The light of day dawned-the signal for battle. Instantly our center opened its artillery, and the left of our line, under Stevens, was ordered to advance. The veterans of the enemy, composing its right, were of course opposed to the Virginia militia, whereas they ought to have been faced by the Continental Brigade. Stevens, however, exhorting his soldiers to rely on the bayonet, advanced with his accustomed intrepidity. Lieut. Col. Otho Williams, adjutant-general, preceded him with a band of volunteers, in order to unite the fire of the enemy before they were in reach of the militia, that experience of its efficiency might encourage the latter to do their duty. The British general, closely watching our motives, discovered this movement on the left, and gave orders to Webster to lead into battle with the right. The command was executed with the characteristic courage and intelligence of that officer. Our left was instantly overpowered by the assault; and the brave Stevens had to endure the mortifying spectacle exhibited by his flying brigade. Without exchanging more than one fire with the enemy, they threw away their arms and sought that safety in flight which generally can be obtained only by courageous resistance. The North Carolina brigade, imitating that on the right, followed the shameful example. Stevens, Caswell, and Gates himself struggled to stop the fugitives and rally them for battle; but every noble feeling of the heart was sunk in base solicitude to preserve life; and having no cavalry to assist their exertions, the attempted reclamation failed entirely. The Continental troops with Dixon's regiment of North Carolinians, were left to oppose the enemy, every corps of whose army was acting with the most determined resolution. De Kalb and Gist yet held the battle on our right in suspense. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard, at the head of Williams's regiment, drove the corps in front of our line. Rawdon could not bring the brigade of Gist to recede-bold was the pressure of the foe; firm as a rock the resistance of Gist. Now the Marylanders were gaining ground; but the deplorable desertion of the militia having left Webster unemployed, that discerning soldier detached some light troops with Tarleton's cavalry in pursuit, and opposed himself to the reserve brought up by Smallwood to replace the fugitives. Here the battle was renewed with fierceness and obstinacy. The Marylanders with Dixon's regiment, although greatly outnumbered, firmly maintained the desperate conflict; and De Kalb, now finding his once exposed flank completely shielded, resorted to the bayonet. Dreadful was the charge. In one point of the line the enemy were driven before us with the loss of many prisoners. But while Smallwood covered the flank of the Second Brigade, his left became exposed; and Webster, never omitting to seize every advantage, turned the light infantry and Twenty-third Regiment on his open flank. Smallwood, however, sustained himself with undiminished vigor; but borne down at last by superiority of force, the First Brigade receded. Soon it returned to the line of battle; again it gave ground, and again rallied. Meanwhile De Kalb, with our right, preserved a conspicuous superiority. Lord Cornwallis, sensible of the advantages gained, and aware of the difficulty to which we were subjected by the shameful flight of our left, concentrated his force and made a decisive charge. Our brave troops were broken; and his Lordship, following up the blow, compelled the intrepid Marylanders to abandon the unequal contest. The road was heaped with the dead and wounded. Arms, artillery, horses, and baggage were strewed in every direction and the whole adjacent country presented evidences of the signal defeat. * * * * * * Our loss was very heavy. More than a third of the Continental troops were killed and wounded; and of the wounded 170 were made prisoners. The regiment of Delaware was nearly annihilated. The North Carolina militia also suffered greatly; more than 300 were taken and nearly 106 killed and wounded. Contrary to the usual course of events and the general wish, the Virginia militia who set the infamous example which produced the destruction of our army escaped entirely. De Kalb, sustaining by his splendid example the courageous efforts of our inferior force, in his last resolute attempt to seize victory, received eleven wounds, and was made prisoner. * * The heroic veteran, though treated with every attention, * * * The British loss is said to have amounted to 80 The account of Tarleton is equally graphic: Before daybreak General Gates had made the following disposition of the American army, consisting of 2,000 Continentals and 4,000 State troops and militia. Three regiments of the Maryland line, under Brigadier-General Gist, formed the right wing. The North Carolina and Virginia Militia, commanded by Generals Caswell and Stev a Lee's Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 178, 179, 180, 182, 183. ens, composed the left wing and center. Colonel Porterfield's and Major Armstrong's light infantry were placed in the rear of the Virginia brigade of militia; Colonel Armand was ordered to support the left with his cavalry. The first Maryland brigade and the Delaware regiment, under Brigadier-General Smallwood, formed the second line and reserve. The principal part of the American artillery was posted to the left of their right wing of Continentals. The remainder was placed in the road, under the protection of their reserve. When the day broke, General Gates, not approving of the situation of Caswell's and Steven's brigades, was proceeding to alter their position. The circumstance, being observed by the British, was reported to Earl Cornwallis, who instantly, in person, commanded Webster's division to advance, and dispatched the same order by an aid-de-camp to Lord Rawdon on the left. The action became immediately general along the front, and was contested on the left and in the center with great firmness and bravery. General Gist preserved perfect order in his brigade, and, with his small arms and artillery, continued a heavy and well-directed fire upon the Thirty-third Regiment and the whole of the left division. The morning being hazy, the smoke hung over, and involved both armies in such a cloud that it was difficult to see or estimate the destruction on either side. Notwithstanding the resistance, it was evident the British moved forward. The light infantry and the Twenty-third Regiment being opposed only by militia, who were somewhat deranged by General Gates's intended alteration, first broke the enemy's front line, which advantage they judiciously followed, not by pursuing the fugitives, but by wheeling on the left flank of Continentals, who were abandoned by their militia. The contest was yet supported by the Maryland brigades and the Delaware regiment, where a part of the British cavalry, under Major Hanger, was ordered to charge their flank, whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton with the remainder of his regiment completed their confusion. Baron De Kalb, on the right of the Americans, being still ignorant of the flight of their left wing and center, owing to the thickness of the air, made a vigorous charge with a regiment of continental infantry through the left division of the British, and when wounded and taken taken would scarcely believe that General Gates was defeated. After this last effort of the Continentals rout and slaughter ensued in every quarter. Brigadier-General Gist moved off with about 100 Continentals in a body, by wading through the swamp on the right of the American position, where the British cavalry could not follow; this was the only party that retreated in a compact state from the field of battle. * * * In a pursuit of 22 miles many prisoners of all ranks, 20 ammunition wagons, 150 carriages, containing the baggage, stores, and camp equipage of the American army, fell into the hands of the victors. In the action near Camden the killed, wounded, and missing of the King's troops amounted to 324, officers included. The destruction fell principally upon the center, owing to the well-directed fire of the Continentals and the execution done by the American artillery. The Americans lost 70 officers, 2,000 men (killed, wounded, and prisoners), 8 pieces of cannon, several colors, and all their carriages and wagons containing the stores, ammunition, and baggage of the whole army, a The conduct of one of the regiments of militia at Camden merits special observation. A week after the battle, Governor Nash of North Carolina wrote to the delegates of the assembly: Since our late defeat near Camden I delayed writing till I could give you some certain account of that unhappy affair. The militia, except one North Carolina regiment, commanded on the occasion by Colonel Dixon, of the regulars, gave way on the first fire and fled with the utmost precipitation. The regulars and the regiment just mentioned bravely stood and pushed bayonets to the last. By the desertion of the militia the enemy were able to turn the left of the standing troops and to bend their whole force against them. The conflict was obstinate and bloody and lasted for fifteen minutes. In his reflection on the battle of Camden, Lee says: None, without violence to the claims of honor and justice, can withhold applause from Colonel Dixon and his North Carolina regiment of militia. Having their flank exposed by the flight of the other militia, they turned with disdain from the ignoble example, and fixing their eyes on the Marylanders, whose left they became, deter @Tarleton's Campaign in North Carolina, p. 106-109. mined to vie in deeds of courage with their veteran comrades. Nor did they shrink from this daring resolve. In every vicissitude of the battle this regiment maintained its ground, and when the reserve under Smallwood, covering our left, relieved its naked flank, forced the enemy to fall back. Colonel Dixon had seen service, having commanded a Continental regiment under Washington. By his precepts and example he infused his own spirit into the breasts of his troops, who, emulating the noble ardor of their leader, demonstrated the wisdom of selecting experienced officers to command raw soldiers." Years after the Revolution, in alluding to this same regiment, the former commander of the famous Partisan Legion plainly expressed his opinion of our military policy: Here was a splendid instance of self-possession by a single regiment out of two brigades. Dixon had commanded a Continental regiment and, of course, to his example and knowledge much is to be ascribed, yet praise is nevertheless due to the troops. While I record with delight facts which maintain our native and national courage, I feel a horror lest demagogues who flourish in a representative system of government (the best, when virtue rules, the wit of man can devise) shall avail themselves of the occasional testimony to produce a great result. Convinced as I am that a government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle, I can not withhold my denunciation of its wickedness and folly.b To return to military operations at the North, the situation was materially changed in July by the advent of a French force under Rochambeau. After getting back to New York, Clinton had planned an attack upon the French at Newport, but this was given up on account of a disagreement with the English admiral and of a demonstration against New York made by Washington. No other operations of moment took place during the campaign. Two events favorable to the American cause occurred during the yearthe joining by Spain of the French alliance, and the declaration of war against Great Britain by Holland. On the 1st of May, 1780, there were at New York 15,162 British and German troops and 2,162 Provincials; in South Carolina, 10,059 British and Germans, and 2,758 Provincials, making a total of 30,171 The following table gives the quotas assigned to the different States and the number of troops furnished by each: men. Conjectural estimate of militia in addition to the above,a [Total conjectural estimate of militia, 16,000. Grand total, 42,826. These errors in addition are here corrected.] We see from the table that the men actually sent to the Continental Army fell short of the quotas required by nearly one-half; that the militia, mostly employed in the South, outnumbered the Continentals; and that the total of troops furnished exceeded that of the previous year by a little over a thousand. BOUNTY. In 1780 the same causes tended to retard enlistments and to stimulate bounties as in former years. The enormous depreciation of the currency also contributed to the apparent increase of the bounty, which in New Jersey reached the large sum of $1,000 in excess of all Continental allowances and bounties. This depreciation caused the greatest distress among the officers, and impelled Washington to repeatedly urge that they be offered half-pay for life to induce them to remain in service till the end of the war. Congress finally adopted this recommendation on the 21st of October. REDUCTION OF THE ARMY. On the 3d of October it was resolved that after the 1st of January, 1781, the Army should consist of: Four regiments of cavalry, each of 6 troops of 64 noncommissioned officers and privates. Four regiments of artillery, with 9 companies of 65 noncommissioned officers and privates. Forty-nine regiments of infantry, with 9 companies of 64 noncommissioned officers and privates. One regiment of artificers, with 8 companies of 60 noncommissioned officers and privates. The officers of each company consisted of a captain and 2 lieutenants. The quotas were assigned as follows: New Hampshire: Two regiments of infantry. Massachusetts: Ten regiments of infantry and 1 of artillery. Connecticut: Five regiments of infantry and 1 of cavalry. New York: Two regiments of infantry and 1 of artillery. New Jersey: Two regiments of infantry. Pennsylvania: Six regiments of infantry and 1 of artillery. Delaware: One regiment of infantry. Virginia: Eight regiments of infantry, 2 of cavalry, and 1 of artillery. North Carolina: Four regiments of infantry. South Carolina: Two regiments of infantry. Georgia: One regiment of infantry. a Exact returns of militia not rendered. See Report of General Knox, Secretary of War, American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. I. Referring to the reduction of the Army, Washington, on the 11th of October, wrote to the President of Congress: I must confess, also, that it would have given me infinite pleasure if Congress had thought proper to take the reduction and incorporation of the regiments under their own direction. The mode of leaving it to the States is contrary to my sentiments, because it is an adherence to the State system, and because I fear it will be productive of great confusion and discontent; and it is requisite the business in contemplation should be conducted with the greatest circumspection. I fear also the professing to select the officers retained in service will give disgust both to those who go and to those who remain. The former will be sent away under the public stigma of inferior merit, and the latter will feel no pleasure in a present preference when they reflect that at some future period they may experience a similar fate. I barely mention this, as I am persuaded Congress did not advert to the operation of the expressions made use of, and will readily alter them." In making the reduction, Congress provided that the officers made supernumerary, as well as those who remained in service, should receive half-pay for life. DETACHED SERVICE. In the same letter, Washington refers to detached service, an evil from which our Army has suffered since its foundation to the present time. Speaking of the organization of the regiments and of the number of officers needed in each, he writes: I would therefore beg leave to propose that each regiment of infantry should consist of 1 colonel, where the present colonels are continued, or 1 lieutenant-colonel commandant, 2 majors (a first and second), 9 captains, 22 subalterns, 1 surgeon, 1 mate, 1 sergeant-major, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 45 sergeants, I drum major, 1 fife major, 10 drums, 10 fifes, 612 rank and file. Fifty regiments, at 612 rank and file each, will amount to 30,600 rank and file, the force I have stated to be requisite. The number of officers to a regiment by our present establishment has been found insufficient. It is not only inconvenient and productive of irregularities in our formation and maneuvers, but the number taken for the different offices of the staff leaves the regiments defective in field officers, and the companies so unprovided that they are obliged to be intrusted to the care of sergeants and corporals, which soon ruins them. To obviate this, I ask three field officers to a regiment besides a captain and two subalterns, to do the duty of each company, three supernumerary as paymaster, adjutant, and quartermaster, and one to reside in the State as a recruiting officer. * * * These field officers will be thought necessary when we consider the great proportion employed as adjutant-general, inspectors, brigade majors, wagon master, superintendent of hospitals; in addition to whom I would also propose a field officer to reside in each State, where the number of its regiments exceeds two, and a captain where it does not, to direct the recruiting service and transact with the State all business for the line to which he belongs, which I think would be a very useful institution. b The provision of an extra field officer to conduct the recruiting service and to transact all business with the State was an approach to the depot system now adopted throughout Europe. To lessen the evil of detaching enlisted men, a resolution was passed in March, 1779, organizing a wagoners' corps, similar in its object to the "military trains" of Europe. This resolution was repealed in April, the commander in chief being authorized to enlist for nine months, or for the next campaign, all the wagoners he might deem necessary. DEPRECIATION OF THE CURRENCY. The military policy during the Revolutionary period was so strongly influenced by the depreciation of the currency that a brief statement of its progress would seem necessary. a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 7, pp. 254, 255. b Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 7, p. 251, 252. 15836-04 -4 |