The efforts made by General Patterson to hold his army together, are fully explained in the testimony of Colonel Biddle before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Q. When did you first hear any complaints there that the regiments wanted to go home?-A. I think there was no question about their going until they got to Charlestown. The time of none of them expired until then. They all expected to go home at the end of their three months. There was no appeal made to them until we got to Charlestown.

Q. They manifested no dissatisfaction before that time?-A. No, sir; I do not know as they did, until at Charlestown when they expected to go home. I recollect perfectly the discussions that took place in regard to those troops. The regular officers said the troops would not stay a day after their time had expired. The General said, "Well, you will see." They said, "We know, because we saw it in Mexico." I said, "This is entirely a different matter; this is a fight for the existence of our Government, and the men will not dare go home, I think." General Patterson took it up and went out and made a direct appeal to the men. The General speaks very well under all circumstances, and he made remarkably good speeches then, as I thought, and as all thought. The General went to his son's regiment, which was a very fine regiment, and which we understood was willing to remain. The General made a speech to them, but to our surprise a considerable number of them refused to put up their muskets when the question was put to them. The officers were very much mortified at this, and spoke to the men, and finally they got them, with few exceptions, to put up their muskets. But still it was a sort of touch-and-go with them. That was the first time the fear crossed my mind that there would be trouble. The General then went to the other regiments, but found that it was not feasible at all; from one-half to two-thirds refused to go. He finally got to an Irish regiment and made a very powerful appeal to them, knowing the Irish character very well. He carried them with a sort of shout, and they all said they would remain. They all lifted up their muskets. But he had hardly turned his back when they hallooed out “Shoes and pants!" "Shoes and pants!” Q. And it was evident then that you could do no more?-A. Yes, sir.a

While, through short enlistments, such was the demoralization of the troops in the Shenandoah, the disposition of the militia in the main army was quite as alarming. On the morning of the 21st of July, although the Secretary of War and the commanding general had besought them to remain, a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery, whose term of service had expired, began their homeward march to the sound of the enemy's cannon. 998

The same day the remainder of the army, launched against the enemy in position at Bull Run was totally defeated. In the panic that ensued, discipline again gave proof of its value. The battalion of regulars which covered the retreat and was the last to leave the field, checked the enemy's pursuit and retired in perfect order.

It is well known that the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link, and with slight modification the same principle applies to an army--that complicated mechanism upon which has often depended the fate of republics and empires. The army which went forth to Bull Run, freighted with the hope of a loyal people, was simply a chain of weak links.

Except a battalion of eight companies, made up of the Second, Third, and Eighth Infantry, a battalion of marines, a small detachment from the First and Second Dragoons, and 6 batteries of artillery, aggregating 800 men," the troops who were expected to vanquish opposition,

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, pp. 196, 197. b General McDowell's official report, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 6, Doc. 1.

cOfficial Report Maj. George Sykes's, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 25, Doc. 1. d Draper's History of the American Civil War, vol. 2, p. 115.

were composed exclusively of volunteers and militia. Some of the former had, on the day of the battle, been mustered into the service less than a month; the term of service of all the regiments of militia was on the eve of expiring. These facts will explain to any military mind the loss of the battle. The plan was all that could have been anticipated from an able and judicious commander, but when he sought to execute it "to test his machinery," he found that discipline, the only sure bond of cohesion, was entirely wanting.

General Heintzelman, after having in vain sought to rally his broken regiments, spoke of their conduct as follows: "The want of discipline in these regiments was so great, that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear and continue to firefortunately for the braver ones, very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat."

As a skirmish line from some of the regiments of volunteers which participated in the conflict, was afterwards able to dispute the advance of the enemy in line of battle, it is plain that the loss of the battle was due more to the lack of discipline than to the want of individual

courage.

The number of troops which crossed Bull Run was: Confederate forces, estimated at 29,949; Union forces, 55,000.

The Union loss in killed and wounded was 1,492, or but 2.7 per cent of the total force engaged.d

The same regiments after a year's discipline would have scorned to retire with a loss of less than 30 to 50 per cent.

The effect of this disastrous battle, which gave the enemy all the advantages of the initiative, had he chosen to use it, was to paralyze military operations for more than six months.

Amazed and humiliated, the people bowed their heads, and confiding everything to military commanders, patiently awaited the opening of another campaign.

In contrast with the conclusions of the historian, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, reported that the principal cause of defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley.

a Official report of General Heintzelman, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 26, Doc. 1.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 249.
Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, vol. 1.

In his volume on the Army under Pope, Mr. John C. Ropes estimates General Pope's total force at Manassas at 55,000 men, and that of the Confederates at 54,268, Lee's immediate command being 31,768, and Jackson's 22,500. Assuming Pope's losses at 1,492 killed and wounded, this would be a percentage of casualties of about 2.7 per cent.-EDITORS.

The effect of the lesson taught at Bull Run is thus described by Mr. Swinton, the historian of the Army of the Potomac: "When the army that so lately had gone forth with such high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discomfited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there that which had suffered worse defeat than the army-it was the system under which Bull Run had been fought and lost. The lesson was a severe one; but if it was needed to demonstrate the legitimate result of the crude experimentalism under which the war had been conducted, when campaigns were planned by ignorant politicians and battles precipitated by the pressure of sanguine journalists, were fought by raw three-month levies-the price paid was perhaps not too high. The Bull Run experiment taught the country it was real war it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for by a strict conformity to military principles.' (Swinton's Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.) f Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 5.

OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1861.

The victories of Rich Mountain and Carricks Ford, which resulted early in July in the capture and dispersion of the enemy's forces in western Virginia, partly relieved the gloom and depression occasioned by the defeat at Bull Run, but these victories were soon obscured by fresh tidings of disaster.

August 20, General Lyon was killed and the Union forces defeated at Wilson's Creek, Missouri; September 20, Lexington, Mo., was surrendered, followed on the 21st of October by the disastrous repulse at Balls Bluff; November 7, occurred the bold but indecisive battle of Belmont, succeeded on the 20th of December by the victory of Drainesville.

The loss in killed and wounded at Wilsons Creek was 949, at Lexington 150, at Balls Bluff 449, at Belmont 263, at Drainesville 68.

It will be seen from the above figures that with the exception of Wilson's Creek those engagements scarcely rose above the dignity of a skirmish; nevertheless so conscious was the country of being unprepared for war, that in moral effect they were all invested with the importance of great battles.

In connection with the quality and paucity of troops placed at the disposition of the Union commanders, the trifling losses in the battles and skirmishes of 1861 possess for the statesman a special significance. They attested at the beginning of the war the utter weakness of a nation, which needed only time to develop its resources, to take a fore most rank among the great powers of the world.

a Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, vol. 1, pp. xxxvii-x].

CHAPTER XVIII.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE REBELLION (CONTINUED).

MILITARY LEGISLATION IN 1861.

The military system under which, in two campaigns of seven weeks each, Prussia humiliated Austria, in 1866, and subverted the French Empire in 1870, was the joint product of soldiers and statesmen, who began their laborers (in 1806) immediately after the disastrous battle of Jena. The military system under which we subdued the Rebellion was established by Congress in less than four weeks.

The energy and haste with which the new Congress set to work to repair the neglect of its predecessors, may be inferred from the number and character of the bills and the joint resolution introduced in the Senate on the 6th of July, two days after the opening of the session, which bills were as follows: A bill to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property; a bill to increase the present military establishment of the United States; a bill providing for the better organization of the military establishment; a bill for the organization of a volunteer militia force, to be called the National Guard of the United States; also a joint resolution to ratify and confirm certain acts of the President for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion."

In providing for the national defense, no false notions of economya political virtue paraded only in time of peace-were permitted to delay Congressional action. The first bill, in conformity with the recommendation of the President, proposed to authorize a force of 400,000 volunteers, and to appropriate $400,000,000, a sum greater than the total cost of the wars of the Revolution and 1812. Prodigal as these propositions may appear, the number of men was increased by 100,000 and the appropriation by $100,000,000. The bill as thus amended the appropriation was stricken out and reserved for separate consideration-passed the Senate on the 10th day of July, and was sent to the House. On the 11th it was recalled by resolution of the Senate, and after several important amendments was again sent to the House. On the 16th the bill with amendments passed the House. The Senate non-concurring, it was referred on the 17th to a committee of conference, passed both Houses on the 18th, and on the 22d received the President's signature.

The same day that the first bill to authorize the employment of half a million of men became a law, another bill was introduced in the Sen

a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 10, p. 1, Doc. 1.

ate to remove all restriction upon the President, by permitting him to accept the services of volunteers in such numbers as the exigencies of the public service might require. On the 23d the bill passed the Senate with the proviso added to the first section, "That the number of troops hereby authorized should not exceed five hundred thousand." The next day the bill passed the House without a division, and on the 25th was approved by the President. The second bill, which appears to have slipped through Congress amid the whirl and excitement produced by the defeat at Bull Run, was not intended to increase the total number of volunteers above 500,000, yet under an improvident system, it was afterwards construed to sanction the employment of more than a million."

Pending the enactment of the above laws, the bill to increase the Regular Army also came up for discussion. The Senate satisfied itself with giving legal effect to the proclamation of the President of May 3; but in the House the proposed increase, feeble as it was, again raised the specter of a standing army.

It mattered not that without the previous sanction of Congress, a quarter of a million of men were already in the field. Such a breach of the Constitution was lost sight of, when compared with the danger of a few disciplined soldiers. To allay the specter, the House therefore voted that the eleven new regiments should be converted into a force of volunteers. This action was apparently based on the report submitted by Mr. Blair, who stated:

That the Military Committee of the House unanimously dissented from the recommendation of the Secretary of War; they did not consider that there was any occasion to increase the military establishment, but as something had been done to organize the new regiments, the committee had stripped the organization of that feature which alone made it repugnant to a free people-that of establishing a large standing army.b

On the 24th of July, the bill was referred to a committee of conference, when the House receded from its position on the condition that at the end of the war, the Army should be reduced to a number not exceeding 25,000 men.

The bill received the President's approval on the 29th of July. A clear comprehension of the many needless sacrifices imposed on the people in subduing the Rebellion, requires that the three acts of July 22, 25, and 29 be quoted entire.

Act of July 22:

Whereas certain of the forts, arsenals, custom-houses, navy-yards, and other property of the United States have been seized, and other violations of law have been committed, and are threatened by organized bodies of men in several of the States, and a conspiracy has been entered into to overthrow the Government of the United States: Therefore,

Resolved, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to accept the services of volunteers, either as cavalry, infantry, or artillery, in such numbers, not exceeding five hundred thousand, as he may deem necessary, for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, enforcing the law, and preserving and protecting the public property: Provided, That the services of the volunteers shall be for such time as the President may direct, not exceeding three years nor less than six months, and

a See Note 2, Callan's Military Laws of the United States, p. 472:

"I remember that the construction placed upon those acts by the President and Secretary of War, was that only 500,000 men should be called out under oath, and practically I think they were so treated by all the Departments. My attention was called to it, of course, in fixing the quota of this State." (Letter from Hon. Austin Blair, ex-Governor of Michigan, dated December 19, 1878.)

Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 10, p. 7, Doc. 1.