the exception of one regiment of infantry and two battalions of artillery, retained under the command of General Knox, for the defense of the Highlands. On the 17th of November the British evacuated New York, and on the 22d of December, at Annapolis, Washington resigned his commission to Congress.

PENSIONS.

From the ill-judged economy which contributed so largely during the whole war to deprive our commanders of adequate armies, we may turn with pleasure to the generosity which our Government has ever displayed toward those who have risked their lives in the national defense. The liberality of the Government in the matter of pensions has not been confined to the brave men who have been maimed in battle, or whose health has been ruined by disease, it has been justly extended to the widows and orphans of soldiers who, from whatever cause, have perished that their country might live. In proportion, too, as wars have receded, public opinion has justified Congress in the extension of pensions, until thousands of men have been added to the rolls who never saw an enemy, and whose terms of service may not have exceeded two weeks. So just, however, is the principle of pensions, and so strong in the popular mind is the determination to reward the citizen soldier, that since the early days of the Republic, but one Senator or Representative in Congress has ventured to make the slightest opposition to this important and most commendable feature of our military policy.

The statesman therefore who would relieve us from the burdens of taxation, as well as the philanthropist who would save the health, the lives, and the limbs of our people, must turn from the list of deserving pensioners to the cause, and seek by judicious and humane legislation to set on foot a military system which by lessening the demand for men, will, with equal certainty, economize both life and treasure. The statistics of the Revolution already quoted, show that our extravagance called out from first to last more than 395,000 men, all of whom, under our pension system, had a claim upon the gratitude of the nation. The greatest number of troops that Congress was able to raise during any one year of the war (1776) was 89,600 men, of whom 42,700 were militia.

The largest force, Continental and militia, that Washington could lead to battle at any one time was less than seventeen thousand, while at the battles of Trenton and Princeton, during the time of our greatest peril, his effective strength was less than four thousand.

If we now turn from the reports of the small armies in the field to the report of the Commissioner of Pensions it will be found that a feeble military policy gave us an army of pensioners numbering 95,753, of whom 39,287 were widows.

Unlike the dissolving armies in the field, the pension rolls for 1875 show that ninety-two years after the close of the war the army of the Revolutionary pensioners was still represented by 379 widows. The last Revolutionary soldier expired in 1869, eighty-six years after the close of the struggle.

The total amount paid to Revolutionary pensioners up to June 30, 1876, for periods of service of six months and over was $46,177,845.44. To widows of soldiers who served six months the total amount paid to June 30, 1876, was $19,668,795.70.

15836-04- -5

If to these figures be added $15,000,000, the approximate amount paid to invalids disabled in the Revolution, the total of pensions in round numbers amounts to $80,000,000," a sum equal to five-twelfths of the two hundred million of irredeemable currency issued by Congress, and equal to nearly one-half the debts recognized by Congress and the States at the close of the war.

EXPENSE OF THE WAR.

Exclusive of bounties paid by individuals, towns, and counties, and of provisions seized by impressinent for the use of the Army, the debt of Congress and of the States, at the close of the war, amounted to $170,000,000. If to this sum be added the two hundred millions of currency, for the redemption of which the faith of the Continental Congress and the Confederation was twice solemnly pledged, the debt actually incurred by the war amounted to $370,000,000.

Small as this sum may appear when compared with the Rebellion war debt of three thousand millions, investigation will show that the indebtedness of the Revolution was greater in proportion to population.

Assuming three millions as the total number of our people at the beginning of the Revolution, the whole cost of this war to each man, woman, and child, was $123, while, upon the basis of a population of 31,000,000 in 1861, the total cost per capita of the War of the Rebellion was but $96.

Both of these wars were waged upon the same extravagant system, and so long as we blindly adhere to it similar pecuniary sacrifices are sure to follow in the train of every great military contest of the future.

LESSONS OF THE REVOLUTION.

The lessons to be drawn from the Revolution are:

First. That nearly all of the dangers which threatened the cause of independence may be traced to the total inexperience of our statesmen in regard to military affairs, which led to vital mistakes in army legis lation.

Second. That for waging either an offensive or a defensive war a confederation is the weakest of all forms of government.

Third. That in proportion as the general government gives the States authority to arm and equip troops, it lessens the military strength of the whole people and correspondingly increases the national expenditures.

a The foregoing figures were furnished by Mr. T. A. Bentley, Commissioner of

Pensions.

The war of the Revolution left unpaid a national debt of near $360,000,000; whereas not long after the war of 1812, a debt of $123,000,000 was paid. (Ingersoll's Second War, vol. 1, p. 14).

The same writer, page 58, in speaking of the payment of the war debt of 1812, states, "Within twenty-three years afterwards, the whole debt of the United States was extinguished, with partial atonement of the nonpayment of that of the Revolution, by an expensive pension system, somewhat requiting the soldiers of the Revolution, defrauded of their pay by Continental or paper money and national insolvency."

On the same bases of population, the annual expense per capita of the Revolutionary war was $17, and that of the rebellion $24, this larger sum being due to the shorter duration of the contest.

Fourth. That the war resources of a nation can only be called forth and energetically directed by one general government to which the people owe a paramount allegiance.

Fifth. Admitting the poverty of the colonies, their want of credit, their inability to provide proper clothing, food, arms, ammunition, and other supplies for the Army; also the possibilities of a confederation which might deprive Congress of the power to enforce its requisitions-all of these considerations, instead of being accepted as reasons for adopting a feeble military policy, called for wise legislation looking to a vigorous prosecution of the war with the least expense in men and money.

Sixth. No matter what reasons may be given for the adoption of an unwise military policy, that these are powerless to diminish or modify the disastrous effects which inevitably follow.

Seventh. That when a nation attempts to combat disciplined troops with raw levies, it must maintain an army of at least twice the size of that of the enemy, and even then have no guarantee of success.

Eighth. That neither voluntary enlistments based on patriotism, nor the bounty, can be relied upon to supply men for the army during a prolonged war.

Ninth. That the draft, connected or not connected with voluntary enlistments and bounties, is the only sure reliance of a government in time of war.

Tenth. That short enlistments are destructive to discipline, constantly expose an army to disaster, and inevitably prolong war with all its attendant dangers and expenses.

Eleventh. That short enlistments at the beginning of a war tend to disgust men with the service, and force the government to resort either to bounties or the draft.

Twelfth. That regular troops, engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view the best and most economical.

Thirteenth. That when a nation at war relies upon a system of regulars and volunteers, or regulars and militia, the men, in the absence of compulsion, or very strong inducements, will invariably enlist in the organizations most lax in discipline.

Fourteenth. That troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training, and cannot be attained without the existence of a good corps of officers.

Fifteenth. That the insufficiency of numbers to counterbalance a lack of discipline should convince us that our true policy, both in peace and war, as Washington puts it, "Ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE REVOLUTION TILL THE WAR OF 1812.

Washington's solicitude in regard to our military policy did not end with the Revolutionary struggle. In taking leave of the governors of the States before resigning his commission, he wrote with a wisdom no less becoming the soldier than the statesman:

There are four things, which I humbly conceive, are essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States, as an independent power.

First. An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head;
Second. A sacred regard to public justice;

Third. The adoption of a proper peace establishment; and,

Fourth. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity; and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community.

In amplification of his views as to a proper peace establishment, he continues:

It is necessary to say but a few words on the third topic which was proposed, and which regards particularly the defense of the Republic; as there can be little doubt that Congress will recommend a proper peace establishment for the United States, in which a due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. If this should be the case, I would beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the strongest terms. The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accouterments, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed. * * *

Despite this advice, the moment independence was established, all the States hastened to resume nearly every attribute of sovereignty. So unmindful were they of the common welfare, that every measure looking to the discharge of the national debt was resisted, and remonstrance was necessary to induce them to send enough delegates to Congress to constitute a quorum for business.

The finances of the nation being completely exhausted, Congress on the 2d of June, 1784, resolved

That the commanding officer be, and he is hereby, directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates to guard the stores

at Fort Pitt and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point, and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain, and those privates to be retained who were enlisted on the best terms: Provided, That Congress before its recess shall not take other measures respecting the disposition of those troops.

This law disbanded all that remained of the Continental Army, save one battery of artillery at West Point, which was raised by Alexander Hamilton in New York in 1776, and which is now in the regular service as Battery F of the Fourth Regiment of Artillery. As the express purpose of retaining these 80 soldiers was to guard the public stores, the resolution was equivalent to a declaration that our infant republic would begin its career by entirely dispensing with a regular army.

On the following day, wholly ignoring the disasters occasioned by the employment of raw levies during the Revolution, Congress adopted the following preamble and resolution :

Whereas a body of troops to consist of 700 noncommissioned officers and privates, properly officered, are immediately and indispensably necessary for securing and protecting the northwestern frontiers of the United States, and their Indian friends and allies, and for garrisoning the posts, soon to be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty:

Resolved, That it be and it is hereby recommended to the States hereafter named, and as most conveniently situated, to furnish forthwith from their militia, 700 men, to serve for twelve months, unless sooner discharged, in the following proportions: Connecticut, 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; Pennsylvania, 260; making in the whole 700.

Resolved, That the Secretary of War take order for forming the said troops when assembled into one regiment to consist of eight companies of infantry and two of artillery, arming and equipping them in a soldier-like manner.

The officers of this mixed regiment of infantry and artillery, composed of militia from different States, consisted of 1 lieutenant-colonel from Pennsylvania, commandant; 2 majors, one from New York and one from Connecticut, commandants of companies; 8 captains, 10 lieutenants, one as adjutant; 10 ensigns, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, and 4 mates. It did not take long to convince Congress that a certain number of regular troops was indispensable. On the 1st of April, 1785, it resolvedThat it is necessary that a body of troops consisting of 700 noncommissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged, for the protection of the Northwestern frontiers, to defend the settlers on the land belonging to the United States from the depredations of the Indians and to prevent unwarrantable intrusion thereon, and for guarding the public stores.

A few days later, on the 7th and 12th of April, this important measure was supplemented by further legislation, designating the States which were to furnish the recruits and defining the organization of the new regular regiment." This was identical with that of the militia regiment of the previous year, except that there was no chaplain and that a lieutenant was to act as quartermaster and another lieutenant as paymaster.

With a view, no doubt, to induce the officers and men of the militia then in the United States service to join the new regiment, the recruits were to come from the same States which had supplied the militia contingents and similar proportions.

In various reorganizations of the Army this regiment has been retained and is now in the service as the Third U. S. Infantry.