Shortly after retiring from the office of Commissioner and returning to the practice of law in Washington, I prepared and published a little volume on the general subject of federal taxation, from which I think the following would be of general interest as to the uses of taxable alcoholic spirits, tobacco, and other things, from which the Government derives such a tremendous revenue. It is estimated that there are fifty drinks of whiskey in a gallon, the tax therefore on an ordinary drink of whiskey, is 2c. The record justifies an estimate of nineteen million drinks of whiskey taken in the United States every day, and the tax on the distilled spirits thus consumed in the United States in ten days would build a modern United States battleship.

The tax on a cigar is three-tenths of one cent. Every day the smokers of cigars in the United States consume about twenty million cigars and pay sixty thousand dollars into the United States Treasury daily. The tax on ordinary cigarettes is one dollar and eight cents per thousand. Every day the cigarette smokers in the United States consume approximately eight and onehalf million cigarettes and pay daily into the country's treasury nearly ten thousand dollars. The smokers of cigars and cigarettes pay, therefore, every day seventy thousand dollars into the Federal Treasury.

The tax on a pound of smoking or chewing tobacco is six cents. There is an average of one hundred and twenty "chews" of tobacco in a pound. Our Federal Government therefore gets onetwentieth of one cent per "chew." The consumers of chewing and smoking tobacco therefore pay into the Treasury sixty thousand dollars a day.

There were over twenty-five million packs of playing cards sold during the fiscal year of 1913, from which a tax of more than half a million dollars was collected, an amount entirely adequate to support the Military Academy at West Point.

The recent report of the present Commissioner of Internal Revenue shows that during the last fiscal year there was collected through the imposition of federal taxation, three hundred and forty-five million dollars ($345,000,000.), in round numbers, an increase of $23,000,000 over the prior fiscal year, this being due however to some extent, to the additional amount collected from the Corporation Excise Tax Law. The articles of taxation furnishing the additional increase in collections for the last year being: distilled spirits, $7,500,000; manufactured tobacco, includ

ing cigars, cigarettes and snuff, over $6,000,000; fermented liquors, beer, ale, etc., nearly $3,000,000; and from the Corporation Tax Law, $6,500,000.

One feature in connection with the collection of so great an amount of revenue which is worthy of attention, primarily to bankers, lawyers, and collection agencies, is found in the fact that at no time has it cost more than 2% of the amount collected, for its entire collection. The amount for collection has ranged from 1.92% down to 1.60%. Such a record of making collections at the least possible cost, bears tribute to the business methods of at least one of the federal departments. Especially is this true, when it is remembered that customs or tariff duties are paid when taxable articles come into this country and the internal revenue tax is collected on the article manufactured in this country, it would seem that the internal revenue tax would be the more difficult to collect, and, therefore, the cost of collection greater. The reverse is true, however, and is due to several causes, among them being the comparatively few articles upon which internal revenue tax is imposed, and the manner of indicating that the tax has been paid. The principal cause, however, is the difference in the number of people who are benefited or could be benefited by violating the law.

Any one who wants to consume or use a foreign made article would be benefited in a financial way, if he could get that article into the country free of duty. Governent officials are therefore expected to prevent violations of the customs laws.

On the other hand, as regards articles upon which internal revenue tax is imposed, the manufacturer or dealer might be interested in evading the tax, but never the consumer.

In the case of the internal revenue tax, therefore, it is limited to the manufacturers of and the dealers in the objects of taxation.

This review is sufficient to suggest at once at least one reason for the opposition to prohibition not only in some of the states, but in the National Congress, when that question is suggested there, as it now is, by the extereme and unusual proposal for an amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibiting the sale or manufacture of distilled or malt liquors in any form throughout the United States. That is, the taxpayers naturally wonder in what way and from what source three hundred and fifty million dollars a year would be raised to take the place of the portion of

that enormous amount which represents the tax on whiskey, brandy, gin, wines and beer. Although of course there are minor objects of taxation which go to make up the above total, that is, tobacco in all of its forms, oleomargarine, adulterated and process butter, filled cheese, mixed flour, playing cards, and penalties or fines collected in connection with violations of the law, this last item amounting to something over half a million dollars a year.

In conclusion it should be borne in mind that the Corporation Tax Law, passed only a few years ago, to "provide revenue, equalize duties and encourage the industries of the United States and for other purposes", has now become a part of and is worked into, the recent law which is commonly known as the Income Tax Law, passed by Congress October 3rd, 1913. That law of course goes ever so much more into the taxation of the individual than its predecessor, the Corporation Tax Law, although the constitutionality of the Income Tax Law is being challenged now by several cases pending in the Supreme Court of the United States. Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Bureau is proceeding with great activity under the provisions of that Act, and it is the hope of those who framed the law and brought about its passage through Congress, that many millions of dollars will be added to the Federal Treasury through that source.

Washington, D. C.

John G. Capers.

Published monthly during the Academic year, by students of the Yale Law School. P. Ó. Address, Drawer Q, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.

If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his subscription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a continuation of the subscription is desired.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT BY NONFEASANCE

In the case of Whittaker v. Sanford, decided by the Supreme Court of Maine in the summer of 1913, the defendant, Frank Sanford, was the founder and leader of a religious sect, by which he was regarded as the second Elijah, who was to have temporal power over all the earth, and prepare it for the second coming of Chirst. The plaintiff's husband was a minister of this sect, and the plaintiff herself had been a member for some years. The society had two colonies, one in Jaffa, Syria, the other in Shiloh, Maine; and they owned two sailing yachts, which served to transport the faithful between these colonies. While in Jaffa, the plaintiff had decided to renounce the sect, and to return to America by steamer. The defendant offered her transportation on the yacht "Kingdom", and promised that her liberty should not be restrained in any way. The jury found that after the arrival of the yacht in South Freeport harbor, the plaintiff was detained on board for nearly a month, by the simple means of refusing to provide a boat for her passage to the shore; and that defendant's influence over his officers and crew, who were all members of the 1 110 Me. 77.

sect, and over the plaintiff's husband was such that with them his word was law. They also found however that no direct force or threats of force were employed, and that the plaintiff was treated as a guest, with due courtesy and respect. On these facts, the form of action being on the case, the Supreme Court held that Sanford was guilty of a false imprisonment. The Court held further that while physical restraint is essential to this action, a force exercised upon the person is not.

In the case of Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal & Coke Co., decided on appeal in the King's Bench in the summer of 1913, it was held by a divided court that a mine owner's refusal to supply means for the plaintiffs', his employees, who had wrongfully quit work, to leave the mine, although the cage was idle for a short time during their detention, was not false imprisonment.2

Here are two cases in which it is held, in the one by the full court, in the other by a minority of the court, that when A is confined on B's premises (to which position the act of B contributed to bring him, although it does not appear that that is essential), there is a positive duty upon B to extricate him. This duty, moreover, does not arise out of any contract, but the breach of it is apparantly a tort. Contrast this duty with the ordinary duty not to imprison another falsely.

Judge Cooley, in his treatise on "The Elements of Torts", defines false imprisonment to consist "in imposing by force or threats an unlawful restraint upon a man's freedom of movement." Analyzing this definition, we find three essential elements, the restraint, the illegality, which must mean simply the lack of just cause or excuse, and the means employed, which must be force or threats. There is no doubt that the first two elements were present in both cases stated above, and it is with the third that we are concerned here. Let us examine a few cases, to see how they have satisfied this third requirement.

In the case of Fotheringham v. Adams Express Co., the defendant's detectives were in constant attendance upon the plaintiff for about two weeks, and although they never laid hands on him, he knew perfectly well that if he attempted to get away he would be restrained. Here certainly we have positive physical acts, which

23 K. B. 771 (June, 1913).

8 P. 50, tit. False Imprisonment. 4 36 Fed. R. 252.