is being accomplished by the formulation and establishment of rules that are being gradually taken out of the domain of discussion into that of general acceptance-a process in which the recent conferences at The Hague have played a great and honorable part. There is no civilized country now which is not sensitive to this general opinion, none that is willing to subject itself to the discredit of standing brutally on its power to deny to other countries the benefit of recognized rules of right conduct. The deference shown to this international public opinion is in due proportion to a nation's greatness and advance in civilization. The nearest approach to defiance will be found among the most isolated and least civilized of countries, whose ignorance of the world prevents the effect of the world's opinion; and in every such country internal disorder, oppression, poverty, and wretchedness mark the penalties which warn mankind that the laws established by civilization for the guidance of national conduct can not be ignored with impunity.

National regard for international opinion is not caused by amour propre alone not merely by desire for the approval and good opinion of mankind. Underlying the desire for approval and the aversion to general condemnation with nations as with the individual, there is a deep sense of interest, based partly upon the knowledge that mankind backs its opinions by its conduct and that nonconformity to the standard of nations means condemnation and isolation, and partly upon the knowledge that in the give and take of international affairs it is better for every nation to secure the protection of the law by complying with it than to forfeit the law's benefits by ignoring it.

Beyond all this there is a consciousness that in the most important affairs of nations, in their political status, the success of their undertakings and their processes of development, there is an indefinite and almost mysterious influence exercised by the general opinion of the world regarding the nation's character and conduct. The greatest and strongest governments recognize this influence and act with reference to it. They dread the moral isolation created by general adverse opinion and the unfriendly feeling that accompanies it, and they desire general approval and the kindly feeling that goes with it. This is quite independent of any calculation upon a physical en

forcement of the opinion of others. It is difficult to say just why such opinion is of importance, because it is always difficult to analyze the action of moral forces; but it remains true and is universally recognized that the nation which has with it the moral force of the world's approval is strong, and the nation which rests under the world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power.

These are the considerations which determine the course of national conduct regarding the vast majority of questions to which are to be applied the rules of international law. The real sanction which enforces those rules is the injury which inevitably follows nonconformity to public opinion; while, for the occasional and violent or persistent lawbreaker, there always stands behind discussion the ultimate possibility of war, as the sheriff and the policeman await the occasional and comparatively rare violators of municipal law.

Of course, the force of public opinion can be brought to bear only upon comparatively simple questions and clearly ascertained and understood rights. Upon complicated or doubtful questions, as to which judgment is difficult, each party to the controversy can maintain its position of refusing to yield to the other's arguments without incurring public condemnation. Upon this class of questions the growth of arbitration furnishes a new and additional opportunity for opinion to act; because, however complicated the question in dispute may be, the proposition that it should be submitted to an impartial tribunal is exceedingly simple, and the proposition that the award of such a tribunal shall be complied with is equally simple, and the nation which refuses to submit a question properly the subject of arbitration naturally invites condemnation.

Manifestly, this power of international public opinion is exercised not so much by governments as by the people of each country whose opinions are interpreted in the press and determine the country's attitude towards the nation whose conduct is under consideration. International opinion is the consensus of individual opinion in the nations. The most certain way to promote obedience to the law of nations and to substitute the power of opinion for the power of armies and navies is, on the one hand, to foster that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" which found place in the great Declara

tion of 1776, and, on the other hand, to spread among the people of every country a just appreciation of international rights and duties and a knowledge of the principles and rules of international law to which national conduct ought to conform; so that the general opinion, whose approval or condemnation supplies the sanction for the law, may be sound and just and worthy of respect.

ELIHU ROOT.

THE PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT AND

SOME OF ITS DIFFICULTIES

The twelfth convention adopted by the Hague Conference of 1907 provides for the establishment of an International Prize Court to which appeals may be carried in certain instances from the prize courts of the captors. The proposal for such a convention was presented very early in the proceedings of the conference. On Wednesday, June 19, at its second plenary sitting, Baron Marschall Von Bieberstein, first delegate of Germany, intimated that he had been charged by his Government to present a project which had for its object the establishment of a supreme international prize court of appeal in time of naval war. Sir E. Fry, chief delegate of Great Britain, said that he had like instructions and would gladly collaborate with Baron Marschall. "A delegate of the United States gave cordial support to the Anglo-American project." 1 On Saturday morning, June 22, the special committee dealing with arbitration and the International Committee of Inquiry met, M. Bourgeois presiding, and the separate proposals as above mentioned were submitted by Baron Marschall on behalf of Germany and Sir E. Fry on behalf of Great Britain. Two subcommittees were appointed to deal with these proposals. The German plan was for a tribunal ad hoc, to be instituted in time of war, the members to be practically nominated by the two belligerent powers. The British plan provided permanent judges and that each signatory power of the Hague convention whose mercantile marine at the date of signature of the projected agreement exceeded 800,000 tons should designate, for a place upon this tribunal, within three months after ratification of the present act, a jurisconsult of recognized competence in questions of international maritime law, enjoying the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the functions of a judge in this court.2 The advantages

1 Weekly edition of the London Times, June 21, 1907, p. 2, supplement. 2 Weekly London Times, June 23, 1907, p. 405.

claimed for the British proposal were expert and neutral judges and the establishment of the court in time of peace. When the debate

4

was opened on these proposals in the subcommittee on July 4, M. Keiroku Tsudzuki, of Japan, "hoped that the conference would first arrive at an agreement on the codification of rules affecting prize cases before instituting an international court." 3 After debate on July 11 the chairman, M. Bourgeois, recognized the existence of unanimity in favor of the establishment of a prize court" and echoed the aspirations for uniformity of prize legislation." The rival schemes were referred to a comité de redaction. It became also understood that private negotiations gave hope of an approximation of the views of the different delegations and the success of these negotiations was announced July 25.5 Finally, September 21, at its sixth plenary sitting, a joint proposition from Germany, the United States, France, and Great Britain having been presented, the conference adopted the convention for the institution of an International Prize Court of Appeal by thirty-seven votes to one (Brazil), with six abstentions (Japan, Russia, Turkey, Siam, Venezuela, and Santo Domingo). Brazil alone voted against the project, because she was dissatisfied with her share in the appointment of the judges, and Japan and Russia abstained from voting apparently on the ground that a codification of maritime law ought to precede the institution of such a court. The court provided for conformed in the main to the British proposal. It will consist of fifteen judges appointed for terms of six years. The appointees of Germany, the United States, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia will invariably be members of the court. Those appointed by other powers sit according to a scheme of rotation, being divided into six groups. A belligerent power having a case before the court may always have a judge in the court, and each nation involved is repre

3 Same, July 12, 1907, p. 2, supplement.

▲ Same, July 19, 1907, pp. 458-459; July 26, 1907, p. 468.

658.

Same, August 2, 1907, p. 2, supplement.

Same, September 27, 1907, p. 613, and Green Bag, November, 1907, pp. 654

7 Weekly London Times, August 30, 1907, p. 549. See also the excellent article by Prof. Amos S. Hershey concerning this court, giving full details of the nine articles of the convention. Green Bag for November, 1907, p. 652.