CHAPTER VII. CAMPAIGN OF 1781. Be the dangers of standing armies what they may, with the opening year came ample proof of the correctness of Washington's statement, that "It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war." MUTINY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LINE. The growing discontent of troops without pay, without clothing, and often without food, culminated, on the 1st of January, in a revolt of the Pennsylvania Line. Despite the efforts of their officers, several of whom were killed and wounded in the attempt to restore order, the mutineers, under the command of their sergeants, marched toward Philadelphia with the intention of demanding redress from the Government. Fearing that the defection might extend to the rest of the Army, Congress sent a committee, preceded by the governor of Pennsylvania, to make the following propositions to the mutineers: To discharge all those who had enlisted indefinitely for three years or during the war, the fact to be inquired into by three commissioners to be appointed by the executive and to be ascertained, where the original enlistment could not be produced, by the oath of the soldier. To give immediate certificates for the depreciation on their pay and to settle arrearages as soon as circumstances would admit. To furnish them immediately with certain specified articles of clothing which were greatly wanted." These terms which involved the complete surrender of the civil power, not to the Army, but to a band of mutineers, were accepted with the further stipulation that the enlisted men of the Pennsylvania Line should depute three additional commissioners to act with the others in determining what soldiers should be discharged. General Wayne, who commanded the troops at the time of the revolt, wrote as follows in regard to this settlement: But I could wish that the Commissioners had given time for the officers to produce the attestations before they made the oath so common. The papers were collected the soonest possible; the enlistments were generally and expressly for the war. the birds were flown. I will not say that it was not in some degree an act of expediency, in order to get the artillery, spare ammunition, and part of the small arms out of their hands. These I have taken the precaution to forward by water to Philadelphia.b As a consequence of the mutiny, the six regiments composing the quota of Pennsylvania, under the latest resolution of Congress, were @Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 7, p. 359. dissolved for the time being and did not again reassemble at the appointed rendezvous before the month of March. A similar movement on the part of the New Jersey troops was suppressed by strong military measures. MILITARY OPERATIONS. The principal events in the South, during the campaign of 1781, were Morgan's victory over Tarleton at the Cowpens and the skillful retreat of Greene through North Carolina prior to taking the offensive and fighting the battles of Guilford Court-House, Hobkirk Hill, and Eutaw Springs. Although the British in each instance remained masters of the field, these engagements were practical victories for Greene, who had been compelled to make his tactical dispositions conform to the character of his troops. Morgan's injunction to the militia at the Cowpens was, "Just hold up your heads, boys-three fires, and you are free." Avoiding the fatal mistake of Gates at Camden, the militia in this engagement were posted in two lines in front of the Continental regulars. At Guilford Court-House, where Greene made a similar disposition of his troops, three rounds only were asked of the militia, as at the Cowpens; but when the enemy came in sight the first line gave way, followed shortly after by the second. The battle was then given over to the Continental regular troops, nearly all of whom, with the exception of one regiment, were raw recruits. An incident of this battle should not be overlooked. Stevens, profiting by his experience at Camden, where he had been deserted by his brigade, placed a chain of sentinels in rear of the second line with orders to shoot the first man who should try to quit his post. While the militia as a body did not surpass the expectations of Greene and Morgan, many of the Virginia contingent, who had been former Continental soldiers, proved the worth of instruction and discipline by their individual good conduct at the Cowpens, and the same fact was illustrated at Guilford Court House by the behavior of many of the militia officers from the same State." In January Arnold ravaged the banks of the James, captured Richmond without opposition, and burnt the public buildings. After the battle of Guilford Court House Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington, and then marched to Virginia. At the north, Washington, though joined by Rochambeau, was not strong enough to attack New York. After remaining inactive until August, the two commanders marched their troops southward, joined the forces under Lafayette, and in conjunction with the French fleet, achieved at Yorktown, on the 19th of October, the crowning success of the war -the capture of Cornwallis and his army of 7,000 men. This victory proved to be the last battle of the Revolution, although it did not at the time abate Washington's preparations for another campaign. a These officers had recently held commissions in the Continental Army, and having been made supernumerary by the reduction of that establishment had been appointed to the militia by Governor Jefferson at the urgent request of General Greene. STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1781. On the 1st of September, 1781, the British forces in America were estimated as follows: STRENGTH OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY AND OF THE MILITIA IN 1781, 1782, AND 1783. The following tables show the quotas assigned to the States and the troops furnished by each during the years 1781, 1782, and 1783: @ a Accurate returns of the Continental troops and the militia were not always rendered-particularly of the militia. See report of General Knox, Secretary of War, American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 14-19. a The Army of the Northern Department was discharged on the 5th of November, 1783, and that in the Southern States on the 15th of November, 1783. (War Office of the United States, May 10, 1790. H. Knox, Secretary of War. American State Papers, Military Affairs.) The number of soldiers furnished by the several States to the Continental Army during the war was as follows: The number of militia furnished by the several States during the war, according to the returns and conjectural estimates of the Secretary of War, was 164,087." a American State Papers, vol. 1, pp. 14, 19. Total Continentals and militia furnished during the war, 395,858. If we examine these figures, it will appear that in 1776, when the aggregate number of our troops reached 89,600, the British had but 20.121, and that from that time our number steadily dwindled down to 29,340 in 1781, while the British strength constantly increased till it reached 42,075. Looking back at the whole Revolutionary struggle, notwithstanding our employment from first to last of almost 400,000 men, we find that but two military events had a direct bearing upon the expulsion of the British. One of these was the capture of Burgoyne: the other that of Cornwallis-an event which was only made possible by the cooperation of a French army and a French fleet. SUPREMACY OF THE STATES. When extravagance and disaster had ruined the credit of the Government so that Congress no longer felt able to carry on the war successfully, the project of a confederation of the States was brought forward as the only means by which the contest could be prolonged. Fortunately for our country when this change in its form of government actually took place, complications in European politics had given us powerful allies, first in France and afterwards Spain. Under the confederation, authority to arm and equip troops being left wholly to the States, they necessarily became more or less independent of Congress. In May, 1779, without consulting the Commander in Chief, the people of Boston fitted out a military and naval expedition of nearly four thousand men for the purpose of capturing a British force, seven to eight hundred strong, which had established a post near the mouth of the Penobscot. The garrison was besieged until the 13th of August, when the arrival of a British fleet compelled its assailants to destroy their transports, take to the woods, and make their way home through the wilderness as best they could. Congress having assumed later the expense of this ill-advised undertaking, its sole effect was to deplete the national treasury. Still graver complications were liable to occur under the system of confederation, as was strikingly illustrated by the action of the governor of Virginia. General Greene, while operating near Fort Ninetysix, in South Carolina, and impatiently awaiting the militia ordered by Congress, was apprised that Governor Jefferson had detained the Virginia contingent and ordered it to remain for the defense of the State. In a letter dated June 27, Greene represents the confusion and danger to which such an interference gave rise: The tardiness and finally the countermanding of the militia ordered to join this army has been attended with the most mortifying and disagreeable consequences. Had they taken the field in time and in force we should have completed the reduction of all the enemy's outposts in this country, and for want of which we have been obliged to raise the siege of Ninety-six after having the town closely besieged for upward of twenty days, and where four more would have completed its reduction. For want of the militia the approaches went on slow and the siege was rendered bloody and tedious. The high respect which I ever wish to pay to the prerogatives of every State induces me to question with all due deference the propriety of your excellency's order for countermanding the militia which were directed to join this army. No general plan can ever be undertaken with safety when partial orders may interrupt its progress. Nor is it just to the common interest that local motives should influence measures for the benefit of a part to the prejudice of a whole. I conceive * * * |