such person was not shown by the facts to be incompetent to serve as a juror in the case.

State vs. Estlinbaum, Kansas.

JUROR WHOLESALE LIQUOR DEALER COMPETENT TO SERVE ON JURY IN CASE OF SELLING TO INEBRIATE.

In this action to recover damages on account of the sale of liquor by defendant to plaintiff's husband, who, it was alleged, was in the habit of becoming intoxicated, the plaintiff cannot complain on account of the action of the court in permitting a wholesale liquor dealer to serve on the jury. There was no statute rendering him incompetent; hence his acceptance cannot be held to be error of law.

Owen vs. Cramer, Appellate Ct., Kentucky, February, 1895.

JURY FEES—NOT IMPERATIVE.—

Judge Dunne, of Chicago, overruled the demurrer to the petition for mandamus filed against Justice John K. Prindiville compelling him to issue a special venire at the instance of Charles Horn. The latter was arrested for selling liquor to a minor and before the justice demanded a jury trial, which was denied because Horn refused to pay the fees of the jurors in advance. The Court held that the issuance of a venire was not a judicial, but a ministerial act; that the offense with which Horn was charged was criminal, and hence under the law Horn was not obliged to pay the jury fees.

JUROR INCOMPETENT IF HE HAS STRONG
AGAINST SALOONS.-

PREJUDICE

A juror who states that his prejudice is strong against saloons, or that, in his opinion, to engage in the sale of liquor is an evidence of immorality, is incompetent to serve in proceedings to compel the granting of a license, even though he may also be of the opinion that he could lay his prejudice aside, and give a verdict according to the law and the evidence.

Fletcher vs. Crist (Ind.), 38 N. E. Rep. 472.

JUROR-NOT DISQUALIFIED BY TEMPERANCE SENTIMENT.—

A man's temperance sentiment does not disqualify him as a juror to sit on a case trying a man for the violation of the prohibitory law of North Dakota.

Tomlinson vs. State (N. Dak.), Sup. Ct. Decision.

CHAPTER XXI.

SCREENS.

SCREENS-LAW NOT IN CONFLICT WITH U. S. LAW.—

Under act of March 11, 1895, section 10, which provides that all the provisions of the act to regulate the sale of liquor shall apply to persons whether prosecuting business under the laws of Indiana or under the laws of the United States, a person is indictable for violation of such act, although licensed under the laws of the United States.

State vs. Mathis (Ind.), 48 N. E. Rep. 645.

SCREEN ORDINANCE-INVALID.

Under Rev. St. 1881, § 3333, empowering towns to license, regulate, or restrain the sale of intoxicating liquors, a town cannot pass a penal ordinance requiring the removal of all screens and other obstructions to the view of the interior of saloons.

Steffy vs. Town of Monroe City, Indiana, 35 N. E. Rep. 121.

SCREENS-IN INDIANA.

Under act of March 11, 1895, section 10, which provides that all the provisions of the act to regulate the sale of liquor shall apply to persons whether prosecuting business under the laws of Indiana or under the laws of the United

States, a person is indictable for violation of such act, although licensed under the laws of the United States.

State vs. Mathis (Ind.), 48 N. E. Rep. 645.

SCREEN LAW OF IOWA REFERS ALSO TO WHOLESALERS WHO GIVE AWAY LIQUORS BY THE GLASS.

Acts 25th Gen. Assem., ch. 62, § 17, subd. 3, declaring that the bar where liquors are furnished shall be in plain view from the street, unobstructed by screens, blinds, etc., applies not only to retailers, but to wholesale dealers who give away liquors by the glass to be drank on the premises. Ritchie vs. Salesky (Iowa), 67 N. W. Rep. 399.

SCREEN LAW INCLUDES HOTEL OFFICE USED AS A BARROOM.—

The law providing that during the time places where liquor is sold, or kept for sale, must be closed, all curtains, screens, etc., obstructing the view of the interior of the barroom, shall be removed, includes a barroom used also as a hotel office.

People vs. Carrel (Mich.), 76 N. W. 118.

SCREEN LAW APPLIED TO "OPEN HOUSE” IN TEXAS.

It is provided by the laws of Texas that an "open house is one in which no screen or other device is used or placed, either inside or outside of such house or place of business, for the purpose of or that will obstruct the view through the open door or place of entrance into any such house or place of business where intoxicating liquors are sold in quantities less than a quart," it is a question of fact and not opinion as to whether a screen placed in the front part of a saloon obstructs the view into the room where the liquors are sold and drunk, and the jury are to decide the question.

Mertzbacher vs. State (Ct. Crim. App. Tex.), 36 S. W. Rep. 308.

CHAPTER XXII.

BONDS.

BONDS-ARE PENAL IN MINNESOTA.

Bonds given by persons in behalf of saloonkeepers, as required under the city of St. Paul ordinances, are penal and not indemnity bonds, and the bondsmen are liable to the city for the full face of the bonds should events prove the bad character of the place and the failure of the owner to make of it a resort of good repute.

An action was brought by the city against S. Olsen's bondsmen for the recovery of $2,000, the full liability under their bonds. Olsen had been found guilty of keeping his place open for business on Sunday and fined $50 and costs. His attorney entered a demurrer to the complaint.

Judge Simpson of the district court overruled the demurrer and declared that such bonds are penal bonds on their face and that they are collectible by the city as such. The bond guarantees the good character of the place, the Court holds, and if the owner fails to make it such, a cause of action lies against the bondsmen by the city.

DEALER'S BOND-ACTION TO RECOVER NOT ABROGATED BY REPEAL OF LAW UNDER WHICH IT WAS EXECUTED.—

The right to recover the amount of a liquor dealer's bond is vested upon a violation of it, and the bond is not rendered inoperative so as to require the dismissal of a pending action thereon by the abrogation of the law under which is was executed.

State vs. Williams, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 30 S. W. Rep. 477.

LIQUOR DEALER'S BOND-MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.—

A liquor dealer's bond, providing for a penalty in case the liquor dealer permits any game prohibited by the laws of the state to be conducted on the premises must be

strictly construed; and the state cannot maintain any action thereon for the penalty when the bond is made payable to the county judge, instead of to the state, as required by act March 29, 1887.

State vs. Vinson (Tex.), 23 S. W. Rep. 807.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CORPORATIONS.

TAXING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

Each state may impose such conditions in the way of taxes, etc., upon foreign corporations or corporations formed under laws of another state seeking to do business in their jurisdiction as they may deem expedient.

People vs. Roberts, 19 U. S. S. C. Rep. 58, 1898.

CORPORATIONS-ONE STATE MAY EXCLUDE CORPORATION OF ANOTHER STATE.—

In Paul vs. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that a state might exclude a corporation of another state from its jurisdiction, and that corporations are not within the clause of the constitution which declares "that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" (Art. 4, s. 2). This, however, was not the case of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and the power of expulsion would seem not to include such. Paul vs. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.

CORPORATION LICENSE.

A question affecting liquor interests was decided by Judge Smith, of Philadelphia, in the appeal of the Schoenhofen Brewing Company from the judgment of the Quarter