that one may not conflict with the other in matters of police regulations.

Santa Clara Supervisors vs. G. Sherrer, Sup. Court, California, October, '94.

MUNICIPAL POWER-MAY BE DELEGATED BY STATE.

The general rule is that a state legislature has authority to regulate, control and restrain the traffic in intoxicating liquors within its own borders. Such authority belongs to the police power of the state, and may, subject to constitutional restrictions, be delegated to the local legislative bodies of municipal corporations.

Keilkope vs. City of Denver, Colo., 25 Pac. Rep. 535.

MUNICIPAL POWER-COUNTY IN GEORGIA CANNOT LEVY ARBITRARY TAX.—

The Supreme Court of Georgia has decided that a county can exercise only such powers as are conferred on it by law; therefore, when the county authorities of a given county imposed an arbitrary tax of fifty dollars for the year 1897 on all dealers in spirituous or malt liquors, etc., doing business in that county, relying for the power so to do upon the provisions of section 405, the imposition of such tax was unlawful.

Albany Bottling Co. vs. Commissioners, 1898.

MUNICIPAL POWER-ORDINANCE AGAINST SOLICITING ORDERS OVERRULED BY STATUTE OF STATE ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

Although soliciting orders was, by a valid municipal ordinance, made an offense against the corporation, at a time when such an act was not indictable under the criminal laws of this state, the subsequent enactment by the General Assembly of a statute making this identical act a crime or misdemeanor deprived the municipal authorities (they having no jurisdiction over state offenses) of the power to try and punish offenders for committing the act in question.

Strauss vs. Mayor, etc., of Waycross, Ga., 25 S. E. Rep. 329.

MUNICIPAL POWER-CITY MAY PROHIBIT DRUNKENNESS BY

ORDINANCE.—

Where express authority is given to a city by its charter to prohibit drunkenness within its borders, an ordinance passed in pursuance of that power prohibiting public drunkenness is constitutional, as an exercise of a proper delegation of the police power.

City of Gallatin (Mo.) vs. Tarwater, 44 S. W. 750.

MUNICIPAL POWER-CANNOT PROHIBIT SALE OF HOP TEA.

A city ordinance prohibiting the sale of hop tea and other liquors containing alcohol.in insufficient quantities to intoxicate, and commonly used as a beverage, is unauthorized and void.

Grant vs. City of Fontana (Kansas), 50 Pac. 104.

MUNICIPAL POWER-STATE PROHIBITION IN KANSAS DOES NOT PREVENT ENACTMENT OF CITY ORDINANCES.

The passage of the prohibitory liquor law by the state legislature does not prevent cities from enacting ordinances providing for the control of the liquor traffic within the limits of such cities.

In re Thomas, Kan., 37 Pac. Rep. 171.

MUNICIPAL POWER-ORDINANCE VOID IN ONE PART, NOT INVALIDATED IN OTHER PROVISIONS.—

A provision of a county ordinance, which undertakes to prescribe the punishment of a person conducting a saloon without a license, and which is void as being in contravention of Pen. Code, §§ 19, 435, which fix such punishment, does not invalidate the other provisions of the ordinance; hence, on a conviction thereunder, the punishment fixed by the statute may be imposed.

Ex parte, Stephen, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 86.

MUNICIPAL POWER-AUTHORITY TO DESTROY LIQUOR IN ANTICIPATION OF RIOT DENIED.

The power of a city council to order the destruction of all intoxicating liquors in the city, and pledge the faith of the city to pay for them, in anticipation of riot, lawlessness

and mob, as in the evacuation of Richmond in April, 1865, is denied in Wallace vs. Richmond (Va.), 36 L. R. A., 554, overruling the prior decision in that state which had been followed by the Supreme Court of the United States in another case growing out of similar facts.

MUNICIPAL POWER-ORDINANCE EXCEEDS CHARTER POWERS WHERE IT REVOKES LICENSE FOR SUNDAY SELLING.

A conviction for the violation of an ordinance against the sale of intoxicating liquor by a retail liquor dealer on Sunday, which operates as a revocation of the license of the liquor dealer, is void, and the ordinance which confers upon the conviction such an operation is also void, as not being within the chartered powers of the common council to enact.

State vs. Mayor of City of Rahway, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 5.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-AUTHORITY TO SELL LIQUOR

INJUNCTION.

Neither the "general welfare clause," usually found in the charters of towns or cities, nor the special power "to license and regulate the management of barrooms, saloons," etc., includes the power to run and operate barrooms and saloons, or to otherwise embark the municipal corporation having authority to exercise such powers only, either in the business of selling liquor or in any other commercial enterprise. The exercise of such a power, being inconsistent with the purposes for which municipal corporations are ordinarily organized, must rest upon express legislative authority, and, in the absence of such authority, such a power does not exist.

Mayor, etc., of town of Leesburg vs. Putnam, (Ga.), 29 S. E. Rep. 602.

CHAPTER IX.

SOUTH CAROLINA DISPENSARY ACT.

STATE DISPENSARY-LIQUOR MAY BE SHIPPED TO INDIVIDUALS FOR THEIR OWN USE IN SOUTH CAROLINA.

On May 9, 1898, the South Carolina liquor law was again made the subject of a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which was handed down by Justice White. The state dispensary law having been amended since the decisions holding it invalid, the decision deals with the new law. This law attempted to discriminate against other states in the shipment of liquor to individuals for their own use in South Carolina, but, while this inhibition was eliminated and the privilege restored in the new law, it was coupled with conditions of inspection which, it was claimed, still amounted to discrimination. The Court in their decision accepted this view of the case, holding that the inspection provision of the law was tantamount to a denial of the right of interstate commerce and, therefore, antagonistic to the constitution of the United States. The Court held, however, that the portion of law regulating the sale of original packages within the state was valid.

Vance & Scott vs. the Vandercook Co. of California.

STATE

DISPENSARY-CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMERCE-INTOXICATING LIQUORS—.

LAW-INTERSTATE

There is no power in a state to forbid the importation of intoxicating liquors, either under the Wilson act of 1890, or independently thereof, and one who merely brings barrels of liquor into a port of South Carolina, and unloads them on the dock, cannot be punished under the state dispensary law.

Ex parte Edgerton, U. S. C. C. (S. Car.), 59 Fed. Rep. 115. STATE DISPENSARY-LIQUOR IN PRIVATE HOUSE.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina has rendered a decision which affirms that no man may keep liquor in his

house or place of business for a lawful purpose, such as personal use, unless the vessel in which it is kept has a certificate upon it from the State Liquor Commissioner.

STATE DISPENSARY-INTERSTATE COMMERCE.—

Where one purchases intoxicating liquor for his own use from persons outside the state, and carries it into the state, and does not comply with the regulations of the dispensary law of 1895 after his arrival in the state, such liquor is "contraband," within Dispensary Act, March 6, 1896, § 37, providing that "any person handling contraband liquors in the night time or delivering the same shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

State vs. Holleyman, S. Car., 31 S. E. Rep. 362.

STATE DISPENSARY-MONOPOLIES.

The act of July 2, 1890, to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, is not applicable to the case of a state which, by its laws, assumes an entire monopoly of the traffic in intoxicating liquors (Act S. C., Jan. 2, 1895). A state is neither a "person" nor a "corporation," within the meaning of the act of Congress.

Lowenstein vs. Evans, U. S. C. C. (S. Car.), 69 Fed. Rep. 908.

STATE DISPENSARY-CANNOT OVERRIDE INTERSTATE COM

MERCE.

The South Carolina dispensary act, approved December 24, 1892, (section 25), providing that intoxicating "liquor intended for unlawful sale in this state may be seized in transit and proceeded against as if it were unlawfully kept and deposited in any place," does not authorize a constable to seize without warrant a package of liquor shipped from without the state, and stored within the state, prior to the statute taking effect, in the warehouse of a railway company, in the charge of a receiver appointed by a United States court, and kept therein without concealment.

Bound vs. South Carolina Ry. Co., U. S. C C. (S. Car.), 57 Fed. Rep. 485.