thus leaving the petition without a sufficient number of signers. The prohibitionists insisted that this was contrary to law and took the matter into the courts.

On March 7, 1899, the Supreme Court held that the signers had a right to take off their names and that the petition was left insufficient to require an election.

Buchanan vs. Ferguson, Supreme Court, Tenn., 1899.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-PETITION FOR ELECTION.—

Since the local option law prescribes no requisite for a petition for a local option election, it is sufficient if it expresses in an intelligible manner the desire of the petitioners that a local option election be held.

Dillard vs. State, Texas, 20 S. W. Rep. 1106.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-MANDAMUS TO COMPEL COMMISSIONERS' COURT TO ORDER ELECTION.—

Under Rev. St. art. 3227, as amended by Acts 1893, p. 48, providing that the Commissioners' Court, upon petition of a certain number of qualified voters, shall order an election to determine whether the sale of intoxicating liquor shall be prohibited, mandamus will lie at the suit of such voters to compel the Commissioners' Court to issue the order of election, where they, without right, have refused to do so.

Kimberly vs. Morris (Tex.), 31 S. W. Rep. 808.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-LEGISLATURE CANNOT IMPOSE NEW CONDITIONS WHILE IN FORCE.

Where the local option law was in force in a precinct, the legislature could not impose by an amendatory act new burdens or obligations upon the people of that precinct pending the operation of such local option law. Ex parte Bains, 45 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 24.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-ORAL EVIDENCE OF CONTENTS ADMISSIBLE IN CASE OF LOSS OF PETITIONS TO PROHIBIT SALE OF LIQUOR IN COUNTY.—

Where, in a prosecution for selling liquor in violation of the local option law, it is shown that the various petitions to the County Commissioners' Court, asking that an

election be held in the county to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors therein, are lost, oral evidence of the contents is admissible.

Irish vs. State (Tex.), S. W. Rep. 633.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-REQUIREMENTS OF ELECTION OR

DER.

Under a local option statute providing for the submission to the people of the mere issue "For prohibition" or "Against provision," it is not necessary that the order authorizing the election should contain the statutory exceptions in favor of sales for medicinal and sacramental purposes.

Shields vs. State (Tex.), 42 S. W. R. 398.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-PLACE OF SALE.

Where defendant, while within the limits of a local option precinct, contracted to sell and received payment for several bottles of liquor, which were to be delivered, and were actually delivered, outside of such local option limits, the contract of sale is not a violation of the local option law. Weldon vs. State (Tex.), 36 S. W. Rep. 176.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-DELIVERY OF LIQUOR TO BE PAID IN KIND IS SALE.

Where defendant delivered liquor to another to be paid for in other liquor at some future time, the transaction was a sale within the law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within a local option district.

Keaton vs. State (Tex.), 36 S. W. Rep. 440.

LOCAL OPTION-TEXAS-ONE MAY KEEP LIQUOR FOR AN

OTHER.

The act making criminal the keeping of intoxicating liquors in cold storage for another in a local option district, is repugnant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing to every citizen the free use and exercise of property.

Ex parte Brown, 42 S. W. 554.

LOCAL

EXEMPTION CONSTITU

OPTION-TEXAS-PARTIAL

TIONAL.

Revised Statutes 1895, authorizing the submission of the question of local option to a vote, is not unconstitutional because it exempts from the operation of the law wine used for sacramental and medicinal purposes.

Sparks vs. State (Tex.), 45 S. W. 493.

LOCAL OPTION-NORTH CAROLINA-NO VESTED RIGHT ACQUIRED BY DEALERS.

There is no vested right acquired by those engaged in the liquor traffic which prevents its being forbidden as provided in Laws of 1897.

Guy vs. Commissioners (N. C.), 29 S. E. 771.

CHAPTER III.

PLACE OF SALE.

PLACE OF SALE-INTERNAL REVENUE RULING.—

The Internal Revenue Commissioner on January 13, 1890, made the following ruling:

"I am of the opinion that when a person makes a bona fide offer to purchase goods, and directs in the same order that the goods shall be sent by a common carrier, or any one else, to a place designated by him, the price to be paid at the place of delivery, and the order is accepted by the seller, and the goods are separated from the other goods of the seller as the goods of the purchaser, and are delivered to the carrier with instructions to deliver to the purchaser at the place named by him, and collect the purchase money at that place, that the place of sale, under the law of Congress imposing a special tax upon wholesale dealers, is the point at

which the goods are ordered and set apart and delivered to the carrier. The true test is, was the offer on the part of the purchaser a bona fide one to buy, and was it so accepted by the seller? If the purchaser should decline to receive the goods and pay for them, could the seller maintain an action for the price thereof?"

PLACE OF SALE-SALE TREATED AS MADE WHERE COMPLETED BY DELIVERY.

As ruled in Mathews vs. State, 1894, 18 S. E. Rep. 996, the authority to grant licenses to sell spirituous liquors in Putnam County is vested exclusively in the commissioners of roads and revenues of that county. Delivery, whether made by the seller or his employe, if requisite to complete a sale the contract for which, with payment of the purchase price, was made elsewhere, is contrary to law if the seller has no license authorizing him to sell in the county where the delivery takes place. In such case the sale is to be treated as made, not where the contract was entered into, and the purchase money paid, but where it was completed by delivery.

Doster vs. State (Ga.), 18 S. E. Rep. 997.

PLACE OF SALE-DISTANCE FROM CHURCH OR SCHOOL MEASURED IN DIRECT LINE.—

Under acts 25th Gen. Asem., ch. 63, providing that the business of selling intoxicating liquors shall not be conducted within 300 feet of any church or school building, the distance must be measured on a direct line, and not by the traveled route.

State vs. Greenway (Iowa), 61 N. W. Rep. 239.

PLACE OF SALE-WHERE DELIVERED TO CARRIER.

Upon order by letter, to be shipped C. O. D., place of sale is where goods are delivered to carrier. Prohibitory laws of buyer's residence do not apply.

Commonwealth vs. Kearns, Kentucky.

PLACE OF SALE-WHERE DELIVERED TO CARRIER.—

Where goods are shipped C. O. D. on request, actual or implied, into a local option county, law of latter county does not apply. The actual sale occurs in county from which shipped.

James vs. Commonwealth, Kentucky.

PLACE OF SALE-WHERE AGENT LIVES WHEN GOODS SENT IN GROSS AND DELIVERED SEVERALLY BY AGENT.—

Where an agent, working on a monthly salary, at A, takes individual orders for beer, and sends them to his principal at B, and the orders are shipped in gross to the agent at A, and he delivers the individual orders, collects the money for them, and forwards it to his principal, the sales are made at A.

People vs. De Groot (Mich.), 69 N. W. Rep. 248.

PLACE OF SALE-GOVERNS, AND LAWS OF PLACE TO WHICH LIQUORS SHIPPED HAVE NO EFFECT.—

Where liquors are bought in one county and directions given for shipment to another county, sale takes place in former county, and laws of the county to which they are to be shipped can have no application.

Aberle vs. Administrator U. S. Dist. Ct., Minn., 1896.

PLACE OF SALE-LEGALITY DEPENDS UPON WHETHER MIDDLEMAN WAS AGENT OF PERSONS ORDERING LIQUOR, OR OF DEALER.

Defendant, in a local option city, told persons they could order liquor from a dealer in another city, and gave them blank orders, which they filled out, signed and gave to him to forward. They instructed the dealer to send a certain quantity of liquor to the signers in the care of defendant. The liquor was shipped to defendant, who delivered it part at a time, receiving the money for such part as he delivered. Held, that if defendant acted as agent of the persons who ordered the liquor, he was not guilty of selling, but if he acted as agent of the dealer he was guilty.

State vs. Wingfield (Mo.), 22 S. W. Rep. 363.