that the men who died of disease in the new regular regiments and among the 33,000 volunteers afterwards called out for the war, were the victims of unwise legislation. This number was as follows: New regular regiments: Officers.. Men.. Volunteers for the war: Officers and men By accident in both classes.. Total.... 36 2,055 4,309 141 6,541 In addition the number of men discharged (in ruined health) for disability was: New regular regiments.. 767 2,763 Total....... 3,530 In paying a just tribute to the patriots who forsook their homes to go to a distant land, there to face the ravages of death in defense of the honor of the country, President Polk in his message to Congress, December, 1846, stated: Well may the American people be proud of the energy and gallantry of our regular and volunteer officers and soldiers. The events of these few months afford a gratifying proof that our country can, under any emergency, confidently rely for the maintenance of her honor and the defense of her rights on an effective force ready at all times voluntarily to relinquish the comforts of home for the perils and privations of the camp. And though such a force may be for the time expensive it is in the end economical, as the ability to command it removes the necessity of employing a large standing army in time of peace and proves that our people love their institutions and are ever ready to defend and protect them." The views expressed in these lines undoubtedly represent the average conviction of our people if not of our statesmen. Firmly convinced that in reducing the strength of the Regular Army without making any provision for its expansion, our system "is in the end economical," our representatives have suffered military organization to be neglected till in a moment of excitement, laws have been enacted, without debate, a single defect of which, like the short enlistment clause of the act of May, 1846, may entail the sacrifice of more than 6,000 men. COST OF THE WAR. The money disbursed by the pay department to the various classes of troops during the Mexican war was as follows: The mere pay of troops is, however, but a small portion of the expense of carrying on war, as is shown by the following table, which a House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 22. gives the expenditures of the War and Navy departments from the close of the Florida war to the year 1849: a For the half year from January 1, 1843, to June 30, 1843. These figures show that while by reducing the Army to 8,000 men the expenditures during the two and a half years preceding the war were but $13,873,146.89, or at the rate of $5,549,258.75 per annum, the expenditures for the next four years were $88,500,208.38, or at the rate of $17.700,041.67 per annum. LESSONS OF THE WAR. Notwithstanding its unnecessary prolongation the Mexican war marked a great change if not a revolution in our military policy. This result was due to the decay and gradual abandonment of the militia system which up to that time had been regarded as the "great bulwark of national defense.” Bearing in mind that the laws under which military operations were prosecuted were almost identical with the laws of 1812 let us examine the composition of the forces employed This figure is approximate. The return for September, 1814, gave the aggregate strength of the Army at 38.186. The report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1874, p. 30. gives the number of men, including sailors and marines, who served twelve months or more, at 63,179. From this estimate there should still be deducted twelve months' rangers and volunteers. In the Mexican war it will be remembered that 11,211 men were mustered in for six months, but held only for three, the legal term of the militia. In reality these men, as also in all probability the 1.390, should be considered volunteers rather than militia, inasmuch as militia service was no longer obligatory in any of the States. The percentage of the different classes of troops to the total number of men employed in the two wars was as follows: A comparison of these figures shows that while in the War of 1812 the combined force of regulars and volunteers of twelve or more months service was but 12 per cent of the total number of troops employed. the same force in the Mexican war was no less than 88 per cent. The contrast does not stop here. In the first war, relying upon the States instead of appealing directly to the people as intended by the Constitution, Congress became a witness of disasters like those which occurred in the Revolution; in the second, the national troops, organized and supported by Congress, achieved a series of victories unmarred by a single defeat. In one war, an army of more than 6,000 raw troops, posted in the defense of our own capital, fled with a loss of but 19 killed and wounded: in the other a force of less than 5,000 trained volunteers, supported by a few regular troops, overthrew a Mexican army of four times its number. In one war, an enemy numbering less than 5,000 men baffled all of our efforts at invasion; in the other our army, with less than 6,000 combatants, entered in triumph the enemy's capital. But the difference between the results of the two wars is not wholly to be ascribed to the substitution of national volunteers for the militia. In the war of 1812 the Regular Army, which had itself to be created, was unable to furnish a standard of skill and discipline. In the Mexican war, aside from sustaining the principal losses in killed and wounded, it furnished able commanders, and in every field set an example of skill, fortitude, and courage. As to the influence of military education in producing such diversity of results, General Scott, who, in 1814, was compelled to teach the regular officers of his brigade the elements of squad drill, left his views to the Senate in the memorable words: I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish." @ Cullum's Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy, preface, vol. 1, p. 11. CHAPTER XVI. MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE MEXICAN WAR TO THE REBELLION. Pursuant to the laws increasing the rank and file of the old regiments and raising the new ones, the Army at the close of the war was reduced from 30,890 to 10,320. In effecting this reduction the number of privates per company was fixed at 50 for the dragoons, 64 for the mounted rifles, and 42 for the artillery and infantry." The only trace left by the war on our military organization was the regiment of mounted rifles, the addition of two companies to each regiment of artillery, an extra major to each of the old regiments of infantry, and a slight increase in some of the staff corps. The same fault, it will be perceived, was committed as after the Florida war. We had 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 of mounted rifles, 4 of artillery, and 8 of infantry; in all, 15 regiments, varying in strength from 558 to 800 each, with still no provision for future contingencies. June 17, 1850, this defect was remedied, and the principle of expansion recognized by an act, the second section of which authorized the President by voluntary enlistment to increase the number of privates in each or any of the companies of the existing regiments of the Army, at present serving or which may hereafter serve at the several military posts on the western frontier, and at remote and distant stations, to any number not exceeding 74." The use of this discretion by the President gave ample proof that he could be trusted in matters of economy. Without availing himself immediately of his authority, he waited until 1853-4, when Indian troubles caused him to order that the 123 companies of cavalry, infantry, and artillery in Texas, New Mexico, Oregon, California, Minnesota, and the country west of the Mississippi be raised to 74 privates each. Without the addition of an officer this order increased the rank and file by 3,489 men, the aggregate of the Army being increased to 13,821. Had the remaining 35 companies been raised to the same standard the increase of privates would have been 4,488, and the aggregate of the Army 14,731." This feeble increment of 3,489 men afforded but slight protection to the vast territory which by acquisition from Mexico had been so recently extended to the Pacific. Accordingly, by the act of March 3, 1855, the Army was increased by two regiments of cavalry and two of infantry, having the same organization as the regiments already in service. By this and the preceding laws, the Army with 108 companies serving on the frontier could have been raised in the aggregate to @Army Register, 1849. b Army Register, 1854, p. 31 (table). a 17,861. Had all of its 198 companies been on the frontier, the aggregate would have been 18,349. The actual strength August 1, 1855, was a little over 15,000 men. 66 From 1855 to 1861 the only law worthy of special notice was the one approved April 7, 1858. The first section authorized the President to receive into the service of the United States a regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, for the defense of the Texas frontier. The second section authorized him for the purpose of quelling disturbances in the Territory of Utah, for the protection of supply and emigrant trains, and the suppression of Indian hostilities on the frontier," to call for and accept the services of any number of volunteers, not to exceed two regiments, to be organized at the discretion of the President as mounted infantry. The term of service for all of the above volunteers was fixed at eighteen months. The men were to provide their own horses and horse equipments, for which they were to receive a compensation of 40 cents per day. The fourth section of the law provided that all of the officers should be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States or Territories to which the regiments belonged, except the quartermasters and commissaries, who were to be detailed from their respective departments of the Regular Army of the United States." This effort to secure economy was undoubtedly a wise step in the right direction, but like so much of our hasty and ill-digested military legis lation it began at the wrong end. Had the President been allowed to call for the volunteers by companies, with authority to select the field officers, adjutants, and quartermasters from the Regular Army, not only the economy but the discipline and instruction of the regiments could have been controlled by trusted officers of the Government. The military operations of 1848 to 1861 were limited chiefly to Indian wars and the Utah expedition of 1858. The effect of the latter, although bloodless in its termination, was to transfer nearly all the troops of the Regular Army west of the Mississippi. The expenditures for the Army and Navy from 1850 to 1861 is presented in the following table: The expenditures of the War and Navy Departments for the year 1849, in which were closed up the accounts of the Mexican War, were as follows: War Department Navy Department $14,558, 473. 26 9, 786, 705. 92 |