Twice when the capital was in danger, Congress had conferred dictatorial powers upon Washington. In a situation scarcely less appalling, the President, who had sworn to protect and defend the Constitution, saw but one method to save the Union, and fearlessly adopting it, his act was everywhere received with the approval and gratitude of a patriotic people. LEGALIZING THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION. When Congress assembled in extra session on the 4th of July, 1861, it found that its power to "raise and support armies" had been exercised by the President to the extent of 230,000 men." It was also confronted by estimates for additional appropriations amounting to $185,000,000 for the Army and $30,000,000 for the Navy. The report of the Secretary of War (Mr. Cameron) showed that under the call for 42,000 volunteers no less than 208 regiments had been accepted, of which 153 were already in active service. His exhibit of the forces at the disposition of the Government was as follows: Regulars and volunteers for three months and for the war. Add to this 55 regiments of volunteers for the war, accepted and not yet in service 225,000 Add new regiments of Regular Army 50,000 25,000 Total force now at command of Government 300, 000 80,000 Deduct three-months volunteers b220,000 Force for service after withdrawal of the three-months men This rush to arms of more than a quarter of a million of citizens, seemed to the Secretary of War to justify the neglect of all previous preparations. Unmindful of the fact that they had been called to the field in forced violation of the Constitution, Mr. Cameron said: I cannot forbear to speak favorably of the volunteer system as a substitute for a cumbrous and dangerous standing Army. * * * A government whose every citizen stands ready to march to its defense can never be overthrown, for none is so strong as that whose foundations rest immovably in the hearts of the people. C With proper organization and leadership, it may be admitted that a government whose every citizen stands ready to march to its defense can never be overthrown, but history affords no such example. In the case then engaging the wisdom of our statesmen a population of 8,000,000 of white citizens was in arms, not to defend, but to destroy the Government. To accomplish their purpose they abandoned the militia system in favor of volunteers, and to thwart their treasonable designs the Government was forced to follow their example. Notwithstanding the action of both the Government and the Confederates, the Secretary still adhered to the militia. In speaking of the necessity for Congress "to adopt measures for the reorganization upon a uniform basis of the military of the country," he further stated: I know of no better source of information on the subject than the able report of a Report of Secretary of War, July 1, 1861. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 231. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 231. Gen. Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War, who, by his wise forecast and eminent appreciation of the future wants of the country showed the entire safety of an implicit reliance upon the popular will for the support of the Government, in the most trying emergency, abundant confirmation of which fact is found in the present great rally of the people to the defense of the Constitution and laws.a Besides the act of the President for calling out the volunteers and increasing the Army and Navy, the joint resolution introduced in the Senate by Mr. Wilson on the 6th of July, specified several others which it was proposed to approve and confirm. Among them was the proclamation of April 15, calling out 75,000 militia (which under th act of 1795 was strictly legal), the blockade of southern ports, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In the debates on the resolution, which were continued from time to time till the 2d of August, the supporters of the Government did not conceal or deny that the acts were in violation of the Constitution; their opponents denounced them as flagrant usurpations deserving of impeachment at the bar of the Senate. Mr. Sherman, in vindication of the President, said: I am going to vote for the resolution, and I am going to vote for it upon the assumption that the different acts of the Administration, recited in this preamble were illegal, and not upon the assumption that they were legal and valid. I approve of the doing of them, and therefore I vote for that portion of the resolution. I am willing to make them as legal and valid as if they had the previous express sanction of Congress, and therefore, I vote for that clause of the resolution. I vote for these measures and I approve them, as I said at the outset, all the more because the taking of them involved the President in some personal hazard. I will not approve them more, but I admire them the more, because he did not hesitate to save the Republic, although the act of saving it might be attended by some personal risk to himself.b Mr. Lane, still more emphatic, said: I sanction and approve everything that the President has done during the recess of Congress and the people sanction and approve it, and there is no power this side of heaven that can reverse that decision of the American people.b The resolution, as finally passed and incorporated as the third section of the Act of August 6, to increase the pay of privates in the Regular Army and Volunteers, read as follows: That all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th of March, 1861, respecting the Army and Navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved and in all respects legalized and made valid to the same intent and with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States. While all acts of the President were thus legalized and made valid, his subordinates in the Administration were less fortunate. On the 30th of April, 1862, the House of Representatives passed a resolution censuring the official acts of Mr. Cameron, the late Secretary of War. Magnanimous as he was patriotic, the President would not suffer the blame to rest on his Secretary, and therefore on the 27th of May he sent to both Houses of Congress a message wherein he assumed the entire responsibility. The message, which was a vindication of his own conduct during the dark hours of secession, sets forth a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 234. e Callan's Military Laws of the United States, sec. 3, p. 490. so clearly the dangers involved in the neglect of the national defense that it deserves to be quoted entire: To the Senate and House of Representatives: The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States, and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was clandestinely prepared during the winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable provisional government at Montgomery, Ala., on the 18th day of February, 1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation. Immediately afterwards all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped, and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces, which had been called out by the Government for the defense of Washington, were prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity. I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers, the heads of all the Departments, to meet on Sunday, the 20th day of April, 1861, at the office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should proceed to sea to afford protection to the commercial marine, especially to the California treasure-ships then on their way to this coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to purchase, or charter and arm as quickly as possible, five steamships for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase, or charter and arm an equal number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York to purchase, or charter and arm an equal number. I directed Commander Gillis to purchase, or charter and arm and put to sea two other vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore DuPont, with a view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid and efficient services in the matter, of his Excellency Edwin D. Morgan, the Governor of New York, or, in his absence, George D. Morgan, Wm. M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were by my directions especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to act for his Department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense. On the same occasion I directed that Governor Morgan and Alexander Cummings, of the city of New York, should be authorized by the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, to make all necessary arrangements for the transportation of troops and munitions of war, in aid and assistance of the officers of the Army of the United States, until communication by mails and telegraph should be completely reestablished between the cities of Washington and New York. No security was required to be given by them, and either of them was authorized to act in case of inability to consult with the other. On the same occasion I authorized and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to advance, without requiring security, two millions of dollars of public money to John A. Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard H. Blatchford, of New York, to be used by them in meeting such requisitions, as should be directly consequent upon the military and naval measures for the defense and support of the Government, requiring them only to act without compensation, and to report their transactions when duly called upon. The several departments of the Government at that time contained so large a number of disloyal persons, that it would have been impossible to provide safely, through official agents only, for the performance of the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their ability, loyalty, and patriotism. The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the seaboard cities, inland, across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and the northern lakes. I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the Government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirections occurred to me as objections to these extraordinary proceedings and were necessarily overruled. I recall these transactions now, because my attention has been directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of Representatives on the 30th of last month, which is in these words: "Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, by intrusting Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money, and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction, without requiring from him any guarantee for the faithful performance of his duties when the services of competent public officers were available and by involving the Government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly injurious to the public service and deserves the censure of the House." Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in justice, if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is unanimously entertained by the heads of the Departments who participated in the proceedings which the House of Representatives has censured. It is due to Mr. Cameron to say, that although he fully approved the proceedings, they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President but all the other heads of Departments were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in the premises.a In contemplating the breaches thus made in the Constitution, it is manifest that the approval of Congress could not repair them nor could fear of its censure prevent them. Viewed in whatever light we may choose, the fact remains that in default of a judicious system for the national defense the President raised armies, provided navies, and opened the doors of the Treasury to irresponsible citizens. Looking back to these violent times, it would seem impossible that at the beginning of the great civil war such strides toward despotism should not have proved fatal to the Union. Nevertheless, the history of the Revolution and the Rebellion encourages the hope, but let us not rely upon it too much, that when legislative wisdom fails the liberties of the country may still be safe in the hands of a Washington or a Lincoln. OUR ARMIES ORGANIZED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY." In connection with the foregoing violations of the Constitution, there is anothor fact scarcely less startling. So completely overwhelmed was the Secretary of War in providing arms and supplies for the 75,000 militia, that the subject of organizing the volunteers and regulars called out by the President's proclamation of May 3, was tossed over for solution to the Secretary of the Treasury. In the discharge of a military duty upon which depended the lives of hundreds of thousands of our citizens, if not the salvation of our cause, it was fortunate for the country that the Secretary was not left to the guidance of his limited experience. Three officers, Colonel Thomas, Adjutant-General, Major McDowell, Assistant a President's message, May 27, 1862. b"There are two methods of destroying a republic-by usurpation and by inanityone is active, the other passive. Governments die when the wind gives out, as with man. In 1861 it was not only the default of a judicious system, but because our inherited prejudices tied the hand of the Executive, leaving him at the mercy of Congress, and Congress always neglects their duty and throws off on 'servants.' Garfield's speech last summer was able on this subject.-W. T. S." The above note on the original manuscript is in the handwriting of General Sherman.-EDITORS. "New to me and most interesting.-W. T. S." Note by General Sherman.-EDITORS. Adjutant-General, and Captain Franklin, Topographical Engineers, were detailed to assist him. The senior officer, like the Secretary of War, was so wholly engrossed in preparing orders for the Government, assignment, and instruction of the militia, that he could not be present at any of the discussions of the board. The junior officer was a subordinate of the Secretary of the Treasury, being at the time in charge of the bureau now known as that of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury. When Major McDowell and Captain Franklin reported to Mr. Chase, he informed them that "the whole matter of organization was left with him," and then directed them to draw up a programme. In the informal board as then constituted, there was no equality between members. The officers were free to make propositions, but their acceptance or rejection rested wholly with the Secretary. Both officers united in recommending for all of the troops a regimental organization of three battalions, two of which were to be kept in the field, the third to remain in depot for the purpose of drilling and recruiting. Not coinciding with the officers, the Secretary settled the difference of opinion by compromise. . The three-battalion organization was accepted for the regulars, but rejected for the volunteers on the ground that it was inexpedient to abandon an organization with which the militia were already familiar. Like most compromises this solution proved unsatisfactory, the new regular regiments never were raised, while for the volunteers an organization was adhered to, descending from the Revolution. The next recommendation, that the term of enlistment should be for three years, was accepted. A call for 300,000 men was also discussed. Captain Franklin recommended that they should be considered a part of the Regular Army, the regiments to be regularly numbered, the officers to be commissioned by the President, on nomination by the governors of States, the regiments to be apportioned to the States on the basis of Congressional representation, each regiment to be kept full, by recruitment from the district within which it was raised. These propositions were rejected by the Secretary, who said "he would rather have no regiments raised in Ohio than that they should not be known as Ohio regiments." It was partly to meet these states-rights objections, and to relieve the fear of too great a centralization of power in the hands of the Government, that the proposition was made to permit the Governors to name the officers. It will be seen from the foregoing recommendations that before being fatally committed to a system which had bankrupted the nation in the Revolution, and dissipated nearly all its resources in the war of 1812, an officer of the Army recommended the three-battalion organization, regimental depots, and territorial recruitment. Had he urged in addition, the adoption of the principle of obligatory military service-a principle the Government was forced to adopt two years later—the a Letter from General Franklin, dated November 9, 1877. This objection was entirely groundless. In Iowa, for example, the battalion or regimental organization was unknown, there being but three or four companies of militia in the State. The number of volunteers furnished and sent forth in new organizations from Iowa was 75,793. In the language of General Franklin, "Here his states-rights feelings came in." Letter from General Franklin, November 9, 1877. |