April 4, the Secretary of War, without quoting the authority of the President, issued General Orders, No. 34, directing that the por tions of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge, should constitute the Department of the Shenandoah, commanded by Major-General Banks.

The second paragraph of the order directed that the portion of Virginia east, of the Blue Ridge, and west of the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, including the District of Columbia, should constitute the Department of the Rappahannock, commanded by Major-General McDowell." It is needless to speculate how far personal and political considerations dictated the above orders. It is enough to know that within four weeks from the time the President assumed control of military operations, the States of Virginia and Maryland were divided up into five separate departments, under five independent commanders, while, as a wheel within a wheel, General Wadsworth was independent at Washington, and General Wool at Fort Monroe.

This condition of affairs, with the admission of the President, that in ordering Blenker's division to the Mountain Department, he had yielded to a "pressure" which he could no longer resist, was calculated to demoralize military commanders. With no recognized military chief, they were directed by the order of March 11, to report "directly to the Secretary of War," who could give any orders he chose, without consulting the President.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST YORKTOWN.

Even if their reports reached the latter, they soon became painfully aware, that without political support, their recommendations might be wholly disregarded. In this way they were tempted to abandon the only legitimate channel of military communication, in the hope that by approaching the President through friends of the Administration, they might cause their views to prevail. As evidence of this fact, General Keyes, on the 7th of April, with the concurrence of General McClellan, addressed Senator Harris, of New York, from the headquarters of the Fourth Army Corps, Warwick Court-House, Va., as follows:

The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the Navy should cooperate in the taking of Yorktown and also, (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River.

To-day I have learned that the First Corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the Second Corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the Navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up James River for fear of the Merrimac. The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major-General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by MajorGeneral McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

This army being reduced to 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the Navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

*

*

*

a By direction of the Secretary of War, no allusion being made to the President, a Middle Department, as early as the 22d of March, had already been carved out of the Department of the Potomac. It was commanded by General Dix, and embraced the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, the eastern shore of Maryland, and Virginia, as also three other counties in Maryland, east of the Blue Ridge.

Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it and Gloucester are so strong, that the Navy are afraid to attack either.

* * *

You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary, when I supposed the Navy would cooperate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered, by what I learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite, now that the Navy cannot cooperate.

*

* *

The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased, beyond the numbers we now have to oppose him. The greatest master of the art of war has said that, "If you would invade a country successfully, you must have one line of operations and one army, under one general." But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz: Tremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap of the Chesapeake in the care of Dix. The greatest battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the Rebellion will be crushed, if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I can tell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say, that our success will be uncertain.a

Besides the political aspect of this letter, which was designed to influence both the President and the Secretary of War, it should be observed that General Keyes, in addition to pointing out the danger from the division of our forces, distinctly affirmed that by withdrawing 45,000 men, or five of the thirteen divisions of which the army was composed, the plan of campaign which General McClellan was required to execute, was neither his own plan nor that unanimously recommended by the four corps commanders, to which the President gave his assent.

After the withdrawal of McDowell had been accomplished, there is evidence that the President would have been glad to repair his mistake; but the views of the Secretary of War, supported by his council, prevailed. General Hitchcock states:

As soon as General McClellan heard of this he complained of it. He wished the whole of McDowell's corps sent to him. If he could not get the whole of it, he wanted McCall's and Franklin's divisions, leaving one division only here; failing in that, he wished particularly to have Franklin's division ordered to join him. The President again came to the War Office, on the 11th of April, if I mistake not, and held another conference of considerable length with the same officers as before-the chiefs of bureaus and the Secretary of War. It was plain that the President was extremely anxious to gratify General McClellan and to give him every possible support in his power, not losing sight of his imperative duty to see that the capital was sufficiently guarded. The result of that conference was that he ordered Franklin's division to join McClellan, and it was accordingly sent down to him.

Following this withdrawal of more than 40,000 men, was the siege of Yorktown, from April 5 to May 4; the battles of Williamsburg, May 5, and of West Point, May 7; the occupation of Norfolk, and the destruction of the Merrimac, May 11. With this ironclad out of the way, another line of communication, via the James River, was opened almost

a McClellan's Report, pp. 80, 81, 82.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 305. June 27, 1862, General McDowell testified before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War:

"Question. Did you use any influence or seek in any way to have your corps detached from General McClellan command, to remain here?

"Answer. No, sir; none whatever.

"Question. Neither directly nor indirectly; neither by yourself nor through any other person?

"Answer. No, sir; I speak it without reservation." (Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 262.)

to the suburbs of Richmond. The water line via the York and Pamunkey Rivers terminated at White House, whence by rail it was 20 miles to Richmond.

By selecting the first line, the left flank of the army, on approaching the Confederate capital, would have been securely protected by the James River. The Chickahominy, too, would have been a safe obstacle upon which to rest the right flank. By the line of the York River, both flanks would necessarily be in the air, with the possibility of being separated by the Chickahominy. A choice, however, between these two lines was denied the commander. May 17, the Secretary of War, by direction of the President, sent him the following minute instructions: Your despatch to the President asking reenforcements has been received and carefully considered. The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock, by the way of the Potomac and York rivers, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond, at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate, as to put his left wing in communication with your right, and you are instructed to cooperate, so as to establish this communication as soon as possible.

By extending your right wing to the north of Richmond, it is believed that the communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River. In any event you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond and falling in overwhelming force upon General McDowell. He will move with between 35,000 and 40,000 men. «

The same day, the Secretary, by direction of the President, wrote to General McDowell:

Upon being joined by General Shields' division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, cooperating with the forces under General McClellan, now threatening Richmond, from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation, against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces.

General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and throwing itself upon your column before a junction of the two armies is effected. A copy of his instructions, in regard to the employment of your forces is annexed. b

Pursuant to the explicit terms of these instructions, the Army of the Potomac advanced via the line of the Pamunkey; on the 20th, the left wing crossed the Chickahominy; on the 31st of May and 1st of June, when a flood had made the river almost impassable, the enemy assailed the left wing at Fair Oaks, but were repulsed and retreated in confusion. May 27, four days before this attack, the successful battle at Hanover Court House opened a direct line of communication with General McDowell. In connection with this campaign there are two Napoleonic maxims we should impress upon our minds. The first is: Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief.c

The second is:

When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.d

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, pp. 326, 327. McClellan's Report, p. 97.

C Napoleon's Maxims of War, p. 156. d Napoleon's Maxims of War. p. 85.

We have already seen that from the 11th of March, up to the 17th of May, every order of the President, or Secretary of War, relating to military movements, was in violation of one or both of these maxims. What, in the meantime, was the action of the military commander? April 5, just after arriving in front of the entrenchments at Yorktown, he telegraphed the President:

*

* * I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the First Corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment, the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force, when it is actually under the fire of the enemy and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you can not leave me the whole of the First Corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division. a

April 6 he telegraphed the President:

*

The order forming new departments, if rigidly enforced, deprives me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely necessary to enable me to advance to Richmond. * * The enemy is strong in my front, and I have a most serious task before me, in the fulfillment of which I need all the aid the Government can give me. I again repeat the urgent request that General Franklin and his division may be restored to my command.

April 7 he telegraphed the Secretary of War:

*

** * Since my arrangements were made for this campaign at least 50,000 men have been taken from my command. * * When my present command all join, I shall have about 85,000 men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards, escort, etc. With this army I could assault the enemy's and perhaps carry them; but were I in possession of their entrenchments, and assaulted by double my numbers, I should have no fear as to the result. Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the greatest battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works; but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least the whole of the First Army Corps to land upon York River and attack Gloucester in the rear. My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose, without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Commodore Goldsborough thinks the work too strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester.c

The same day he telegraphed the President:

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My entire force for duty only amounts to about 85,000 men. General Wool's command, as you will observe from accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most cheerfully cooperated with me. The only use that can be made of his command is to protect my communication in rear of this point. At this time only 53,000 men have joined me, but they are coming as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit.d

April 9 the President replies:

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Your despatches complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, pain me very much. And now, allow me to ask you, Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops?" This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 319. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 319. To this despatch the President replied: "You now have over 100,000 troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can." (Same, p. 320.)

C

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 320.

d Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 321.

There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying that you had over 100,000 with you. I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if, that command was away. I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will steadily gain on you-that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by reenforcements alone.

And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always wished not going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, as only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the enemy and the same or equal entrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note, is noting now, that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated. I beg to assure you that I have never written or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. a

No one can fail to sympathize with the President in his trying situation. Contrary to his judgment, at the moment our trained armies were preparing to move, he had been persuaded in quick succession to proclaim a general advance; to depose the General in Chief; to detach Blenker's division, and next, to withdraw the whole of McDowell's corps.

For want of military experience, he could neither appreciate nor forecast the effect of any one of these measures. He had approved the recommendations of the four corps commanders, but in carrying them so far only, as to send three corps to Fort Monroe, he could not see that he had placed the Army of the Potomac in a cul-de-sac, the only debouche from which the enemy had been fortifying for more than a year. When told that McDowell's corps, employed north of the York River, was the key to unlock the military situation, the advisory council had sufficient influence to persuade him to compromise, by forwarding a single division. Although constitutional Commander in Chief, he did not and could not solve the military problems of the war. The pen which could trace the Emancipation Proclamation instinctively avoided strategical discussions. To his mind the narrow peninsula between the York and James rivers afforded as many chances for brilliant maneuvers as the broad plains of Manassas.

METHOD OF MCCLELLAN'S APPOINTMENT TO THE REGULAR ARMY.

The burden of the letter just quoted was a discussion of numbers, independent of their use. From mere numbers, from the erroneous statement "that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated," Mr. Lincoln passed to a warning full of friendship and kindness. He knew that the influences which had deposed the General in Chief, and destroyed all unity of command, were actively at work to secure his further removal from the Army of the Potomac. Although the President had the power to send forward more troops, as a non-military man he felt that he could not take this upon himself, in direct opposition to his Cabinet and its military entourage. He could only close with the urgent admonition, "You must act.'

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, pp. 321, 322.