It may naturally be asked by the unprofessional reader, why the President did not spare himself further correspondence, by relieving his importunate subordinate. The answer is, that at this time he was scarcely better able to dispense with his services, than was the Continental Congress to part with Washington, in the days of the Conway cabal. Our system was all chance. If any of our professional soldiers found themselves in a position to lead our armies to victory, it was by accident or through political influence. McClellan himself, in 1861, owed his first appointment, as major general of militia, to the Governor of Ohio. The Governor of Pennsylvania wanted him at the same time, but made his offer two days too late. McClellan telegraphed to Governor Curtin: Before I heard that you wanted me in any position, I had accepted the command of the Ohio forces. They need my services and I am bound in honor to stand by them, a In those early days the Government was alone blind to the advantages of professional education. After the fall of Fort Sumter, it still gave the Confederacy its Johnstons and Lees. When, on the other hand, Governor Dennison, of Ohio, asked for the detail of two lieutenants, who subsequently became generals, the Secretary of War replied that he had no time to be detailing lieutenants. Local interests, however, triumphed over national indifference. As in the Revolution, we were going to war, not as a nation, but as a confederacy. The glory of the State was to be set above the glory of the Union. Not willing that Ohio should be outdone, Governor Dennison, on the 11th of May, telegraphed to Ohio's representative in the Cabinet, Mr. Chase: Can McClellan get a commission for three years at once, so as to make him rank over all others, and make sure of his holding the chief command here? Ohio must lead throughout the war. May 14 Mr. Chase, who had already secured the adoption of a State, instead of a national system of volunteers, telegraphed back: We have to-day had McClellan appointed a major-general in the Regular Army.a Such were the influences which placed the commander of the Army of the Potomac in his high position. But he had passed now from the military organization of a State, to that of the United States. A year had changed the situation. If State influence gave the commander his first commission, it was no longer an obstacle to his removal, but when the President looked about for a successor, no soldier had yet proved himself worthy. In the West, General Grant had won no fame as an independent commander; his victory at Shiloh at this particular moment being considered a defeat. Sherman, still laboring under the charge of insanity, had not risen above a division. Sheridan, the future cavalry leader of the war, was unknown. Though these considerations were sufficient to keep McClellan in command, the President was wise enough not to believe himself or his military advisers infallible. If they were in the wrong, it might be possible that the commander was in the right. All the President wanted was action, for the result, he was willing to trust to the future. After the battle of Williamsburg and West Point, McClellan fully a Ohio in the War, by Whitelaw Reid, p. 33. Same, p. 31. alive to the importance of concentration, again telegraphed the Secretary of War: From the information reaching me from every source, I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much reduced our numbers, and will continue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to reenforce me without delay, with all the disposable troops in eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to fight the great battle now impending, and to make it decisive. It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a serious struggle; but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise to count upon anything but a stubborn and desperate defense, a life and death contest. him than to fight this battle, and we must win it. I shall fight them, whatever their force may be, but I ask for every man that the Department can send me. I see no other hope for should now be left unemployed. Those who entertain the opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a struggle, are, in my judgment, badly advised, and No troops do not comprehend their situation, which is one requiring desperate measures. May 14, he telegraphed the President: I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg leave to repeat their substance to Your Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views. establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against the army, by All my information from every source accessible to me, offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all commanders whom I have been able to consult. * Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, and will continue to do so. 80,000 men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, propably entrenched, I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy, more than a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. must employ their utmost efforts against the army in Virginia. I most respectfully * * The Confederate leaders and earnestly urge upon Your Excellency, that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be reenforced without delay, by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me. reenforcements whom Your Excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject. Any commander of the Strong reenforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our force, the more perfect will be our combinations, and the less our loss. * * * To these pleadings for the observance of self-evident military principles, the President answered, May 15: * * * Will say, now, that all your despatches to the Secretary of War have been promptly shown to me. Have done and shall do all I could and can to sustain * I am still unwilling to take all our force off the direct line between Richmond and here. c you. * * While begging, through the Secretary of War, for the observance of military principles, General McClellan did not neglect other avenues for approaching the President. May 18, in reply to a despatch from Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, he telegraphed: * * * Indications that enemy intend fighting at Richmond. Policy seems to be to concentrate everything there. They hold central position and will seek to meet us while divided. I think we are committing a great military error in having so many independent columns. The great battle should first be fought by our troops in mass, then divided if necessary.d a McClellan's Report, p. 94. McClellan's Report, p. 95. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 326. d Same, p. 327 The effect of this correspondence has already appeared in the orders given McDowell, but nearly all the advantages of the proposed concentration were in danger of being neutralized, by the instructions sent at the same time to McClellan. In concluding the despatch of the 17th, part of which has already been quoted, the Secretary stated: A copy of the instructions to Major-General McDowell is enclosed with this. The specific task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. At your earnest call for reenforcements, he is sent forward to cooperate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for efficient cooperation. When General McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply him by that route. The President directs that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves forward.« During the Crimean War, the protracted siege of Sebastopol, which lasted eleven months, was universally ascribed to the independence of the allied commanders and their consequent want of cooperation. The execution of the above instructions would have produced an exact parallel to the Crimea with this difference, that national pride did not, with us, as with the allies, forbid the merging of our armies. The allied commanders moreover were hampered by no orders from a distant capital directing how they should cooperate. If the flank of either army were attacked, the other army could be ordered to its support, but had the Confederates attacked the left of the Army of the Potomac, its commander could not have shifted the corps of General McDowell from its position on the right, because his instructions stated: You will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. Nor was this the greatest peril to which our cause might have been exposed. Had the enemy by an overwhelming concentration resolved to fall upon and crush the Army of the Potomac, McDowell's 40,000 men could have been detached at any moment, by making a slight demonstration in rear of the right. Had the commander of the Army of the Potomac discovered the hostile plan, he could have issued no order to prevent the separation of our forces, because McDowell with his troops was only directed to cooperate. Although it exposed him to the charge of captiousness, no one now will deny that McClellan would have been criminal, had he not pointed out errors which surely led to disaster. On the 21st of May, he again telegraphed to the President: I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's command. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that effort, would do more to protect Washington, than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I must still most respectfully suggest the policy of our concentrating here by movements by water. * * * I regret also the configuration of the Department of the Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own department should embrace the entire field of active military operations designed for the capture and occupation of that city. Again, I agree with your Excellency, that one bad general is better than two Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 327. good ones. I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant, addressed to myself and General McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it be otherwise specially directed by your Excellency, and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. a In the same despatch he likewise exposed the fundamental error of the War Department, which, as will appear further on, was the conviction that if the back of an army was toward Washington, that army must of necessity cover the capital: Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington as to any interposition by it as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg upon Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems entirely improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that the extent of my authority over General McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstanding and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results, which a divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully suggest that the danger can only be surely guarded against, by explicitly placing General McDowell under my orders, in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for the closest observance of of your instructions. a The President yielding to the force of his arguments, replied the same day: Your long despatch of yesterday is just received. You will have just such control of General McDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. May 24, having just returned to Washington from Fredericksburg, where he had been to see General McDowell, the President again telegraphed: I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of a regiment of infanfry, two companies of cavalry, and putting Banks in some peril. McDowell and Shields both say they can and positively will move Monday morning. I wish you to move continuously and safely. You will have command of General McDowell after he joins you, precisely as you indicate in your long despatch to me of the 21st. * * * Had this last order been carried out, it would have repaired the mischief of dividing our forces into seven independent bodies and, at last, in conformity with Napoleon's maxim, the enemy would have been confronted by one army acting from one base and conducted by one chief." Unhappily our foes knew but too well how to prevent this result. 66 OCCUPATION OF FREDERICKSBURG. Let us pause here for a moment to call attention to the exercise, by the Secretary of War, of the right to military command. The fathers of the Constitution were satisfied that they secured the subordination of the military to the civil power, when they provided that the President, as Chief Magistrate, should be the Commander in Chief of the a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 328. Army and Navy. Those who urge that the supremacy of the civil power should still further be secured, by permitting the Secretary of War to command, will find the practical working of their system illustrated in General McDowell's movement to Fredericksburg. April 11, a week after his corps was detached from the Army of the Potomac, the Secretary of War, without quoting the President, telegraphed: For the present and until further orders from this Department, you will consider the national capital as especially under your protection, and make no movement throwing your force out of position, for the discharge of this primary duty.a After putting his corps in motion to Catlett's, in the direction of the Rappahannock, McDowell perceived the importance of occupying Fredericksburg, but doubted whether he could do so under his instructions to act as a covering force for Washington. He testified before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War: I asked the Secretary one day if it would be within the scope of the defensive instructions under which I was acting, if I was to take Fredericksburg. He told me verbally, that I might. I felt that it was going beyond the letter of my instructions, but under the verbal instruction, went down opposite Fredericksburg. b This verbal authority of the Secretary was supplemented, on the 23d of April, by the following despatch: The President desires that you should not throw your force across the Rappahannock at present, but that you should get your bridges and transportation all nearly ready and wait further orders.c We have seen that in 1828 the death of the General in Chief, General Brown, raised the question whether the office of major-general should be longer retained. The Military Committee of the Senate, after a thorough investigation, recommended to the Senate the following resolution: Resolved, That it is inexpedient to abolish the office of major-general in the Army.d As already stated, Mr. Porter, the Secretary of War, in opposing the abolition of the office, wrote to the committee: * * * The present state of the Army would be to divide it into two separate tndependent, and probably conflicting commands under the two brigadiers, unless hey should be connected through the instrumentality of the Adjutant-General or Some other subordinate officer, stationed at the seat of government under the Secretary of War, and who would, in fact. perform the appropriate duties of the chief of the Army. This prediction was almost literally fulfilled in the President's orders of April 23. March 17, four days after the office of General in Chief was dispensed with, General Hitchcock was detailed in the War Department as the special military adviser of the Secretary of War. April 2, as already stated, he joined the Adjutant-General in reporting, that the President's orders for the security of the capital had not been complied with. This report was followed, first, by the entire derangement of McClellan's plans, and next, by the division of our forces in Virginia into seven independent commands, with one in Maryland. The next proof that a "subordinate officer stationed at the seat of government under the Secretary of War," was performing "the a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 271. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 262. Same, p. 271. d American State Papers, vol. 3, pp. 820-822. e American State Papers, vol. 4, p. 91. |