article is sold or offered for sale by an agent of such corpor ation acting within the scope of his authority, and the offense is triable in the county in which such article is sold or offered for sale by such agent. OHIO PURE FOOD LAW CONSTRUED.— In the case of the state against Joseph C. Hutchinson, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that whisky is recognized by that name in the pharmacopoeia, and is a drug within the meaning of the pure food and drug statute; also, that the sale of adulterated whisky even as a beverage is an offense against the state pure food law. Afterward, Thomas Ward of Newark was arrested and fined for selling whisky under proof and artificially colored. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court to endeavor to secure a reversal of the decision in the Hutchinson case, but the court has reaffirmed its former decision. State vs. Hutchinson (Ohio), Sup. Ct., 1897. MAY RECOVER FIRE INSURANCE THOUGH HAVING NO LI CENSE. The fact of insured not having a license to sell liquor does not, prima facie, affect his right to recover on a policy covering saloon fixtures. 759. Manchester Fire Assur. Co. vs. Feibelman, (Ala.), 23 So. R. LIFE INSURANCE-RIGHT OF WOODMEN TO EXCLUDE LIQUOR DEALERS. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court in the case of Loeffler against the Modern Woodmen of America. The decision upholds the right of the Order to exclude certain classes, including wholesale liquor dealers. Loeffler joined the Woodmen some time ago and afterward became connected with a wholesale liquor firm. After paying assessments for three years he was denied the privilege of the Order and brought suit, with the above result. TAXATION-WHISKY IN BOND.— The Kentucky Court of Appeals held, in the case of Wathen et al. vs. Young, that whisky in bond cannot escape its liability to taxation, under the authority of an act passed by the legislature to enable a county to fund its indebtedness, merely because the tax (the first lien upon the whisky being to the United States Government for taxes) happened to be paid subsequent to the liquidation of the county's indebtedness, though the whisky was in existence during the period of liquidation and liable for its just proportion of the special tax. The Court said that to hold otherwise would, under the eight-year period allowed by the Federal government in which to pay its tax, often result in whisky in bond escaping its just proportion of a public burden. DEED-RESTRICTION AS TO USE OF PREMISES.— A condition in a deed, prohibiting the use of the land for the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, is binding into whosesoever hands the land may thereafter come; and the grantor may enforce a forfeiture for breach of the condition against a purchaser from the grantee, though the condition does not in express terms purport to bind the "heirs and assigns" of the grantee. Odessa Improvement & Irrigation Co. vs. Dawson (Tex.), 48 S. W. Rep. 576. DEEDS COVENANTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.— An agreement by the vendor not to allow the sale of intoxicating liquors in any building owned by him or afterward conveyed, in the same block, for a period of five years, is not such a restraint of trade as is against public policy. Anderson vs. Rowland, (Tex.), 44 S. W. Rep. 911. SALE CHANGE OF POSSESSION. A change in possession of barrels of whisky, as against attaching creditors of the seller, is not accomplished by rolling them apart from the rest of the stock in the seller's store, and marking them with the buyer's brand-the latter hav ing then no room for them in his store, but agreeing to remove them in a few days-and the good faith of the parties is immaterial. Burchinall vs. Weinberger (Colo.), 34 Pac. Rep. 911. |