a 66 bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice." Instead of dividing the troops into an occupying force, General Heintzelman estimated that defense of the city would suffice." Upon the conclusion of the council a total of 40,000 men for the of war, General McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War that the commanders of the army corps have "unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations," and that General McDowell would at once proceed to Washington to lay it before him. Assuming the right to exercise military command, the Secretary, without consulting the President, replied: Whatever plan has been agreed upon, proceed to execute at once, without losing an hour for my approval. The same afternoon (March 13) General McDowell laid the plan before the Secretary of War, who at 5.30 p. m. telegraphed General McClellan that there was nothing in the paper indicating that it was his plan, further stating: Will you be pleased to state what plan of operations you propose to execute under the present circumstances? At 6.15 p. m. General McClellan replied: The members of the council, together with myself, were unanimous in forming the plan which was presented to you by General McDowell. Steps have already been taken, so that if the plan meets with your approval the movement can commence early to-morrow morning. c The President was now consulted and at 7.40 p. m. the Secretary of War again replied: The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same but gives the following directions as to its execution: First. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication; Second. Leave Washington secure; Third. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe or anywhere between here and there; or at all events move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. March 17, Major-General E. A. Hitchcock was placed on special duty in the War Department as a quasi military adviser to the Secretary of War and the President. March 19, in anticipation of a movement up the Peninsula, General McClellan, in a letter to the Secretary of War, designated West Point as the first place to be reached and used as a main depot after leaving Fort Monroe. Two methods for reaching this point were suggested. The first was to move directly from Fort Monroe between the two rivers, and "to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps." The second was to make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown. The Navy should at once concentrate upon Yorktown all their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should not, in that case, require many hours. A a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, p. 542, Supplement. strong corps would be pushed up the York River, under cover of the Navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some 25 miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full cooperation of the Navy as a part of the programme. Without it the operation may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions which by their aid would be turned without serious loss of either time or men. " The army upon which General McClellan relied to carry out this plan, embracing the four corps of McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, numbered, on the 1st of April, present for duty 136,444; present and absent 158,419. Whatever objections the President may have had to the peninsular route while the enemy still blockaded the Potomac, it is manifest that after having assented to the plan recommended by the four corps commanders of his own appointment, he ought to have ordered to the new theater of operations every soldier who was not deemed necessary for the defense of the capital. But the President was by no means the master of his own actions. He could no longer plead a reluctance to interfere with the plans of his subordinates. He had assumed all the personal responsibilities of a military commander, with the further disadvantage that, as the Chief Magistrate, he could not, even in matters of detail, turn a deaf ear to the appeals and representations of his political and military advisers. Whenever a territory was threatened with a real or imaginary invasion, the people felt that they had the right through their repre sentatives to appeal to him for protection. Educated in political life, he could not fail to apply the same system of reasoning to the decision of military as to political questions. Troops could not be ordered from one department, district, or place to another without first paying "a due regard to all points." In this manner strategical principles, involving perhaps the fate of an army, had to give place to political considerations. The first evidence of this fact was presented in a demand made to detach Blenker's division from the Army of the Potomac, and to send it to the Mountain Department, where it was impossible that a great battle should be fought. For days the President resisted the demand, but on the 31st of May, after most of the troops had embarked for Fort Monroe, he was compelled to yield, and wrote General McClellan as follows: This morning I felt constrained to order General Blenker's division to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the Commander in Chief may order what he pleases. ↳ This order detached 10,000 troops, and was the beginning of the disintegration of the Army. The next day, after having received the assurance of the President that in no event should any more troops be detached from his command, General McClellan sailed for Fort Monroe. a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, pt. 1, p. 313, 314. Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 1, p. 544, Supplement. CHAPTER XX. REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE 1ST OF APRIL TO THE CLOSE OF THE FIRST PERIOD OF 1862. Before sailing from Alexandria for Fort Monroe on the 1st of April, 1862, General McClellan made a written report as to his dispositions for the security of the capital. The troops designated for this purpose were as follows: In the defenses of Washington, Wadsworth's command. At Warrenton.. At Manassas In the valley of the Shenandoah On the lower Potomac... Total..... 18,000 7,780 10, 859 35, 467 1,350 73, 456 To understand the confusion introduced by the suppression of the office of General in Chief, we must return to the despatch of the Secretary of War acknowledging the receipt of the proceedings of the council of corps commanders, handed to him by General McDowell. In this despatch, dated 5.20 p. m., March 13, the Secretary, without quoting the President, informed the commander of the Army, that General Wool at Fort Monroe would be relieved from command, whenever the former desired it, and that in case he made Fort Monroe his base (which was approved, or not objected to, by the President two hours later), he should have control over General Burnside's troops in North Carolina. The despatch concluded: All the forces and means of the Government will be at your disposal. Had this wise resolution been adhered to, all blame in the event of failure must have been borne by General McClellan; but from this grave responsibility, involving the prolongation of the war for years, he was largely, if not wholly, relieved by later orders, which materially weakened his army. DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON. The day after McClellan left Alexandria, April 2, General Wadsworth, in charge of the defenses of Washington, reported in writing to the Secretary of War, that he had 19,022 men for duty out of a total present, including the sick, of 20,477," and that from this force he was directed to detach three regiments to join the troops moving to the Peninsula, and a fourth (still available for the defense of Washington) a There is an apparent discrepancy between these figures and those given by General McClellan April 1. As General Wadsworth was in immediate command of the defenses of Washington, he is probably correct.-EDITORS. |