructions given him by the Secretary of War, on the 21st of that month, stated: It is impracticable here to prescribe the amount of force which ought to be carried into the field; that must depend upon the actual circumstances which you may find existing when you reach the scene of operations. It is of course highly desirable that no unnecessary force should be employed, as the expense may be thereby greatly increased. Still I would not have you hesitate for a moment in calling out such a number of the militia as will enable you, with promptitude and certainty, to put an immediate termination to these difficulties. The horrors of such a warfare are too great to run any risk in its immediate suppression. This subject is therefore committed entirely to your own discretion.a This letter revoked the authority to call out militia, heretofore granted to Generals Clinch and Eustis. On the same day the Secretary wrote to the governors of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama requesting them to fill General Scott's requisition for militia, to "serve for at least three months after arriving at the place of rendezvous." From the above we see clearly that at the beginning of this long contest, as in the War of 1812, security of life and protection of property were once more intrusted to undisciplined troops, whose number depended upon the discretion of military commanders and governors. On his way to the scene of hostilities, General Scott, on the 29th of January, made his first requisition upon the governor of South Carolina, asking him to increase the detachment of 600 men called for by General Eustis, to a regiment of ten companies, and stating "that mounted infantry or riflemen are not required." Writing to the Secretary of War, on the 31st of January, from Augusta, Ga., General Scott gave it as his opinion that the Seminoles would not be promptly subdued by much less than 5,000 men; and having changed his views as to the kind of troops needed, from further information as to the character of the country, he added that "the greater part of the force ought to be mounted." The same day he called upon the governor of Georgia for two mounted regiments and upon the governors of South Carolina and Alabama for one mounted regiment each. The governors of South Carolina and Georgia were authorized to organize their two regiments into a brigade, with the prescribed complement of general and staff officers.d The term of service, as usual, was fixed at three months after arrival at the principal rendezvous; this, for the South Carolina troops, was on the Savannah River: for Georgia, in the direction of Picolata, on the St. Johns, Florida; for Alabama, Mobile, whence the troops were to move to Tampa Bay. February 2 General Scott reported to the Adjutant-General, that none of the patent rifles ordered to Charleston had arrived; that in consequence he would be obliged to arm the volunteers and drafts with muskets, and that there was also a deficiency of knapsacks, accouterments, camp kettles, and tents. a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 216. American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 226. American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 223. d American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 226–227. e The principle of conscription was fully recognized in the law of 1792 and was repeatedly applied in the militia from that time till the Florida War. In regard to procuring arms he wrote: It is useless under such disappointment to waste time in sending to the arsenal at Mount Vernon. I shall take it for granted that that depot, like all the other ordnance establishments in this quarter, is deficient in its supplies. In this state of disappointment and vexation, I shall endeavor to borrow of South Carolina, say, 1,500 musket accouterments and twice as many knapsacks, but it is doubtful whether South Carolina has them to lend.a Notwithstanding the lack of arms, equipments, rations. forage, and transportation, General Scott pushed forward his preparations so rapidly, that by the 8th of March he hoped to take the field and close the war in a single campaign. The troops, as they arrived in Florida, were divided into three columns, the right under General Clinch at Fort Doane,' the left under General Eustis at Volusia, on the St. Johns, the center under Colonel Lindsay at Tampa Bay. 1 These columns, commanded by regular officers, were to beat up the country from their several starting points, and converge near the head of the Withlacoochee. The execution of this plan was, however, deranged by the unexpected arrival of troops from another quarter. As soon as news of Dade's massacre reached New Orleans, MajorGeneral Gaines, commanding the Western Department, without waiting for instructions from Washington, called upon the governor for militia, and with a mixed force of 1,140 regulars and volunteers, sailed, on the 3d of February for Tampa. He thence pushed forward to Fort King, where he arrived on the 22d, nearly destitute of rations and forage. Having replenished his supplies at Fort Doane, he resumed his march toward the Withlacoochee, on the banks of which river he was attacked on the 27th and besieged till the 6th of March, when reenforcements under General Clinch arrived. As soon as the siege was raised, General Gaines turned the command over to General Clinch, and returned to his department. The latter, after relieving the hunger of the troops, who had been compelled to subsist on horseflesh, fell back to Fort Doane. The loss during the siege was 51 killed and wounded. The exhaustion of the supplies at Fort Doane, necessarily compelled General Scott to postpone his plan of campaign. In writing to General Clinch from Picolata, February 26, General Scott stated: I have heard with equal astonishment and regret that Major-General Gaines, without reference to my arrangements, perhaps in ignorance, possibly in defiance of them, should have made a premature movement from Tampa Bay, and having arrived within 20 miles of Fort Doane, should have called for nearly three-fourths of the subsistence in deposit at that place, on which I had relied for the movement of the right wing, in concert with the other parts of the army.c The supplies having been replenished, General Eustis, at the head of 1,400 men, crossed the St. Johns, on the 22d of March: the same day, with a force nearly equal, Colonel Lindsay left Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay. On the 26th, General Clinch, in command of 1,968 men, moved from Fort Doane. Colonel Lindsay, after marching northward for 60 miles a American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 225. Fort King was about 20 miles south of Orange Lake. Fort Doane was 12 miles west of the south side of Orange Lake and 22 miles northwest of Fort King. c American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 244. and scouring the country, returned on the 4th of April to Fort Brooke; Generals Clinch and Eustis, the former accompanied by General Scott, reached Fort Brooke by different routes the following day. The 14th of April the three columns left Tampa and again renewed operations. The center, after penetrating to the forks of the Withlacoochee, was to communicate with the right and then return to Fort Brooke. The right and left marched back to their former stations, Forts Doane and Volusia, where the militia were detached preparatory to their discharge from the service. So formidable were the preparations for this campaign, that the Indians from the first declined to give or receive battle. At its conclusion General Scott, in his official report to the Adjutant-General, dated the 30th of April, explained as follows, the nature of the opposition he had met and his views as to the future conduct of the war: On our side, so far, nothing of importance has been achieved. I am more than ever persuaded that the whole force of the enemy, including the negroes, does not exceed 1,200 fighting men; it is probably something less. Of that force I am equally confident that not 500 have, at any time since the commencement of hostilities, been brought within the same 10 miles square. In all our operations within the last thirty days, we have not found a party of more than perhaps 130, but parties of from 10 to 30 have been encountered almost everywhere. No Indian woman, child, or negro, nor the trace of one, has been seen in that time. Those noncombatants (it has been evident to us all) have been removed beyond the theater of our operations. They were, no doubt, even while the parley was going on with General Gaines, of the 7th of March, moving off to the southeast, beyond Pease Creek and Lake Tohopkelika, and in that almost inaccessible region they are now concealed. That officer, it is said, caused Powell and his chiefs to be informed, by way of inducing them to agree to accept the Withlacoochee as a temporary boundary, that large armies were approaching which would fill up the Indian country or crush everything in the way. The wily chiefs profited by the information-sent off their families and dispersed their warriors into small parties. In this way Powell expects to make good his threat, viz, "That he would protract the war three years.' To end it (in less time) I am now persuaded that not less than 3,000 regular troops are indispensable-2,400 foot and about 600 horse. The country to be scoured and occupied requires that number. I have no particular desire to conduct the operations of the new forces. That is a duty which I shall neither solicit nor decline. Of the above force-3,000 good troops (not volunteers)-500 will be necessary to garrison five posts for the deposit of supplies; say one on the St. Johns, 7 miles below Lake George; one up the Pease Creek, say 15 miles above Charlotte Harbor; one at Tampa Bay; one 12 miles from the Gulf of Mexico, up the Withlacoochee, and one on the same river, near the Fort King road, with 160,000 rations deposited at Tampa Bay and 30,000 or 40,000 at each of the other posts. Five columns with haversacks and a few 1-horse carts may operate securely and with every prospect of success, at least to the north and west of Charlotte Harbor. For the country below additional means will be wanted, viz, 2 or 3 steamers of a light draft of water and 50 or 60 barges of different sizes, capable of carrying from 10 to 50 men each. I give these items in order, if approved, that the necessary appropriations may be asked at once. I beg leave to add, in haste, that new regiments, or regiments of recruits, would be worth little or nothing in this war. I will therefore earnestly recommend that the companies of the old regiments be extended to 80 or 90 privates each. Recruits mixed up with the old soldiers in June or July would become effective by the 1st of December; and I repeat that operations can not be carried on by any troops whatever in this peninsula except between the 20th of November and the end of April. The intermediate period is too hot or too sickly to be endured.a The expression "3,000 good troops (not volunteers)" soon brought General Scott into trouble. This induced him, on the 20th of May, to write to the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows: The contrast made by me in a few words between regulars and volunteers, in my letter to you of the 30th ultimo, being published, I am of course delivered over to the hostility of the whole body of the militia. Now, no one entertains for the vol a American State Papers, vol. 7, pp. 278, 279. unteers who have recently been under my command from South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama a more cordial and sincere respect than I do. There are hundred and hundreds of them whom I should be most happy to call friends. They have patriotism, honor, intelligence, and individual courage; but in masses but little of the latter quality. They would, however, I have no doubt, even fight in masses with desperation in defense of their own neighborhoods and homes. But in a distant war like this I utterly deny their efficiency after the zeal of the first week or two has subsided. On this subject there are many wholesome but most unpalatable truths to be told. Exceptions, however, are to be made, I acknowledge. Who shall tell those truths? I know of no commander who has ever yet had the hardihood. Shall I do it? Believing the good of my country calls for it at my hands, if leisure and strength permit, it shall be done. My sacrifice will be inevitable. * * * What I meant to state at the conclusion of my last letter was this: The troops called for by me came into the field at too late a period generally, to enable me to prosecute the war to a conclusion, a Four days previous to this letter, he was authorized by the Secretary of War to turn over the command in Florida to General Clinch, or to the officer next in rank, and to resume the command of his depart ment. INCREASE OF RAW TROOPS. On the 8th of March, 1836, General Cass, Secretary of War, pursuant to a resolution of the Senate, forwarded, with his approval, a recommendation of the General in Chief, that the number of artillery regiments be increased from four to five, and the infantry from seven to nine; the regiments to have eight companies each, the aggregate enlisted, including the regiment of dragoons, which was to be retained unaltered, to be 9,955. Lest this project should not be approved, he stated that The proposed augmentation of the noncommissioned officers, privates, and musicians may be so distributed as not to require any change in the number of the regiments or in the grades of the officers, by simply adding a given number to each company.b Instead of adopting a policy so obviously humane and economical, Congress, by the act of May 23, 1836, authorized the President to accept the services of 10,000 volunteers, infantry and cavalry, "to serve six or twelve months, unless sooner discharged." In imitation of the system of 1792, they were to furnish their own clothes, and, if cavalry, their own horses. Although under the Constitution these troops were to constitute a national force as distinct from the militia as the Regular Army, their organization was made dependent on the good will of governors who were empowered to appoint all the officers. The third section of the law, copying the phraseology of previous legislation, provided that when companies, battalions, brigades, or divisions of militia already organized should tender their voluntary service, they should continue to be commanded by the officers holding commissions at the time of such tender. The prepossession of Congress in favor of raising new regiments, instead of filling up old ones, was not limited to volunteers. The sixth section created a regular regiment of dragoons, with the same organization as the one already in service, and which, under the seventh section, was to be disbanded whenever the public interest would permit. The last section prescribed that so much of the act as related to volunteers should continue in force for two years from and after its passage. a American State Papers, vol. 7, pp. 298, 299. CREEK CAMPAIGN. This campaign, though brief, was marked, like all our wars, by an unnecessary sacrifice of life and property, the inevitable result of a bad military policy. On the 18th of May, Governor Schley of Georgia, who had already supplemented the deficiency of Government troops by sending two regiments to Florida, wrote to General Scott: The Creek Indians are in a state of open war, killing and destroying everything in their way. They have crossed to the Georgia side of the Chattahoochee and burnt Roanoke, and an attack on Columbus is daily expected. All the white people of the nation who have not been murdered have fled to Georgia. The people on our frontier are in a wretched condition, their lives and property being at the mercy of the savages. The militia of the adjoining counties have been called out almost en masse, and I have been making exertions to get troops to the field, but the want of proper organization of the militia makes this a difficult task. I am endeavoring for the present to defend Georgia, and as soon as I can obtain a sufficient force, I intend to carry the war into the enemy's country. I should have written you immediately on hearing of these difficulties, but did not know until now where to address you. If you can spare any United States troops for this service they will be acceptable, and I should be glad if you can send an officer to muster the militia I have furnished, and shall furnish, into the service of the United States. If your presence is not necessary in Florida, I shall be very glad to see you on the line of the Chattahoochee. We know so little of military matters and the economy of an army, that your presence will be quite acceptable.a Two days previous to the date of this letter, General Scott had been authorized to turn over the command in Florida, and, as information had reached the War Department that hostilities were meditated by the Creeks, he was directed to give his attention to that quarter, with authority to assume command and to call on the governors of Alabama and Georgia for such militia as he might want." He was also notified that General Fenwick had been ordered to go to the Creek country with six companies of artillery. On the 19th of May, General Jesup was assigned, as a brevet majorgeneral, to the command of the United States troops, and of such militia as might, at his discretion, be called into service against the Creeks. He was also ordered to serve under General Scott should the latter proceed to the new theater of war. The two officers met at Augusta and traveled together to Columbus, where they arrived on the 30th of May. Here General Scott encountered difficulties similar to those at the outset of his Florida campaign. The governors of Alabama and Georgia had ordered a large number of militia into the field without arms and adequate supplies. In reference to arms the ordnance officer at Mount Vernon Arsenal wrote to General Scott June 14: The governors of Alabama and Florida have completely exhausted my stock of arms and ammunition; they each had unlimited authority from the Secretary of War to call for whatever they wanted, and I was directed to issue accordingly. Governor Clay has drawn from this depot the following ordnance and ordnance stores, to wit: Four 6-pounders, complete; 6,800 muskets, complete; 157,000 buckshot and ball cartridges; 307 6-pounder canister; 105 6-pounder strapped shot; 9,700 flints; 1,492 sets of infantry accouterments; 50 yards of slow-match; 1,000 priming tubes; 133 portfires. Of the above, 6,000 muskets, the 4 pieces of ordnance, and a due proportion of other stores were shipped to Montgomery, and the balance were ordered to Clai American State Papers, vol. 7, p. 311. |